IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Supreme Court Case No. 46171
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN

ANITA M. E. MOORE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü
Ü

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
Aaron Eugene Lantis
╘╘╘╘Defendant.

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:

Ada County Magistrate Court
Lojek, Michael W.
03/07/2017
PRE-FILE01-17-1414
Appellate Case Number: 46171 -2018
Police Reference Number: 16-114255
Prosecutor Control Number: 2016-0003781

CASE INFORMATION
Offense
Jurisdiction: County
1. Disturbing the Peace

Case Type: Criminal

Statute

Deg

Date

I18-6409

MIS

07/04/2016 Case Flags: No Contact Order Outstanding
Ada County Prosecutor

Warrants
Arrest Warrant - Lantis, Aaron Eugene (Judicial Officer: Clerk, Magistrate Court )
05/15/2017
12:48 PM
Warrant Returned Served
05/13/2017
12:42 PM
Served by Sheriff- Paperwork Return Pending
04/28/2017
9:04 AM
Outstanding Arrest Warrant
04/28/2017
9:04 AM
Pending Judge's Signature
Fine:
$68.5
Bond:
$5,000.00
Any
Bonds
Surety Bond
5/8/2017
12/1/2017
Counts: 1

#AC5-7535347 $5,000.00
Posted
Exonerated

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CR01-17-07609
Ada County Magistrate Court
07/24/2018
Lojek, Michael W.

PARTY INFORMATION
State

State of Idaho

Defendant

Lantis, Aaron Eugene

DATE
03/07/2017
03/07/2017
03/07/2017
03/07/2017

Lead Attorneys
Swenson, David Garrett
208-287-7700(W)
Moore, Anita Marie Elizabeth
Public Defender
208-287-7400(W)
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

INDEX

Initiating Document - Pre-File Case

•

Criminal Complaint

•

Summons Issued (Criminal)

Summons
Lantis, Aaron Eugene
Returned Unserved
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ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609
03/17/2017
03/17/2017

ll Summons Returned - Unserved (Criminal)

04/27/2017

Probable Cause Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Steckel, Daniel L.)

04/28/2017

Warrant/Det Order Issued - Arrest

05/15/2017
05/15/2017

05/15/2017

05/17/2017

05/17/2017
05/17/2017
05/17/2017
05/17/2017
05/19/2017
06/13/2017

06/13/2017

06/16/2017

06/20/2017
06/20/2017
06/20/2017
08/03/2017

08/10/2017
08/11/2017

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Warrant Returned - Served

Bond Receipt and Court Date
5/17/17
Bond Posted - Surety
AC5-7535347 Canyon County

CANCELED Clerk Bond Out Appearance (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Clerk, Magistrate
Court)
Vacated
Advisement of Rights
Application for Public Defender

Order Appointing Public Defender
Notice of Hearing
Request for Discovery

Request for Discovery
Request for Discovery
Response to Request for Discovery
Discovery response to court
Response to Request for Discovery
/ Addendum

Pre-trial Conference (9:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
Trial Status Memo
No Contact Order

Response to Request for Discovery
/Second Addendum
Amended Complaint Filed

•

Jury Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
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ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609
08/11/2017

08/11/2017
08/11/2017
08/11/2017

•
•
•
•
•
•

Motion for Reconsideration
of Motion in Limine
Notice of Intent to Present 404b Evidence At Trial

Jury Trial Started
Pretrial Memorandum

08/11/2017

Notice of Hearing

08/11/2017

Verdict form

08/11/2017
08/11/2017
08/14/2017

Court Minutes
Jury Instructions Filed

ll Jury Packet

Jury Trial Work Product Documentation- Misc Documents

08/14/2017
08/25/2017

08/31/2017
09/25/2017

10/10/2017

10/12/2017

10/31/2017

10/31/2017
11/01/2017

•

Exhibit List/Log

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Motion
for judgement of acquittal
Scheduling Order

Objection
to Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Reply
to State's Objection to Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Notice
of Hearing
Oral Argument (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
Motion for Acquittal
Court Minutes

Order
Denying Motion for Acquittal

11/28/2017

Sentencing (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)

11/28/2017

Disposition (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
1. Disturbing the Peace
Guilty (After Trial)
TCN: :
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ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609
11/28/2017

11/28/2017
11/28/2017

11/28/2017
11/28/2017
11/28/2017

Sentence (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
1. Disturbing the Peace
Misdemeanor Sentence
Condition - Adult:
1. Supervised Probation, Obey all laws. Maintain Contact w/Probation. Comply
w/sentence including fine payment., $75, 1Y, 11/28/2017 - 11/27/2018, 11/28/2017
2. Unsupervised Probation, Obey all laws. Notify Court of change of address., 1Y,
11/27/2018 - 11/27/2019, 11/28/2017
Confinement
Type:
Facility: Ada County Jail
Term: 180 Days
Suspended: 163 Days
Effective Date: 11/28/2017
Pre-Sentence Credit for Time Served
Credit Term: 2 Days
Other:
Comment: No Options on first 3 days- forthwith All options on remaining
12 days
Fee Totals:
Public Defender
750.00
Fee
Fee Totals $
750.00
Comment (Destroy pictures)

•
•
•
•

Judgment of Conviction
Supervised Probation Ordered
Charges: 1
Remanded
No Contact Order

•

Court Minutes

11/28/2017

Case Final Judgment Entered

12/01/2017

Plea (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
1. Disturbing the Peace
None
TCN: :

12/05/2017

12/05/2017
12/06/2017

12/07/2017

12/08/2017

•
•
•
•
•

Motion
for Stay of Execution of Sentencing Pending Appeal
Notice of Appeal

Notice
of Reassignment
Order
Staying Execution of Sentence Pending Appeal
Order
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ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609
Governing Procedure on Appeal
12/13/2017

01/03/2018

01/03/2018

01/04/2018

01/22/2018

01/22/2018

02/23/2018

02/23/2018

02/26/2018

02/27/2018

03/26/2018

03/30/2018

04/02/2018

04/26/2018
04/26/2018
05/10/2018

06/14/2018

•
•

Notice of Preparation of Transcript
Appeal
Order
Conditional Dismissing Appeal

•

Memorandum
for the Record (Conditional Order Filed in Error)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Order
Conditional Order Dismissing Appeal - RESCINDED
Notice
of Lodging Appeal Transcript
Transcript Lodged
Appeal 8.11.17
Motion
to Extend Time to File Brief of Appllant
Affidavit in Support of Motion
to Extend Time
Objection
Objection to Motion to Extend Time to File Brief of Appellant
Brief Filed
Brief of Appellant
Brief Filed
of Respondent
Reply
Reply Brief of Appellant
Notice of Hearing
(4-26-18 @ 3:30pm)(Oral Argument)
Oral Argument (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Schroeder, Gerald F.)
Court Minutes

Review Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Schroeder, Gerald F.)
(Judges Review / Decision)
Decision or Opinion
on Appeal

06/18/2018
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ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT

CASE SUMMARY

•
•
•
•
•

CASE NO. CR01-17-07609

Notice of Hearing

06/28/2018

06/28/2018
07/02/2018

07/23/2018
07/23/2018

Review Hearing (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
Re: Opinion on Appeal- Defendant's Presence Excused
Pretrial Memorandum

Objection
to Dismissal and Memorandum in Support

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
Notice
of Appeal

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Defendant Lantis, Aaron Eugene
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 9/14/2018

1,504.00
195.00
1,309.00
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JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Whitney Welsh
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STA TE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.
_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR0l-17-

7/oO/

COMPLAINT

PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE me this

_J_ day of March, 2017, Whitney

Welsh, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State ofldaho, who, being first
duly sworn, complains and says that: AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of July,
2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime(s) of DISTURBING THE
PEACE, MISDEMEANOR, I.C. § 18-6409 as follows:
That the defendant, AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of July, 2016, in
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, towit Hillary Henslee, by offensive and/or threatening conduct, by sending sexually suggestive
pictures of Hillary Henslee to her employer(s).

COMPLAINT (LANTIS) Page 1
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All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and against
the peace and dignity of the State ofldaho.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By:
i y Welsh
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

.
SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this

I

JI-,
day of

~

Magistrate

COMPLAINT (LANTIS) Page 2
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MAY 15 ·2017

DR#: 16-114255
OFFICER:
AGENCY:

CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk
By RACHAEL WEATHERBY
DEPurv

--1

•:,1•

.•,,.

:.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Whitney Welsh
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.

)

)
)
) Case No. CR0l-17-07609 - \
)
) ARREST WARRANT
)
)
)

__________ )
Address: 1856 W MOUNTAIN POINTE AVE., NAMPA, ID 83651
Sex: MALE Race:
Height: 6 Ft. 0 In. Weight: 205 Lbs.
Hair/Eyes: BLOND OR STRAWBERRY/BLUE
TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL OR POLICEMAN IN THE STATE OF
IDAHO:
A COMPLAINT UPON OATH having been this day laid before me by Brian Aune, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney, stating that the crime(s) of DISTURBING THE PEACE, MISDEMEANOR, LC.
§18-6409 have been committed, and accusing AARON EUGENE LANTIS thereof and having found
probable cause;
ARREST WARRANT (Lantis) Page 1

RECEIVED
Ada County: Sheriff
WARAANTS

APR 2! 2017
000010
Stephen Bartlett,
Sheriff •-·
BOISE ID
0
r

•
i·

YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to immediately arrest the defendant named above
\

at any time during the day or night, and to bring him/her before me at my office in the County of Ada, qr
in case of my absence or in.ability to act, before the nearest or most accessible Magistrate . Ada County., :

DATED thiffl_day of April, 2017.

,,

Magistrate for the Distric Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Magistrate Division
Bond$

VJ} OO(?

-

RETURN OF SERVICE

• ..i

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served the foregoing Warrant by arresting the defendant and
bringing _ _ _ into Court this __ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __, 2017.

(Deputy Sheriff) (State Policeman)
(City Policeman)

ARREST WARRANT (Lantis) Page 2
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,_
COMMITMENT FOR EXAMINATION AFTER APPEARANCE
THE WITHIN NAMED Defendant, having been brought before me under this Warrant, is

committed for examination to the Sheriff of Ada County, State of Idaho, and is admitted to bail in the sum
of$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __, surety, cash or by undertaking of two sufficient sureties, and is committed
to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County until such bail is given. This Cause is continued for further
appearance until _ _ _ _ day of _ _ _ __, 2017.

Magistrate for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Magistrate Division
ORDER OF RELEASE

(1

·'

TO THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO:
YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to release the Defendant from your custody.
DATED: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Magistrate for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Magistrate Division
NCICENTRY:

(Additional Levels Inclusive)

□ Idaho Only
□ North West Shuttle (ID, WA, OR)
□

Western States (ID, WA, OR, MT, CA, WY, SD, ND, UT, CO, AZ, NV)

D Nationwide
BY: - - - - - - - DATED: _ _ _ _ __

ARREST WARRANT (Lantis) Page 3
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NOTICE SETTING DATE AND TIME FOR COURT APPEARANCE
Case# CR011707609

You have been released on bail bond which has been filed with the Sheriff of Canyon County for
delivery to the Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the StatM1.!.f~Id~a~ho~,..LinL!.-:::-:;::-----and for the County of Canyon.
A.M

°l ,_, ~---MAY 15 ,2017

You are notified herewith that you MUST appear in said Court, located at:

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By RACHAEL WEATHERBY
DEPUTY

0 1115 Albany Street, Caldwell Idaho, second floor

200 W FRONT ST BOISE ID 83702
Add ress _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

@) Other County ADA COUNTY

9
On(date) 0511712017
atthehourof :00AM
foryourarraignment.
Your failure to appear will result in the forfeiture of your bond and in the
issuance of a Bench Warrant for your arrest.

8
Dated this _ _ _ _day of~M_a""""y'---------'I 20 _!.:_

BOND & RELEASE INFORMATION
LANTIS AARON E
Ph
N 707-299-0026
' N
D efiendant s a m e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ one o ~ - - - - -

Addres 1707 S 26TH ST NAMPA ID 83686
Arrest N O 17-003407 / 334284

Charge ADA CO HOLD

NPD
. A
Arrestmg gency_ _ _ _ _ __

Type of Bond:

@)Surety Bond

Qcash Bond

Surety Bonding Agent JEREMY ALVAREZ/ALADDIN

O Book & Release

50_0_0_ _ __
Bond Amount ~$_

Phone 323-2245

Copy to File .[]_ Copy to Defendant[]

Copy to Court 0--
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Filed: May 17. 2017 at 8:53 AM
By:

Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
'Bret\da,,'R,~ Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CR01-17-07609
Notice of Appointment of Public Defender and
Setting Case for Hearing

Aaron Eugene Lantis
Defendant.
TO: Ada County Public Defender

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you are appointed to represent the defendant in this
cause, or in the District Court until relieved by court order. The case is continued for AC
Pretrials (Hawley/Lojek) on June 20, 2017, at 9:15 AM Judge Hawley/Lojek.
TO: Aaron Eugene Lantis

IT HAS BEEN ORDERED BY THIS COURT that the defendant is to contact the Ada County
Public Defender's Office at 200 W Front St #1107 Boise, ID 83702. Telephone: (208) 287-7400.
If the defendant is unable to post bond and obtain his/her release from jail that the proper
authorities allow the defendant to make a phone call to the Ada County Public Defender.
IT HAS BEEN FURTHER ORDERED: That the parties, prior to the pre-trial conference,
complete and comply with Rule 16 I.C.R. and that the defendant shall be personally present at
all court proceedings, unless otherwise excused. Failure to appear may result in a bench
warrant for the defendant's arrest.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date I served a copy of the attached to:
Brian Taylor Aune
200 W Front Street Rm 3191
Boise ID 83702
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
Ada County Public Defender
200 West Front Street Suite 1107
Boise ID 83702
public.defender@adacounty.id .gov

[X] By email [ ] By mail

[ X] By email [ ] By mail

Aaron Eugene Lantis
1707 S 26th St
Nampa ID 83686
Dated: May 17, 2017

Dated: _ _ _ __
Signed: 5/19/2017 09:27 AM

1

NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER
M-CR (NO40) 7.29.16

CR01 -17 - 07609
NOTH
Notice of Hearing

000014
~iii\1111111111111111 II IIIII IIIIII Ill

Electronically Filed
5/19/2017 2:44:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Defendant
ANITA M. E. MOORE, ISB #5885
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR01-17-07609

Plaintiff,
vs.

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.
TO:

THE STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff, and to the Ada County Prosecutor:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned requests discovery and photocopies of the following

information, evidence, and materials pursuant to ICR 16:
1)

All unredacted material or information within the prosecutor’s possession or control, or
which thereafter comes into their possession or control, which tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or tends to reduce the punishment therefore. ICR 16(a).

2)

Any unredacted, relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies
thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecution, the existence of which
is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence; and also
the substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after
arrest to a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, or the prosecution’s agent; and the recorded
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury that relates to the offense charged.

3)

Any unredacted, written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the substance of any
relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before or after arrest in response to
interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the
prosecuting attorney.

4)

Any prior criminal record of the defendant and co-defendant, if any.

5)

All unredacted documents and tangible objects as defined by ICR 16(b)(4) in the possession
or control of the prosecutor that are material to the defendant, intended for use by the
prosecutor or obtained from or belonging to the defendant or co-defendant.

6)

All reports or physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments within
the possession, control, or knowledge of the prosecutor, the existence of which is known or is
available to the prosecutor by the exercise of due diligence.

7)

A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts
who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial, together with any record of prior
felony convictions of any such person which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting
attorney. Additionally, the defense requests ALL statements (written or oral, recorded, or
unrecorded) made by ALL prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the
prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney’s agents or to any official involved in the

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

1
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investigatory process of this case (including, but not limited to police officers, investigators,
and victim-witness coordinators).
8)

A list of all benefits offered to the alleged victim for being a “victim” of crime (including, but
not limited to financial assistance, free or reduced-cost legal representation, housing, or UVisa certification).

9)

Unredacted copies of ALL communications between the prosecution, including the
prosecuting attorney’s agents, and alleged victims offering benefits and accepting benefits
(including, but not limited to, letters, emails, and informational pamphlets).

10)

Unredacted copies of ALL documents provided to, and received from, alleged victims
relating to crime victim benefits (including, but not limited to, Crime Victims Compensation
Program applications provided to alleged victims and received by the Industrial
Commission).

11)

A written summary or report of any testimony that the State intends to introduce pursuant to
rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing; including the
witness’ opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and the witnesses qualifications.

12)

All reports or memoranda made by police officers or investigators in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case, including, what are commonly referred to as “ticket
notes.”

13)

Any writing or object that may be used to refresh the memory of all persons who may be
called as witnesses, pursuant to IRE 612.

14)

Any and all audio and/or video recordings made by law enforcement officials during the
course of their investigation.

15)

Any evidence, documents or witnesses that the State discovers or could discover with due
diligence after complying with this request.
The undersigned further requests written compliance within 14 days of service of the within

instrument pursuant to ICR 16.
DATED May 19, 2017.
ANTHONY R. GEDDES
Chief Public Defender

For Anita M. E. Moore
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 19, 2017, I electronically served a true and correct copy of the
within instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor via the iCourt Portal.

Debbie Florence

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

2
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Electronically Filed
6/13/2017 10:45:49 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-17-07609
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal
Rules, requests Discovery and inspection of the following:
(1) Documents and Tangible Objects:
Request is hereby made by the prosecution to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the defendant, and which the defendant intends to introduce in
evidence at trial.

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (LANTIS) Page 1
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(2) Reports of Examinations and Tests:
The prosecution hereby requests the defendant to permit the State to inspect and copy or
photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or
experiments made in connection with this case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of
the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports
relate to testimony of the witness.
(3) Defense Witnesses:
The prosecution requests the defendant to furnish the State with a list of names and
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial.
(4) Expert Witnesses:
The prosecution requests the defendant to provide a written summary or report of any
testimony that the defense intends to introduce pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c)(4), including
the facts and data supporting the opinion and the witness’s qualifications.
(5) Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519, the State hereby requests that the defendant
state in writing within ten (10) days any specific place or places at which the defendant claims to
have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon
whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.

-

1
DATED this the ___________
day of May, 2017.
June
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (LANTIS) Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1st
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the _____ day of May, 2017, I caused to be served, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Request for Discovery upon the individual(s) named below in
the manner noted: Anita Moore, 200 W Front Street Rm 1107 Boise ID 83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
x By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _________
x By iCourt eFile and Serve.

______________________________
Legal Assistant

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (LANTIS) Page 3
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Electronically Filed
6/13/2017 10:45:49 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.

)
)
) Case No: CR01-17-07609
)
DISCOVERY RESPONSE
)
) TO COURT
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has complied with and lodged objections to
the Defendant’s Request for Discovery.

June
1
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the _____
day of May, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1st
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the _____ day of May, 2017 I caused to be served, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Discovery Response to Court upon the individual(s) named
below in the manner noted: Anita Moore, 200 W Front Street Rm 1107 Boise ID 83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
x By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.
x By iCourt eFile and Serve.
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Electronically Filed
6/16/2017 1:08:06 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
) Case No. CR01-17-07609
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
) ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY
) RESPONSE TO COURT
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
)
)
Defendant.
)
COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County,

State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to
Discovery.
16 day of June, 2017.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the ____
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

16th

day of June, 2017, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Addendum to Discovery Response to Court was served to the following in the manner
noted below: Anita Moore, 200 W Front Street Rm 1107 Boise ID 83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
x By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By hand.
x By iCourt eFile & Serve.
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Trial status Memo
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•
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
OF THE DISTRICT COURT

1111~11mm111111111111~1111111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

)

Defendant.

Case No.

C,,R£J/-/7- ()7bf/1

TRIAL STATUS MEMORANDUM

IT

i-10-/:/-a.,t 8:,s~m

Appearances: Prosecutor _ _
a-_~-------------------Defense Counsel

4Af/r/l /JfdO/3~~

D

This case is ready for trial.

D

Discovery has been completed.

//4#~

'fl

Cut off date for discovery is \

)ii

State is to prepare a formal complaint for trial. (by .....\...___Wl5--=-=E'-"'lc:::...=----'BS"'--.;....f"c,,,e.E'
_ _. _"t12--\
_ _t4_L-_-J)

WE:'="-

~ 0 es;::-o_e.,s

~ 14-L

D

Parties are to prepare proposed jury instruction on the elements of count(s) _ _ _ __

D
D

The State does not intend to amend the charge.

D

The parties anticipate the case can be tried in one day.

~

Courtroom media equipment will be needed.

The State may amend the charge to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

presentation of evidence.)

□

TRIAL STATUS MEMORANDUM

(The attorneys are responsible for the

1r·. <?--°\
~ ~ \

\P, -,-,-,e;-s&.S...

V..}\~,..,~s._

[REV. 000024
11-2010]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL QJ@TRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY .QE ADA
Plaintiff,
vs.

A
Defendant.

12..~ ~i
LPM _ _ __

) Case No. CR. o \- \ "l- - -:J,<,.,oG\
)
) DR# I ~ - I I Y ?, SS
CHRISTOPHER D RICH, Clerk
)
v,
..:..
By LISA POSEY
) Law Enforcement Agency _,tt:._,__l_
- ->_D
_____:D:..::E::....Pu::....r.c..v_ _ __

JUN 2 0 2017

~

Expires at 11 :59 P.M. on
) or upon dismissal of this case.
)

) NO CONTACT ORDER

b cJ...tJ✓ /IL
c

O

AMENDED

The Cou finds that a no contact order is appropriate in this case , therefore , it is hereby ordered that you , the above-named
Defenda t, shall not engage in any of the following conduct with regard to the person(s) listed below. You shall not contact or
attempt t contact (including in person or through another person , or in writing or email , or by telephone , pager, or facsimile) the
person(s) named below in any manner. Prohibited contact includes that you shall not harass, stalk, threaten , engage in any
other con uct that would place the person(s) named below in reasonable fear of bodily injury, knowing ly follow and knowingly
remain wi hin 100 feet of the followi g person(s) :
~
.
Exceptions are as follows :
no exceptions
.M. on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
to contact by telephone between ______ .M. and _ _ __
for the following purposes: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
to participate in counseling/mediation
to provide for the exchange of children between the parties through : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
to retrieve personal necessities from the residence/protected address one time through :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
to meet with or through attorneys and/or during legal proceedings
to respond to emergencies involving the parties' natural or adopted children
other: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r ordered that you shall not go within 900 feet (300 yards) of the following address(es) :

Work Address

Residenc Address

Defenda appeared or had actual notice of this hearing and had the opportunity to participate, present evidence, and make
/
D NO
argument against the entry of th is order. D YES
A violatio of this order is a separate crime under Idaho Code § 18-920, for which no bail will be set until you appear before a
judge. T e maximum penalty for a violation of this order is one year in jail and/or up to a $1000 fine . However, if the violation is
a third off nse, the violation is a felony , which is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for up to five years and/or up to
a $5000 f ne .
Only a ju ge can modify this order. If more than one protection order/no contact order is in place, the most restrictive proh ibition
controls, hether in a civil or criminal case .
e subject to federal prosecution if you possess, receive , or transport a firearm or ammunition while a no contact order
18 U.S.C. § 922.

Date

Law Enfo cement ldentific_atioryNumbo /.
Dateserv d:

loL~
U;b
I

NO CONT CT ORDER XFILE

No Cont ct Order Cas e CR

X

ACSO

XPROSECUTOR

X o 'EFENSE ATTORNEY

[PROPOSED REV 06-29-2016]
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Electronically Filed
8/3/2017 2:23:27 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2016-0000887; CR01-17)
07609
)
vs.
SECOND ADDENDUM TO
)
DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO
)
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
COURT
)
)
Defendant.
)
COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County,

State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to
Discovery.
3 day of August, 2017.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the ____
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
SECOND ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (LANTIS) Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3

day of August, 2017, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Addendum to Discovery Response to Court was served to the following in the manner
noted below:
Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender, Boise ID 83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By hand.
x By iCourt eFile & Serve.


Legal Assistant
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r AMCO
Amended Complaint Filed

AUG 10 2017
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,
By DAYSHA ZUBER
DEPUTY

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.

___________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR0l-17-7609
AMENDED COMPLAINT

PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE me this \

0

day of August, 2017, D. Garrett

Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, who, being
first duly sworn, complains and says that: AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of
July, 2016, in the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did commit the crime of: I. DISTURBING THE
PEACE, MISDEMEANOR, J.C. 18-6409 as follows:
That the Defendant, AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of July, 2016, in
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, towit: Hillary Henslee, by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Hillary
Henslee's employer.
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Clerk

All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and against
the peace and dignity of the State ofldaho.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

y:D.Garrett' Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this

I ~ day of August, 2017.
___E__

Jm7t

Magistrate
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Electronically Filed
8/11/2017 7:52:08 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.
_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR0l-17-7609
STATE'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
MOTION IN LIMINE

COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada,

State of Idaho, and moves this Court to reconsider its order excluding Defendant's statements and
evidence of conduct on or around July 4, 2016, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). The
statements and conduct at issue are inextricably intertwined with the criminal conduct alleged in the
complaint and are part of the same criminal episode. As such, they are not subject to the
requirements of l.R.E. 404(b).
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 30, 2016, Hillary Henslee and William Doyle were at the home of Hillary's boss,
Nancy Van Winkle. The Defendant, Aaron Lantis, crone to the home and, upset to find Hillary there
with William, told Hillary that he would end her. On July 1, the Defendant told Hillary that he had a
plan to ruin her life and that her actions would dictate if he carried out his plan. On July 3, the
Defendant sent Hillary a screenshot of an email that he said he intended to send to Hillary's
employer. On July 4, the Defendant texted Hillary that he had discovered that Hillary had deleted
William's phone nwnber from the Defendant's phone, and that Hillary would regret doing that.

Hillary subsequently deleted the text messages and screenshot from her phone.
At 9:42 A.M. on July 4, 2016, Nancy Van Winkle received an email from Santa Clause
<concemedtelleriib@gmail.com>. The email read as follows:
As a concerned neighbor, I am wondering if you were aware that your bank
employee who is watching your house was using it for "extra curricular activities".
Last Thursday night 6/30/16 she had a customer Billy out in your hot tub, and her
boyfriend showed up. Two different trucks, one a white truck, and one a grey truck,
two different guys. So there was a huge spectacle and a lot of noise. Come to find
out, she has a lot of outside things to show off. It is concerning that that is the face of
the branch, your new assistant manager Hillary Henslee. There are nude photos
floating around, and she is obviously not very lady like or christian. I am wondering
if this is the attitude of IIBK, or if you were aware that your house was being used as
some form of brothel? Is this going to be a every night thing? If there is that much
noise going forward, we may need to call the police to intervene. I am not sure if
your upper management is aware of how you conduct business, or the people you
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are choosing to represent IIBK or Star in general? Do your employees sleep with all
the customers, is that some "preferred treatment" for account holders? I am attaching
some of the photos circulating of her so that you are aware of them. I will not bother
with all of the completely nude ones. Obviously I am not the only person to see
these. Some of them taken at her desk or in your bathroom even.
State's Exhibit 2.
There were four sexually provocative photographs of Hillary attached to the email. Nancy
Van Winkle forwarded the email to Hillary on July 5, 2016.
Nampa Police Department Officer Jeremy Miller contacted Aaron Lantis on July 5. In a
recorded phone interview, Aaron Lantis admitted that he had confronted Hillary at her employer's
home on June 30 and had, at some point, told Hillary that he was going to wreck her life. When
asked what he was referencing, Aaron Lantis said, "The pain that you are feeling inside, you want
them to feel that as well." He continued by clarifying that the reference was to Hillary's work. He
said that Hillary had wanted her job so badly and that he wanted Hillary to lose her job. Aaron
confirmed that he had sent a screenshot of the email to Hillary on the night of July 3, and had sent
the email to Hillary's supervisor on July 4. Aaron provided a description of the email and the photos
that were attached. He confirmed that his intent in sending the email was to cause Hillary to lose her
job.
On August 10, 2017, the State filed a complaint alleging that the Defendant had disturbed
the peace of Hillary Henslee by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to her employer. This
Court granted the Defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the Defendant's statements that he
would end Hillary, that he would wreck her life, that he had a plan to ruin her life, and that her
actions would determine whether his plan was carried out. The Court further excluded evidence that

MOTION TO RECONSIDER (LANTIS), Page 3

000032

the Defendant sent a screenshot of the email to Hillary on July 3, and that he sent a text on July 4
stating that Hillary would regret deleting William's number from the Defendant's phone.
II. ARGUMENT

I.R.E. 404(b) states that "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith."
Evidence is not subject to I.RE. 404 if it does not bear upon the defendant's character. State v.
Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945,949 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190 (Ct. App.
2011 )). Several federal courts have distinguished between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" crimes,
wrongs, or other acts in the context of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See, e.g., US. v. Sumlin,
489 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144 (6th Cir. 1995). In Barnes, the court
stated:
[F.R.E. 404(b)] does not apply where the challenged evidence is 'inextricably
intertwined' with evidence of the crime charged in the indictment. When the other
crimes or wrongs occurred at different times and under different circumstances from
the offense charged, the deeds are termed 'extrinsic.' 'Intrinsic' acts, on the other
hand, are those that are part of a single criminal episode. [F.R.E. 404(b)] is not
implicated when the other crimes or wrongs evidence is part of a continuing pattern
of illegal activity. When that circumstance applies, the government has no duty to
disclose the other crimes or wrongs evidence.
49 F.3d at 1149.
The Barnes court found that evidence of an earlier drug shipment was directly related to the
one for which the defendants were charged, that the evidence was therefore intrinsic to the conduct
alleged, and that the F.R.E. 404(b) was therefore not implicated. Id Idaho courts have also used the
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distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic acts to determine whether I.RE. 404(b) was implicated.

See Whitaker, 152 Idaho at 949. The Whitaker court stated, "[e]vidence of an act is intrinsic when it
and evidence of the crime charged are inextricably intertwined, or both acts are part of a single
criminal episode, or it was a necessary preliminary to the crime charged." Id. (quoting State v.

Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008) and Sumlin, 489 F.ed at 689). "Evidence is inextricably
intertwined when it is 'so interconnected with the charged offense that a complete account of the
charged offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure of the uncharged misconduct."' Id.
(quoting State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 413 (Ct. App. 2002). The Whitaker court ultimately
determined that evidence of the defendant viewing pornography on some occasion entirely separate
from the charged conduct was not intrinsic to the charged offense, and was therefore subject to the
requirements ofl.R.E. 404(b). ld.
In the instant case, evidence of the Defendant's conversation with Hillary Henslee on June
30 is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense. The email that is the subject of the charge
discusses the June 30 incident and makes allegations as to Hillary's conduct thereat. As such, the
State could not give a complete account of the charged offense without providing evidence related
to the June 30 incident. Furthermore, the Defendant's statements that he would end Hillary or wreck
her life are connected both to the June 30 incident and to why Hillary's peace would be disturbed
the allegations contained in the email that was sent to Hillary's boss. The June 30 incident and the
Defendant's statements on June 30 are intrinsic to the charged offense
Evidence that the Defendant told Hillary that he had a plan to do wreck her life, that he had
created an email with pictures, and that she would regret deleting William's number, as well as
evidence that he sent a screenshot of the very email he later admitted to sending to her employers, is
intrinsic to the charged offense because it is part of a single criminal episode. Similarly, evidence
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that the Defendant sent one of the pictures included in the email to Hillary on July 5 is part of the
same criminal episode as the charged offense. Unlike the evidence in Whitaker, the evidence of the
Defendant's statements and actions relate directly to the email that was sent to Hillary's boss. It is
not evidence of other instances or emails the Defendant had created that could lead the jury to
believe that he had the character for sending such emails, but rather evidence that the Defendant
created and sent the specific email referenced in the complaint. The statements are one course of
conduct, essentially contemporaneous in time, that culminated in the Defendant sending the email
and pictures to Hillary's boss. As such, this evidence is intrinsic to the charged offense and is not
subject to the requirements of I.R.E. 404(b).
The State respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its ruling on the Defendant's
motion in limine, and that the Defendant's motion be denied on the grounds that the statements are
not character evidence subject to the requirements of l.R.E. 404(b).
DATED this 1Q day of August 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

clOb-~

D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the

__.I,. . \~ _ day of August 2017, I delivered a copy

of the State's Motion to Reconsider to Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender's Office, by the
method indicated below.
□

By depositing copies ofthe same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.

□

By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.

□

By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

□

By Hand Delivering said document to defense counsel.

□

By informing the office ofsaid individual(s) that said copies were available/or pickup at
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.

□

By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number:

- - --

~ By iCourt eFile and Serve
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DR# 2016-114255

~.
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t

Erin Pon
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:
Attachments:

HIiiary <llvinlovlnllfe03@yahoo.ln>
Thursday, July 07, 2016 9:05 AM
Erin Pon
Fwd: Hillary Henslee

10076Jpeg;25S78Jpeg;25591Jpeg;27340jpeg

Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone

•···---· Original message ----·-From: "Nancy L. VanWinkle 11 <Nancy.Van:W:inkle@IIBK.NET>
Date: 7/5/16 8:45 AM (GMT-07:00)
To: Hillary <Bvinkwln1ife03@yahoo.in>
Subject: Fwd: Hillary Henslee
Sorry you are going through this messy stuff.. ,glad you have loving support around you though

Sent li'om my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy srnartphonc

•······· Original message -----From: Santa Claus <concemedteHeriib@gmail.com>
Date: 7/4/16.9:42 AM (OMT-07;00)
To: "Nancy L. VanWi'nkle" <Nancy.VanWinkle@IIBK.NET>
Cc: Kurt Oustavel, <Kurt.Gusta:vel@IIBK.NET>, "Spring H. Alexander" <Spring.Alex:ander@IlBK,NET>,
Richard.Ambrosio@iibk.net, i\!iciaJlitter@iibk.net. Jcrald.Jaeger@jibk.net
Subject: Hillary Henslee
••• External Email ••·

Nancy.
As a concerned neighbor, I am wondering if you were aware that your bank employee who is watching your
house was using it for "extra curricular activitles 11 • last Thursday night 6/30/16 she had a customer Billy out In
your hot tub, and her boyfriend showed Up. Two different trucks, one a whlte truck, and one a grey truck, two
different guys. So there was a huge spectacle and a lot of noise. Come to find out, she has a lot of outside
things to show off. It Is concerning that that is the tace of the branch, your new assistant manager Hillary
Henslee, There are nude photos floating around. and she is obviously not very lady like or chrlstian. I am
wondering if this is the attitude of rIBK, or if you were aware that your house was being used as some fonn of
brothel? Is this going to be a every night thing? If there is that much noise going forward. we may need to call
the police to intervene. I am not sure if your upper management is aware of how you conduct business, or the
people you are choosing to represent IIBK or Star in general? Do your employees sleep with all the customers,
is that some "preferred treatment" for account holders? I attaching some of the photos circulating of her so

am

1
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OR# 2016°114255

I,

•
that you are aware of them. I will not bother with all of the completely nude ones. Obviously I am not the only
person to see these. Some of them taken at her desk or in your bathroom even.

frxi1

~

fipjl

Follow us on: L:'...llj..ike Idaho Independent Bank. i.::=_follow@TheldahoBank ~onnect Idaho
Independent Bank

2
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Electronically Filed
8/11/2017 7:52:08 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR0l-17-7609
NOTICE OF INTENT TO
USE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO
404(b)

COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State
ofldaho, and makes the following declaration: in the alternative to its motion for reconsideration of
the Defendant's motion in limine, that the State provides notice that it intends to introduce evidence
at trial of prior conduct by the Defendant pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b). This evidence will
relate to statements the Defendant made to Hillary Henslee and to Officer Jeremy Miller. The
statements are that the Defendant said he would wreck Hillary Henslee's life, that he had a plan to
do so, that he had created an email with pictures, and that Hillary would regret deleting William
Doyle's phone number from the Defendant's phone. The 'evidence will also include information
regarding the Defendant's interactions with Hillary Henslee from June 30 through July 5. It will
include information that the Defendant confronted Hillary and William on June 30, sent a copy of
the email to Hillary on July 3, and sent one of the pictures from the email in a text message to

NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO 404B Page I

000039

Hillary on July 5. This evidence was previously disclosed to the Defendant on June 1, 2017, and
June 16, 2017.
The evidence will be introduced for the purpose of showing motive, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

DATED this _l'Q__ day of August, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

lib~

By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

JL

day of August 2017 I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document to: Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender by
the method indicated below:
NOTIFIED AVAILABLE FOR PICK UP
_ _ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid)
FAX TRANSMISSION
HAND DELIVERY
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•

CR01-17-07609
PTME
Pretrial Memorandum
378888

•

3TRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
,TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

111111111111111111111111111111111111111

)
Plaintiff,

□

,M, _____- - -

AUG 11 2017
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk

) MAGISTRATE MINUTES/ NOTICE

STATE OF IDAHO,

dr= Ati~~~~
0

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

)

~
~

vs.

)

Defendant.

~ □ BC □ EA □ GC □ MC

Cf2:D \- l"J- :J fO O Cf

Case Number:
Event Date: _
Judge:

)
)

Case Called:
□

__,:8----+-f

\~\'--+-'\\'--"t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

., l/
kOdVf,--:

)

________________}

Clerk:

1:'

7
_Ll~-~L--___

K4J 2)

□ In Chambers

Interpreter: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

3uJ::eA1$-e/Y\

Defendant: □ Present □ Not Present □ In Custody
□

NO,_..,.,=~~-s:-:
.. f;:;:-1~:::-;:~D;-----A.M _ _ _~ - -

~rivate _-'~'---.,,.__----=----=-------□ PD Appointed

□ PD Denied

□ Waived Attorney

Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. Bond $ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

□ Advised Rights

□ Not Guilty

□ Guilty/ Admit

□ Written Guilty Plea

□ No Contact

_________________________
L
NOTICE OF HEARING

~ Sentencing on !0 /:,2 ICJ

at

2-: :30

□

□ Pre-Trial Release Order

Release Defendant, This Case Only

•e /k
Judge

"V /-c,~J

□

Court Trial Conference on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ __

□

Court Trial on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ __

□

Pre-Trial Conference on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ __

□

Jury Trial on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ __

□ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ am/pm w/ Judge _ _ _ _ _ __
□

Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208) 287-7400.
You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest, or
default judgment may be entered if you are charged with a ·
tion.
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET,
SE, ID 83702

I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as fo.,s:
Defendant:

Hand Delivered

□

Via Counsel

ef'

Defense Atty: Hand Delivered..-d"

lntdept Mail □

Prosecutor:

lntdept Mail

Hand Delivere~

CHRISTOPHER

Signatur

□
Magistrate Judge (for Pre-Trial Memorandum)
DATED

MAGISTRATE MINUTES/ NOTICE OF HEARING

7'/t l } tl
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[REV 10-2013]

t:k._

CR01 - 17 - 07609

VERD

[JO _ _ _ _-;:;;-:=:::--~---FILED
A.M _ _ ___r-.M.-t::,t,,,L.
_ __

:-5

Verdict form
378894

AUG 11 2017

1111111111111111111111111111111111111111

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DAYSHA ZUBER
DEPUTY

VERDICT

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

CASE No.

vs.

CR01-17-7609

AARON LANTIS
Defendant

We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant AARON LANTIS

___ Not Guilty

X

Guilty

Of the crime Disturbing the Peace 18-6409

Dated this 11th Day of August, 2017.

Presi~

000042

VERDICT

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

CASE No.

vs.

CR01-17-7609

AARON LANTIS
Defendant

We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant AARON LANTIS

___ Not Guilty
___ Guilty
Of the crime Disturbing the Peace 18-6409

Dated this 11th Day of August, 2017.

Presiding Juror
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Time
Speaker
Note
08:47:21 AM!
! Lantis CR01-17-7609 Jury Trial
··o°EE47:55 AM. Garreff·········-r·p·reTimfriary Issues
··································································----·····················································

Swensen
··os:·o"r-f1···AM~······················· ·Jury···Enfe·rs·....................................··························································································································......................···········
09:02:56 AM
Judge Reads Jury Instructions
..6§:·o°J":2·:fANi" .................................... Jury Roif"Call
················································································
..09: 10:24.. AM....................................... Jury.. Sworn ..for. Voir..Dire
09:28:25 AM I Judge
Lists witnesses

::32:03

..................

.............

.................................................................................................................................

A~j~!~:e~-: ~: ~=:=~=~-~:~-~ -___ ----~~~:~~=~~~

09:45:50 AM
Moves to excuse Juror #2 for cause
09:46:36 AM i Anita
Submits
········..............
Moore
............................. ----,r-----------G-·................................................................................................ _ _ .................................................................. _____
09:46:39 AM Judge
Excuses Juror #2

I

T0:05'06-:J\Ml

~!~;: ~- passes

10:05:04 AM i Anita

panel foC_c_a_u_s_e

······················---····················---.-_~~:~~~-=

Voir Dire

···············--l Moore··············'···········································································---·······························································································································
10:29:52 AM I
Passes panel for cause
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

10:36: 16 AM
Peremptory
Final 6 jurors Sworn
10:42:26 AM
····································--·········································································································
Remaining Juror Exits
10:42:41 AM
·······················································---··························································································----···································································································
seated
10:43:41 AM
....................................................................................
....Final 6 jurors -..........................
- - -..······.....................................................................
10:44:14 AM
Recess
·················································································································································································································································································--11 :04:53 AM
back on the record
11 :05:14 AM Anita
I Moves to exlude witnesses
,

___

___

,

················································ ..~.~.~.~~··············!·······································----······················----··························------

11 :05:43 AM Garrett
Victim
Swensen

--························--························································································································---

11 :06:08 AM I Judge
Exlude witnesses- except Victim
i
Lojek
.
................................................ i' ....................................
11 :07:00 AM I Anita
I Would like copies of exhibits

o, ............................................... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .............................................................................................................................

-11:01:42AMI ~~:e':t-licanoomp1;;wiihihiil- - - - - - -

--- - - - ---

TF07~59AMi~:::•en-Lchib-it_s_m_a-rked··············································----···························································································
, Lojek

i

................................................ ,0, .................................... 0, ................................................................................................................................................. _ _ _ ...................................................... .

11:10:44 AM I:

I Jury Enters
:

CR01-17 - 07609

CMIN
Court Minutes

8/11/2017

>f 6
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I Jury Instructions
11:12:27 AM Judge
..................... _ _..... Lojek
i
11 :23:24 AM Garrett
Opening Statement
Swensen

- - - ......................

___

- - - ......................

11 :25:56 AM Anita
1 Opening Statement
.............................
Moore .....J .Call_s_S_W-#1
. . . . ..
11 :30:13 AM : Garrett

___

.......................................................................................................................................

Swensen

- - - ......................- - -

___ ___

11 :30:50 AM SW #1
Sworn By Clerk
.......................................................................................... .
11
:31
:29
AM
Nancy
Vanwinkle
DX
.............................................................................................
..........................- 11 :31 :39 AM
States name for record
11 :37:22 AM Anita
Objection- relevance .. ____ ...........................................................................................................................
,

,

Moore
11 :37:25 AM Garrett
Swensen

........................... ----.

11 :38:09 AM j Judge
ILojek
.. 11 :38: 13 AM! SW #1
11 :38:34 AM IGarrett

________

Response

i,.

_____

Sustained

.
[ Continues DX
Nothing further

i

___

.................................................................... .

--

..................................................................

. ................................
.................................................................
..........................................................................

..............................

Swensen j

- - - -........................................................................................

11 :38:37 AM Anita
f CX
Moore
1
.. f1·:38:40 .. AM. ·sw·#1 .............t·cx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .___ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

___

:~:::;;::: i2!:e-n I::::::;:;::-:-:_.__. ._. . . ._. _
. _________ ----.. . -..-. .-..-. .: : : : : : : : :
.Tf: 38:49 AM 1Judge
Lojek
...........,i.....................
,

__

,

...I.Witness Ex·cused.................................................................................................................................
'
___________
Calls SW#2

____
______

..............................

,

11 :39:27 AM Garrett
Swensen

_____
-______
ID's defendant

...........................................................................................

...........................................................................

11 :39:46 AM SW #2
. Sworn By Clerk
................................................ ·..................................................................................
- - -.....................................................
11 :40: 12 AM
Hillary Hensle
...fr.4'6:3·2 AM
DX
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................
......... ..............

..........................................................................

,

__

................................................................- - -

____............................................- -

11 :41 :49 AM
...........................................................................................
................................
11 :42:32 AM Anita
. Objection- Relevance
1
Moore
11 :42:41 AM 1 Garrett
Response
!Swensen I

...............................................................

!

I

...ff.42:44 AM j•Judge

i Lojek
8/11/2017

i

't"overruieci..................................................................,_ _ ...........................................................................................................

i
2 of6

000045

Lojek Zuber 8/11 /17

1A-CRT400

Reviews SE #'s 3, 4, 5 and 6
11 :46:22 AM SW #2
........................................... _ _ ............................................ _ _ _ _ .........................·---······••00,,,............................................
11 :47:41 AM Garrett
Move to admit
Swensen
11 :47:45 AM Anita
, Moore
11 :47:48 AMI Judge
Lojek
·Tf)f9:2f)i~M Anita

INo Objection
I
S-E-#-,s--3,-4-,-5-a-nd 6 will be admitted

1--:

i

[ O-b-1e_c_ti_o-n-_a_s_k-ed-a-nd-an_s_w_e-re_d_········································································---·····················

Moore
11 :49:29 AM Garrett
Swensen

-----·····································

Will withdraw

___

,,.,

.....................................................

11 :49:50 AM Judge
Sustained
i Lojek
,
··········•······························
························································------·································································································································
11 :53:29 AM Garrett
Nothing further
Swensen

---···················································································································-----·············································································································

11 :55:11 AM

.......

Jury Exits

......

······································································---

---····················································································--

11 :56: 15 AM - - - · ··~·~·~·~·~~.............................................................................................................................................................................................................
01 :05:39 PM
back on the record
01 :05:57 PM IJudge
IReady to bring Jury back in ----···························································································
: Lojek
:

··6r·o"a:3f."i=irvft·······························--r-jury·. Ente"ii········..

··o"f:·of:4·9. "i:ifvffsw #2
01:08:46 PMIAnita

·································

·••i•h~ick·on··ffi·e. .sfiind················
icx

···················································

··································································

······································································

·························································

~.~.~E~..............i·······---········································································································································-----Objection- collective

................................................ i..

o1 :09:03 PM Garrett
Swensen

----····················································································--

i Sustained
01 :09:28 PM I Judge
I Lojek
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
01:13:22 PM Garrett
Objection- relevance
Swensen
·························································································································································---········································---···························································

01:13:28 PM Anita
Response
,
Moore
----•·········
····································---······························································--- - - 01: 13:38 PM. Judge
Overruled
i Lojek
i
01:15:16 PMjGarrett
[Objection-Relevanc-e---············································------···································

I

!Swensen

I

i

i Response

01: 15: 19 PM Anita
................................................ I· Moore
01:15:20 PMIJudge
Lojek

i

8/11/2017

.~i...........

__

........................................
:overruled

__ ___

.......................................................... - - -

i
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01 :16:22 PM Garrett
Swensen

Objection- Relevance

___

___

............................
.........................................................................
01 :16:24 PM Anita
i Response
: Moore
I
................................................½....................................}·················.. •••••• ........................................................................ _ _ _ ,,., .....................................................................................................
01:16:35 PM\Judge
\Overruled
i Lojek
I
01:17:49 PMf Anita
[Nothing further
·······································································································

················································+--------.

~:-i?'.53

,,,,

r~J~E:~~J:: := ____ -~~~::- --- - - ----~~~-- -~~:=

01 :19:51 PM \Anita
1 Objection- asked and answered
I
Moore
·
- - - - . . . . . - -.............................................................· - - - - - - -............................................................................................................- - - !
01: 19:54 PM Garrett
Response
Swensen

- - - - - - - · · ·....................- - - - -..............................

01:19:56 PM Judge
Sustained
Lojek
----lf---00,,00,,.,,,,,,,,.,,.,,.,.,,,,
•••••• ..
01 :20:14 PM ~~:e
..

---······················--

•••••• .. •• .......... •••••••• .... •• .. - - - - - - - • •............................ _ _ _ _ .. ,,.,.,,,,.,,,,,,,,,

iObjection- beyond the scope of cross

PM 1j Garrett".............R.esponse ..................................................................

o'f:·2·□ -:2·2

___

.........................................................................................................

- - -.................................................................
················································'·~~ensen
01 :21:10 PM Judge
1 Sustained
Lojek
- - + - - ' - - - - ; ,................................................·---··························.................................................................................................................................
Nothing further
01 :21 :37 PM Garrett
Swensen
01 :21 :45 PM Anita
INothing further
Moore
I
01 :21-:-49_P_M-11•Jucige...............f"i~xcu·sed ..from courtroom·~··subject to re·caff"...........................................................................................
Lojek
l
-----1,--- ..········ ............... ·········································
01 :22:52 PM Garrett
calls SW
Swensen
.................................

___

..............................................................

____

......................

.....................................................

--··························--------

01 :22:56 PM SW #3
Sworn By Clerk
•····•··········································
....................................................................................................----·············· ..······ ..······························---01:24:10 PM
Jeremy Miller
............................. ·······································································------································································---o1 :24:14 PM
Nampa Police Officer
.........................................................................................
.....................·--········································································.............................. .
01:24:19 PM
DX
..........................................................................................................................................- - -.......................................................................................... .
Reviews SE #1
01:28:04 PM
- - - - - - -..············..··············································-01 :28:49 PM Garrett
Move to admit and publish SE #1
1 Swensen I

01 :29:00 PM! Anita
: Moore
01 :29:05 PMl Judge
Lojek

i

8/11/2017

I
I

No objection

f SE #1 will be admitted

---·························································

i
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01 :30:51 PM
01 :32:43 PM Garrett

Plays audio
-----·····················································

Nothing further

Swensen
·····························································--··········································································································································································-----

01 :32:46 PM. Anita

No questions

I Moore
01 :32:51 PM I Judge

.................................................$, ....... _ __
i,,!

.................................................i Lojek

01 :33:27 PM Garrett

Excused from courtroom- subject to recall
···························································································--

State rests

Swensen
·············································································-+---

01 :34:01 PM Anita

...........................

Would like to be heard outside presence of Jury
:.....................................
Moore
,.......................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................. .

~

01 :34: 18 PM!
··01 :34:49 Pfvfl°A.n"ifa·····

·······································--···························································
!! Jury···~~~~~···-----·······························
Moves for Judgment of aquittal/Judgment of dismissal

i Moore \
----------·················································································································································
01 :39:57 PM i Judge
I response
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Lojek·························································--······························------···························································
01 :47:31 PM Garrett

Reponse

Swensen

_ _ _ .......................................................................................................................... ----------····--··••00 .., .................................................
01 :51 :29 PM Anita
Final word
Moore
..........................
.. ............ ..
..,.,... .. .. ....,...,... .. .. ...
01 :53:03 PM i Judge
motion denied Re Rule 48

___

__

,,,,,,,,,, ,,

,, .,,,.,,,.,

,. ,.,.,.,.,. ,.

,.,.,,,. ,.,.,.,.,. ,.

~!i!~r~~1:: : -;1t~~~~:~v?--- ---- ---===;~~=-~=
i Lojek

i

i Moore

:

··,12·:·32:03 .PMTAn"ita·····-.....1-0-ef-ense will rest

::q?.:):~~?.J::·PM. · · · ·

02:36:48 PM Anita
Moore

02:36:5_8_P_M_,i Judge

----·····························································································································

!i
I

Jury_E_n_te_rs_ _ _ _ _ ..................................::············..······························::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.......................................
Defense Rests

f lnst-ru-ct_s_J_u_ry---······················---······························································--

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l. ~.?.J~.~. . . . . . . . .·. ___ . . . . . . . ____
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vs.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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Judge Michael Lojek
Magistrate Judge
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In a moment the Clerk will call the roll of the jury. When your name is
called you will also be identified with a number. Please remember your number
as we will be using it later in the jury selection process.
The Clerk will now call the roll of the jury.
Ladies and Gentlemen, you have been summoned as prospective jurors
in the lawsuit now before us. The first thing we do in a trial is to select 6 jurors
from among you.
I am Judge Michael Lojek, the judge in charge of the courtroom and this
trial. The deputy clerk of court is Daysha Zuber. She will mark the trial exhibits
and administers oaths to you jurors and to the witnesses.
Each of you is qualified to serve as a juror of this court. This call upon
your time does not frequently come to you, but is part of your obligation for your
citizenship in this state and country. No one should avoid fulfilling this obligation
except under the most pressing circumstances. Service on a jury is a civic and
patriotic obligation, which all good citizens should perform.
Service on a jury affords you an opportunity to be a part of the judicial
process, by which the legal affairs and liberties of your fellow men and women
are determined and protected under our form of government. You are being
asked to perform one of the highest duties of citizenship, that is, to sit in
judgment on facts, which will determine the guilt or innocence of persons
charged with a crime.
To assist you with the process of selection of a jury, I will introduce you to
the parties and their lawyers and tell you in summary what this action is about.
When I introduce an individual would you please identify yourself for the jury
panel.
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The state of Idaho is the plaintiff in this action. The lawyer representing
the state is Garret Swenson, a member of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office.
The defendant Aaron Lantis is represented by Anita Moore. I will now read you
the pertinent portion of the complaint which sets forth the claim against the
defendant. The complaint is not to be considered as evidence but is a mere
formal charge against the defendant. You must not consider it as evidence of
his guilt and you must not be influenced by the fact that a charge has been filed.
With regard to Aaron Lantis, the complaint charges that he, on or about
the 4th day of July, 2016 did commit the crime of Disturbing the Peace, A
violation of Idaho State Code 18-6409. To this charge, a plea of not guilty has
been entered.
The initial 14 jurors have been randomly selected by the Jury Commission
and are properly seated in the jury box.

In this part of the jury selection, you will be asked questions touching on
your qualifications to serve as jurors in this particular case. This part of the case
is known as the vior dire examination.
Voir dire examination is for the purpose of determining if your decision in
this case would in any way be influenced by opinions which you now hold or by
some personal experience or special knowledge which you may have concerning
the subject matter to be tried.

The object is to obtain six persons who will

impartially try the issues of this case upon the evidence presented in this
courtroom without being influenced by any other factors.
Please understand that this questioning is not for the purpose of prying
into your affairs for personal reasons but is only for the purpose of obtaining an
impartial jury.
Each question has an important bearing upon your qualifications as a
juror and each question is based upon a requirement of the law with respect to
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such qualifications. Each question is asked each of you, as though each of you
were being questioned separately.
If your answer to any question is yes, please raise your hand. You will
then be asked to identify yourself by both your name and juror number.
At this time I would instruct both sides to avoid repeating any question
during this voir dire process which has already been asked. I would ask counsel
to note, however, that you certainly have the right to ask follow-up questions of
any individual juror based upon that juror's response to any previous question.
The jury should be aware that during and following the voir dire
examination one or more of you may be challenged.
Each side has a certain number of "peremptory challenges", by which I
mean each side can challenge a juror and ask that he or she be excused without
giving a reason therefore. In addition each side has challenges "for cause", by
which I mean that each side can ask that a juror be excused for a specific
reason. If you are excused by either side please do not feel offended or feel that
your honesty or integrity is being questioned. It is not.
The clerk will now swear the entire jury panel for the voir dire examination.
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER ,2.

During the course of this trial, including the jury selection process, you are
instructed that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone
else, nor to form an opinion as to the merits of the case until after the case has
been submitted to you for your determination.
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Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over
with you what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted
and what we will be doing. At the end of the trial I will give you more detailed
guidance on how you are to reach your decision.
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. The state will
begin by making an opening statement of the case. After the state's opening
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the
state has presented its case.
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge(s) against
the defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to
do so. If the defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal
evidence. This is evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence.
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions
on the law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will
each be given time for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will
summarize the evidence to help you understand how it relates to the law. After
the closing arguments, you will leave the courtroom together to make your
decision. During your deliberations, you will have with you my instructions, the
exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in court.
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Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to
be innocent. The presumption of innocence means two things.
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The
state has that burden throughout the trial.

The defendant is never

required to prove his or her innocence, nor does the defendant ever have
to produce any evidence at all.

Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or

imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It
may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or
from lack of evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant
not guilty.
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Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you
must follow my instructions regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or
should be, or what either side may state the law to be. You must consider the
instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order
in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative
importance.

The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the

evidence before you.
your deliberations.

Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in

Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital to the

administration of justice.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in
this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits
offered and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of
evidence in court is governed by rules of law.

At times during the trial, an

objection may be made to a question asked a witness, or to a witness' answer,
or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked to decide a particular
rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the
Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations.

If I

sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer
the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what
the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I
tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of
your mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations.
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law
which should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At
other times I will excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable
while we work out any problems.

You are not to speculate about any such
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discussions. They are necessary from time to time and help the trial run more
smoothly.
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence,"
"direct evidence" and "hearsay evidence."

Do not be concerned with these

terms. You are to consider all the evidence admitted in this trial.
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the
sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and
what weight you attach to it.
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You
bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your
lives. In your everyday affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe,
what you believe, and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The
same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these
decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations.
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because
more witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your job is to think
about the testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you
believe of what he or she had to say.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his
or her opinion on that matter.

In determining the weight to be given such

opinion, you should consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and
the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are not bound by such opinion.
Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.
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If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am
inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to
be influenced by any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express,
nor will I intend to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not
worthy of belief; what facts are or are not established; or what inferences should
be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine seems to indicate an
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.
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Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That
subject must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it
will be my duty to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment.

000060

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

I

If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses
said. If you do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow
jurors go to the jury room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking
distract you so that you do not hear other answers by witnesses. When you
leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was
said and not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you
cannot assign to one person the duty of taking notes for all of you.
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It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the
court during the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night.
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the
attorneys, parties, witnesses, your friends, or members of your family. "No
discussion" also means no emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting
to electronic bulletin boards, and any other form of communication, electronic or
otherwise.
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at
the end of the trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your
deliberations.
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do
that not to insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but
because experience has shown this is one of the hardest instructions for jurors to
follow. I know of no other situation in our culture where we ask strangers to sit
together watching and listening to something, then go into a little room together
and not talk about the one thing they have in common: what they just watched
together.
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The first is to help you keep an
open mind. When you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them
and it is extremely important that you not make any decisions about this case
until you have heard all the evidence and all the rules for making your decisions,
and you won't have that until the very end of the trial. The second reason for the
rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision when you
deliberate. If you have conversations in groups of two or three during the trial,
you won't remember to repeat all of your thoughts and observations for the rest
of your fellow jurors when you deliberate at the end of the trial.
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any person tries to talk to
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you about this case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because
you are a juror. If that person persists, simply walk away and report the incident
to the marshal.

Do not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or
locations connected with this case. Do not look up any information from any
source, including the Internet. Do not communicate any private or special
knowledge about any of the facts of this case to your fellow jurors. Do not read
or listen to any news reports about this case or about anyone involved in this
case, whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio or
television.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and to
"Google" something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting
for jurors to do their own research to make sure they are making the correct
decision. You must resist that temptation for our system of justice to work as it
should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case only on the evidence
received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or do
outside research during the trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over
with new jurors and you could be held in contempt of court.
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the marshal may
confiscate all cell phones and other means of electronic communications.
Should you need to communicate with me or anyone else during the
deliberations, please notify the marshal.
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You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to
the law.
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the
rules, you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell
you, it is my instruction that you must follow.
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In order for the defendant to be guilty of Disturbing the Peace, the state
must prove each of the following:
1. On or about July 4, 2016,
2. in the state of Idaho,
3. the defendant, Aaron Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully
4. disturbed the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee
5. by offensive conduct.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
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It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If
you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on
that precise date.
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"Malice" and "maliciously" mean the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to
do a wrongful act.
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An act is "wilful" or done "wilfully" when done on purpose. One can act wilfully
without intending to violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
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As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply
those facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the
evidence presented in the case.
The evidence you are to consider consists of:
1.

sworn testimony of witnesses;

2.

exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and

3.

any facts to which the parties have stipulated.

Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including:
1.

arguments and statements by lawyers.

The lawyers are not witnesses.

What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other
times is included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If
the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have
stated them, follow your memory;
2.

testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been
instructed to disregard;

3.

anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session.
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A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify.
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the
fact that the defendant does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or
enter into your deliberations in any way.
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I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will
retire to the jury room for your deliberations.
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your
position even if shown that it is wrong.

Remember that you are not partisans or

advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before
making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all
of the evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with
the law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions.
During your deliberations, you each have a right to re-examine your own views and
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after
a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of
the jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.
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The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They
are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on
them in any way.
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions.
There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you
should not concern yourselves about such gap.
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INSTRUCTION NO. j_

You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you
to reach a verdict.

Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your

determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts.
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Upon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as a presiding juror, who will
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly;
that the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every
juror has a chance to express himself or herself upon each question.
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court.
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise.
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to
communicate with me, you may send a note by the marshal. You are not to reveal to me
or anyone else how the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are
instructed by me to do so.
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you
with these instructions.
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON LANTIS,
Defendant.

___________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)

Criminal No. CR0l-17-7609

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, AARON LANTIS, by and through his

Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, Anita Moore, handling attorney,
and, pursuant to Rule 29( c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, hereby moves this Honorable Court for
its order acquitting Mr. Lantis of the charge of disturbing the peace in violation of§ 18-6409,
Idaho Code, the court having previously denied his pre-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal
under Rule 29(a) and dismissal under Rule 48 on August 11, 2017, and the jury having
subsequently entered a verdict of guilty on the same day. This motion is made on the grounds
that the state's evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction in that it fails to prove an actus
reus that falls within the strictures of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL - 1
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ARGUMENT

After the state rested, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal and dismissal,
respectively, pursuant to Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, and cited in support State
v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct.App.2015), rev. den. State v. Pierce, _

Idaho _ , 2016 Ida.

LEXIS 28 (2016). After studying the Pierce decision, the court denied the defense's motion,
holding that the present case was distinguishable. In support of its ruling, the court cited the
Court of Appeals' comment, 159 Idaho at 664, that "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not
provide evidence at trial that Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within
the meaning of I.C. § 18-6409." The court apparently interpreted this comment to mean that the
state in Pierce had failed to offer any evidence as to the effect of Pierce's conduct upon the
complaining parties, since it contrasted this with the state of the evidence in the present case,
which included Hillary Henslee's testimony that Mr. Lantis' conduct left her feeling humiliated,
fearful for her job, and worried what recipients of the email in question thought of her. This, the
court held, was sufficient grounds to deny Mr. Lantis' motion and send the case to the jury. The
trial proceeded and then went to the jury; after about an hour of deliberation, the jury entered a
guilty verdict.
The Pierce case, however, bears closer examination. Pierce went to trial in Canyon
County, the Hon. Dayo Onanubosi presiding, and was convicted of violating a protection order
in violation of§ 39-6312, Idaho Code. The state's theory of the offense was that the standardform protection order, entered during the course of a contentious divorce, contained a clause
directing Pierce not to disturb the protected party's peace; and that he disturbed her peace on two
separate occasions by having the water and the electricity, respectively, shut off at his home
where she was residing.

Pierce made pre-verdict and post-verdict motions for judgment of

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL - 2
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acquittal under Rule 29, which motions were denied. He then appealed to the district court, the
Hon. Duff McKee presiding. The district court reversed on several grounds, the most pertinent
of which for purposes of the instant case was that the conduct alleged did not constitute
disturbing the peace within the meaning of§ 18-6409.
The state appealed further, raising the single issue whether the district court on
intermediate appeal erred by holding the state to the standards set by § 18-6409 when it had not
chosen to charge Pierce with a violation of that statute. Although Pierce raised additional issues
in his respondent's brief, the Court of Appeals did not address these; instead, it rejected the
state's argument that § 18-6409 was inapplicable, and affirmed the district court, holding that it
was undisputed that the state offered no evidence that Pierce had disturbed the peace within the
meaning of§ 18-6409. The Idaho Supreme Court then, without opinion, declined the state's

invitation to review the Court of Appeals.

1. The Pierce Case Is Not in Fact Distinguishable from the Present Case in Its Most

Critical Aspects; Pierce Strongly Supports the Defense's Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal.

It is critical to note that, in the comment cited above that this court found significant, the
Pierce court went on to add that the state did not provide evidence that Pierce disturbed the

peace "within the meaning of I. C. § I 8-6409" (emphasis added).

In considering the clause

"within the meaning of LC. § 18-6409" it is instructive to study Judge McKee's memorandum
decision, which the Court of Appeals affirmed and quoted from.

A courtesy copy of this

memorandum decision is attached.
To begin with, the memorandum decision makes clear that, so far from failing to proffer
evidence about the effects of Pierce's conduct on the complaining party, the state elicited the

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL - 3

000078

testimony of "several witnesses including the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account
of the breach." Memorandum Decision at 4. The court summed up "the turmoil all of this caused
in the life of the protected party and her children .... ":
With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being
restored within a few hours. The electrical service caused greater disruption.
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not
treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the
next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen foods were lost, and
the protected party and her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the
several days until the power was turned back on. This, the state contends, was
sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace," with the jury being allowed to
determine for themselves whether the actions in question should be deemed
illegal ....
Id. at 8.

The district court went on to note that disturbing the peace is a "well-recognized and
useful catch-all" for plea bargaining purposes, but that in the absence of a stipulation to a factual
basis, the state has to prove at least one of the "specific elements designated in the statute":
No matter how this statute is dissected or rearranged, the circumstances of the
case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of service, no
matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual noises,
(b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d)
anything related to guns or pistols, or (e) any use of vulgar or obscene language
around children. 1 If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the
misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred.
Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). Thus, the key to the district court's holding on intermediate appeal

was not that the state failed to offer evidence that the complaining party's peace was disturbed:
the state clearly presented copious evidence to that effect. Rather, one of the problems for the
state was that the charged conduct did not fit the legislature' s definition of disturbing the peace.

1

The Idaho Supreme Court, of course, struck down as unconstitutional this last provision pertaining to vulgar
language in front of children in State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004).
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The instant case presents essentially the same problem. The amended complaint alleged
that Aaron Lantis "did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, to-wit [sic]:
Hillary Henslee, by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Hillary
Henslee's employer." The charging instruction (No. 11) puts it in the following terms: "3. the
defendant, Aaron Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully 4. disturbed the peace or quiet of
Hillary Henslee 5. by offensive conduct." Judge McKee's analysis of the facts in Pierce is
squarely on point in the instant case. Sending an offensive email to the complaining party's
bosses, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual noises, (b)
tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, or (d) anything
related to guns or pistols.

Since the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the

misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, and this court should
grant Mr. Lantis' Rule 29 motion.

2. The Slippery Slope Is Fatal to the State's Theory of the Present Alleged Offense.
An important issue on appeal in Pierce was the lack of a jury instruction to clarify the

meaning of "breach of the peace" or "disturbing the peace," which the district court held - and
the Court of Appeals agreed - is a term of art, not carrying the plain, ordinary dictionary
meaning of those words or combination of words. Memorandum Decision at 9; Pierce, 159
Idaho at 663-64. The jury was left to decide for itself what "disturbing the peace" meant, and, at
one point in its deliberations, asked a question that made its level of confusion obvious. Id. at 5.
The state's whole theory of the alleged offense in the case at bar raises substantially the same
problem, namely, that the jury had too much scope to apply its own subjective standards in
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determining whether the charged conduct - sending an email to the complaining party's bosses rose to the level of "offensive conduct" within the meaning of§ 18-6409.
The district court in Pierce expanded on this problem, noting that it is the province of
neither juries nor judges to make the law: the jury is there to determine facts, and the court is
there to instruct on the law and resolve ambiguities in the law. Memorandum Decision at 9-10.
"What a judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of conduct not included in the
statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list of prohibited activities that is
included." Id. at 10. It was impermissible for the court to leave the jury to decide what "breach
the peace" meant, and thus whether the charged actions were prohibited by the protection order
at issue in the case. "To allow the jury to interpret and determine the law according to the
evidence in the case means that the jury could subjectively decide, based upon its own personal
values, customs and standards, what is and what is not against the law at any given time, then to
decide if what the defendant did in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law
thus created. Under any theory oflaw, this is impermissible." Id.
The district court then went on to elucidate the dangers of applying subjective
assessments in determining whether a crime has been committed:
... [T]he law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to determine their
application to particular facts, the interpretation must be based upon an objective
standard relative to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the
particular desires of any single individual. [Case cite omitted.] This is
necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression of what is and is not
acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of what is or is
not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between
individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat
sharp but not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vigor,
but were not loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps
contentious, but without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would
seriously argue that any of these situations approach the level of misconduct
required by the statute. Yet all of them include conduct that could be upsetting or
unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at any given time. It would be
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impermissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal code to be bent in
such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate individual could bring about
the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such
personal and individual demands.
Id. at 10-11 (emphases added).

The district court went on to note that courts have routinely stricken down enactments
that sought to have illegal conduct determined on a case-by-case basis, citing the example of
laws in the South against disturbing the peace based on general terms such as "'offensive
conduct':" in one such case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such a law could not be invoked to
prosecute black people for sitting at a whites-only lunch counter, even though such conduct was
considered by many at the time to be offensive. Memorandum Decision at 12. "The point is that
it is not a subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of objective
elements that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily excludes jury
participation in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury measures the
conduct to be sure; but only after the boundaries and intricacies in application have been defined
by the court." Id. at 13.
There is nothing absurd or far-fetched about the problem of the slippery slope.

We

currently live in an age when the nation is in a fever pitch of touchiness and highly overwrought
sensibilities. We see people coming to blows over mere political differences, and destroying or
calling for the destruction of historic monuments that they find offensive. We have even, in
recent days, been treated to the spectacle of a popular cable sports network pulling a reporter off
an assignment on the grounds that he bears a name very similar to that of a leading Civil War
Confederate general. "Offensive conduct" is at present, and given the current national mood, an
extremely big and ever-expanding tent.
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But it is imperative that in the criminal justice system, where life, liberty and property are
at stake, cooler heads prevail. In the instant case, we have a charge of disturbing the peace based
solely on the theory of "offensive conduct." As we have seen, an extremely broad range of
behaviors may be - and very often is - swept within the ambit of the word "offensive," viewed
in isolation. Taking the word "offensive" in isolation, as the state has done in the present case, is
the source of the slippery slope problem: it leaves the jury free to apply its own subjective
standards to convict Mr. Lantis of a crime of the jury's own making and definition. The danger
is all the greater when, as here, the conduct described in the complaint is of a character that is
highly likely to arouse strong emotions. In such a situation, and with no other guidance than
their own feelings on the meaning of "offensive conduct," the jury is free to define a crime not
contemplated by the legislature and return a verdict of guilty.

3. Either "Offensive Conduct" Must Be Interpreted in its Textual Context to
Exclude the Charged Conduct or § 18-6409 is Void for Vagueness and
Overbroad.

Although the state's theory of the offense cannot stand without taking the word
"offensive" in isolation, the word "offensive" does not in fact occur in isolation in the statute,
and the canons of statutory construction require that it not be read in isolation. The statute must
be read as a whole, with its components taken in the light of the surrounding text.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted
in the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a
whole, and words should be given their plain, usual and ordinary meanings. It
should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous or redundant.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL - 8

000083

State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863 , 867 (2011) (holding that "household member" for
purposes of the attempted strangulation statute includes only those in an intimate relationship
and excludes the parent-child relationship), quoting Ferber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho
307, 310 (2009).

Further, "[i]n determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim

noscitur a sociis, which means "a word is known by the company it keeps." Schultz, 151 Idaho
at 867, citing State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816 (2000), overruled in part by State v. Poe, 139
Idaho 885 (2004).
Reading the word "offensive" in its proper context as part of a whole, and recognizing the
word by the company it keeps, supports the McKee analysis as applied above. The type of
conduct outlawed in § 18-6409 is clearly of the loud, boisterous and tumultuous variety that
disrupts not merely a person' s interior peace of mind but exterior quiet and tranquility:
•

Loud or unusual noise

•

Tumultuous or offensive conduct

•

Threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting

•

Firing any gun or pistol

•

Disrupting services connected with the burial of the dead

Even the now-stricken-down provision against using profane language in front of
children is modified by the phrase "in a loud and boisterous manner." There is not even any
reference in the statute to email or any other kind of electronic communication. It must be the
case, then, that the "offensive conduct" the statute contemplates needs to be tumultuous, noisy,
and generally part of a class of behaviors that breaches the exterior peace of a person or a
community by means of some jarring and abrupt assault on the senses, or conduct calculated to
incite or provoke violence.

That necessarily excludes the state' s theory that Aaron Lantis
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disturbed the peace by sending an offensive email to Hillary Henslee ' s bosses: sending an
upsetting email to third parties simply does not fall into this category of conduct.
If, on the other hand, the state is right, and the word "offensive" is properly read in

isolation and outside the context of the words that surround it, and it encompasses that which
breaches only a persons' interior peace by provoking some negative emotional response, then §
18-6409 must be void for vagueness and overbroad, since no one, including Mr. Lantis, is on fair
notice as to what kind of conduct is prohibited, and since there is almost no behavior that it
would not reach, including constitutionally protected conduct.
The United States Supreme Court "has on more than one occasion invalidated
statutes ... because they contained no standard whatever by which criminality could be
ascertained, and the doctrine of these cases has subsequently acquired the shorthand description
of 'void for vagueness. "' Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974), citing Lanzetta v. New

Jersey, 306 U.S. 45 (1939); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). "In these cases, the
criminal provision is vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to
an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all."' Id. , quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614
(1971).The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 , 457 (2001). This "doctrine requires that a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted).
"The more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other
principle element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines
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to govern law enforcement. "' Id. at 358, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
"Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a
' standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections. "' Id. , quoting, Smith , 415 U.S. at 575. "Legislatures may not so abdicate their
responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law." Smith , 415 U.S. at 575. Rather,
the "absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578 (citation omitted). Simply put, a law is void for vagueness
when it subjects a person "to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court,
and jury [are] free to react to nothing more than their own preferences .... " Id. When the
accused asserts that a statute is vague as applied to the facts of his particular case, he must
demonstrate the that statute "failed to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed or
failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in
determining whether to arrest him." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003).
In this case, the state alleges that Mr. Lantis disturbed the peace of Ms. Henslee by using
email to cause her embarrassment and hurt her employment situation. Since, as noted above,
there is no reference to email or any other electronic communication in § 18-6409, there is
nothing in the statute that puts the accused on notice that sending an email might constitute
disturbing the peace. The state' s reading of § 18-6409 leaves it with far too much discretion to
use the criminal law to avenge perceived wrongs committed via email without notice to
reasonable persons that such perceived wrongs are criminal in nature.
If the state' s theory of the offense in this case is justified, then § 18-6409 is also facially

overbroad. The first step in determining whether a statute is facially overbroad is to determine
whether that statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
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U.S. 601 , 614 (1973); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714. The next step in the analysis is to determine
whether the statute precludes a significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Korsen,
138 Idaho at 713. "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion to consider rules of statutory
construction. The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed
legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." State v. Dickerson,
142 Idaho 514, 517 (Ct.App.2006) (internal quotation marks and cites omitted). Courts "are not
free to rewrite a statute under the guise of statutory construction." State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326
(2009).
Speech in its various forms is obviously protected by the First Amendment. While it is
true that the right to free speech is not 100% unqualified, nevertheless, if the state is right in this
case, and sending an "offensive" email can constitute disturbing the peace, then anyone who
sends an email or indeed any sort of communication that someone else might deem "offensive"
needs to fear the risk of being charged with a crime for doing so. Thus, the state' s theory of the
offense in this case, if justified, means that § 18-6409 is overbroad.
CONCLUSION

The Pierce case - both at the level of intermediate appeal and at the Court of Appeals
level - instructs us that there are limits to the kinds of upsetting conduct that can be addressed by
the criminal justice system. In that case, as in the case against Aaron Lantis, the state presented
plenty of evidence as to how disturbed the complaining parties were by the conduct alleged.
Also, as in the Pierce case, the state' s theory of the offense in the instant case left the jury free to
apply its own subjective standards in determining whether the act of sending an "offensive"
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email was criminal. But, as in Pierce, the acts alleged did not fall within the strictures of§ 186409, Idaho Code.
A proper reading of § 18-6409 requires the exclusion of the actus reus described in the
complaint in this case, which means that the state has failed to offer evidence sufficient to sustain
a conviction. Otherwise, if the state' s reading of § 18-6409 is true, then that statute must be
facially overbroad, as sweeping a great deal of protected conduct within its ambit, and void for
vagueness facially and as applied, for putting no one on notice that sending an "offensive" email
may constitute the crime of disturbing the peace.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant, AARON LANTIS, respectfully requests this Court to
enter a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Idaho
Criminal Rules.

DATED, thi~

day of August, 2017.

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ~

ay of August, 2017, I mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to the:

Ada County Prosecutor
by email and by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL - 13

000088

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. CR-2013-13285-C

v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BRIAN W. PIERCE,
Defendnat/Appellant

This case is before this court on appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on
a jury verdict by the magistrate below, and the subsequent denial of a post judgment
motion for acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. The appellant herein, Brian W.
Pierce, appears by and through counsel, Nolan Sorenson, Office of Public Defender,
Caldwell. The state appears by and though counsel, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Nancy
Hurd, Canyon County Prosecutor's Office, Caldwell. The matter has been fully briefed,
and submitted for decision on the briefs without argument.
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For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction entered herein is reversed. The
motion for acquittal presented to the court under Rule 29 is granted. The defendant is
acquitted and all charges are dismissed.

Facts and Procedural History
The salient facts are not in dispute. At the time of the events in question in 2013,
Pierce was in litigation with his ex-wife over issues pertaining to their divorce. On May
15, 2013, an order was entered in the divorce proceeding directing that the house the
parties had been living in was Pierce's separate property. The wife and her two children
were permitted to live there. The two children were not Pierce's children. A domestic
violence order was entered against Pierce - the temporary order was issued May 8, 2013,
and the permanent order replaced the temporary after hearing on May 16, 2013. This
order was to remain in place for a full year, unless modified by the court. The operative
provisions of this order, as are relevant here, was apparently an identical provision in
both orders which provided:
Personal Conduct Order: Respondent shall not harass, annoy, disturb the
peace of, telephone, contact, or otherwise communicate with (either
directly or indirectly, in person or through any other person): The
protected person [and] The minor children residing in the Protected
Person's household.
Both of the orders, including this paragraph, were pre-printed forms used by the court in
connection with domestic abuse orders in Canyon County. Other than filling in names
and addresses, and several blanks, the magistrate made no manuscript entries on either
form. There is no dispute in this case that this order was entered, serially on the dates
indicated, that both orders had been served on Pierce, and that he was aware of it.
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On May 10, 2013, service for water to the subject house was cut off by the utility.

On May 31, 2013, service for electricity to the subject house was cut off by the utility.
The state alleged that both shut-offs were accomplished by Pierce calling the utilities and
requesting that the services be terminated. At trial, the only evidence of Pierce's
involvement was the testimony of the investigating detective, who testified that Peirce
admitted to him that he (Pierce) had called the power company to shut off the power.
There was no direct evidence of Pierce's involvement with the water shut off.
Pierce was charged in a single count complaint with the misdemeanor offense of
willfully violating the terms of the domestic abuse protection order, with knowledge of
the prohibitions contained within the protection order, by turning off the utilities at the
residence where the protected person and her children were residing, alleging that such
disturbed the peace of the protected person and her children.
Following a trial that was completed in less than one day, the jury returned a
verdict finding the defendant guilty of the charge. A post trial motion for acquittal under
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 was denied. The defendant was sentenced on January 16, 2014.
This appeal followed.
Analysis

The charge was violating a domestic violence order, with the charging language
being that the defendant breached the peace of the protected party by his action in
causing the water and power utilities to be shut off. The magistrate ruled that the phrase
"breached the peace" was a term of art, and that reference to the Idaho Code criminal
provision of disturbing the peace would be the criteria for defining the offense in the

protective order. The crime, a misdemeanor, is at LC. § 18-6409, and provides as follows:
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Disturbing the Peace: (1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the
peace and quiet of any neighborhood, family or person by loud or unusual noise,
or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires and gun or pistol or uses vulgar, profane
or indecent language within the presence of hearing of children, in loud and
boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The trial consisted of the testimony of the investigation detective from the Canyon

County Sheritrs office on the occurrence of the breach, and several witnesses including
the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account of the breach. The trial took less
than one day.
The charging instruction was a single instruction to the jury. The instruction was
p~ared by drawing some specific language from the code section on the misdemeanor
crime of breach the peace, adding this to the standard elements instruction for violation of
a domestic protection order. This instruction, numbered for the jury as Instruction No.
204 and edited here slightly to emphasize the relevant portions, read as follows:
Instruction 204
In order for the defendant to be guilty of violating a protection order, the
State must prove each of the following elements:
1. That on or about May 8, 2013 and June l, 2013;
2. In the State ofldaho;
3. The Defendant Brian Wade Pierce;
4. Did willfully violate the temporary domestic violence order ... and
the amended domestic violence order ••. by turning off the utilities
at the residence where [the protected parties] were residing which
disturbed the peace of [the protected parties] with knowledge that a
domestic violence protection order prohibits him from doi
5. Before such violation, the defendant had notice of the order.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.
The jury sent a question through the bailiff that frames the issue in this analysis:
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rue we deciding if he willfully violated the order, i.e., did he shut off the utilities
to disturb her peace or are we deciding if he willfully shut off the utilities and it
disturbed her peace but he didn't necessarily know he was violating the order?
Despite this red flare from the jury that plainly demonstrated that they were confused by
the instructions and did not understand the issues to be resolved, the solution reached by
the court below, with the concurrence of counsel, was to advise the jury that the answer
was within the instructions they already had, and that no further instruction would be
given. The error in not clarifying the jury's confusion is subsumed completely by the
errors in the instructions themselves, discussed within.
The charging instruction is wrong. The grammatical construction of the fourth
element awkwardly attempts to put three concepts for the jury to decide into one
sentence: (1) did or did not the state prove that the defendant shut off the utility in
question, which act (2) did nor did not constitute a breach of the peace of the protected
person, and (3) of which the defendant did or did not willfully intended to breach. As is
apparent from the jury's question, the awkward sentence was confusing. The sentence
could be read to mean that the court has already determined that shutting off the utility
was a breach of the peace, and the only thing to be decided is whether the defendant
intended or knew of the consequences. The instruction set as a whole was wrong in that
the set did not include an instruction defining what would have been necessary to find
that acts in question did constitute disturbing the peace - something to relate the acts in
question to the elements contained in the statute, I.C. §18-6409.
For the jury to determine its verdict, the jury must be able to determine and
complete answer to each of these questions from the evidence at trial:
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(a) Do the acts described in the charge (the termination of utilities) constitute one
or more of the enumerated elements of "disturbing the peace" under the law of
Idaho?
(b) Did the defendant do one of these acts (cause termination of utilities);

(c) If so, did he do so willfully and with malice?
(d) Did the defendant know of the existence of a protective order that prevented
him from doing the acts?
In my view, there is no way the circumstances described by the evidence should

or could constitute a crime under the criminal statute, and therefore they could not form
the basis for a charge of breach of the protective order by disturbing the peace. There is
no other clause or part of the protective order that comes into play, and the state has not
alleged any. The case should not have survived the Rule 29 motions; one of the defense
motions for a directed verdict of acquittal at close of the state's case, or at the close of
evidence, or post-trial should have been granted.
According to the proof at trial, when the electrical power was shut off on or about
May 31, the house belonged to the defendant. The final divorce orders were entered on or
about May 15, 2013, which confirmed the house as being the separate property of the
husband. Yet the protected parties continued to remain in the house, although it is not
clear under what authority. There was no proof that the defendant had been ordered to
allow the protected parties to remain in the house, or that he had to provide them with
utilities. The protected parties were, in effect, tenants at sufferance of the defendant continuing to occupy the house after it had been awarded to him in the divorce, but
before any legal steps had been taken either to clarify what their rights and obligations on
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continuing occupancy would be or to evict them. None of this was brought into evidence
at trial.
The situation with respect to the water service is a little different, in that it is
alleged that this utility was shut off on or about May 10, 2013, before the final divorce
orders were entered. While the defense maintained that the house had always been the
defendant's separate property, no evidence was offered at the trial here and, depending
upon what the evidence might show in this issue, this position may not appear so clearly
defined -- the status of this property as marital property may still have been open in early
May. But even then, it is not alleged that the defendant was legally obligated to provide
water service to the house where is soon-to-be ex-wife and her children were living.
Although there were allegations about the water service, there was no competent
proof at trial that the defendant had anything to do with the termination of water service.

In reading the complete transcript, it turns out that minutes before the trial started, the
court struck the witness from the water utility on motion of the defense for a discovery
rule infraction. This meant that the only proof at trial of the defendant's involvement in
any of the acts alleged consisted of the investigating detective's testimony that the
defendant admitted to calling the power company on or about June 1, because be did not
want to be liable for the power bills. (Tr. p. 110, 1. 1-5.) The detective did not follow up
with any specific inquiry about the water utility.
The defendant's admission to the sheriff's detective as to the power was the sum
total of the evidence on defendant's guilt. The rest of the testimony was devoted to proof
of the consequences - the turmoil all of this caused in the life of the protected party and
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her children. On this proof, the issue of the water utility termination should not have
gone to the jury.
With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being restored
within a few hours. The electrical service termination caused greater disruption. Power
was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not treat this as a
weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the next week. There
was testimony that refrigerated and frozen foods were lost, and the protected party and
her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the several days until the power
was turned back on. This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the
peace," with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in
question should be deemed illegal. I conclude this to be error.
I fully recognize that the charge of "disturbing the peace" is a well-recognized
and useful catch-all into which all manner of questionable conduct can be cataloged for
the purpose of closing troublesome cases. Invariably, these questionable situations turn
up by stipulation in plea agreements whereby more significant charges are being
dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to a disturbing the peace charge. These deals are
usually at the defendant's request, and there is no one calling for any inquiry into whether
the specific acts fit the statute.
Without a stipulation, the State would be obligated to prove one or more of the
specific elements designated in the statute had been violated or breached in order to
sustain a conviction. No matter how this statute is dissected or rearranged, the
circumstances of the case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of
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service, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual
noises, (b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d)
anything related to guns or pistols, or (e) any use of vulgar or obscene language around
children. If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the misdemeanor statute,
the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred.
And if the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, neither has the
circumstance of violating a protective order by disturbing the peace. The magistrate
below correctly observed that the term "disturbing the peace" is a term of art. It does not
carry the plain ordinary dictionary meaning of the words, or combination of words. It

carries the meaning of the statute -here, I.C. § 18-6409.
The state argues that a jury can decide whether a given circumstance could be said
to breach the peace of a given individual. The argument is wrong on two counts. The jury
does not make the law, it is to determine the facts, and it is the responsibility of the judge
to define the law, to set the frame for decision. State v. Golden, 61 Idaho 497, 186 P.2d

485; State v. Bedwell, 77 Idaho 57, 61-62, 286 P.2d 641, 644 ( 1955). The judge may not
make up law out of whole cloth but is bound by case precedent and by the acts of the
legislature. State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122, 131,267 P.3d 709, 718 (2011). lfthere is an
ambiguity in the law, the judge must resolve the ambiguity - it would be improper to
permit the jury to do so. But that is as far as it goes. The judge would also not be
permitted to create new categories of conduct for sanction under the misdemeanor statute,
absent a stipulation. Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619, 620, 651 P.2d 553, 554 (Ct App.

l 982)(Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes, but have no power to
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change the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature and cannot insert into
statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there.)
The principle is that the legislature makes the law, the judge identifies and
explains the law to the jury, and the jury determines whether facts exist or do not exist
within the framework of the law as instructed by the court. The court may interpret the
law, and break down complex provisions to provide relevant extracts for the jury's use.
The court may fill in gaps, if such occur, but must do so consistently with what the
legislature has enacted. What a judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of
conduct not included in the statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list
of prohibited activities that is included.
In this case, the trial judge left for the jury to decide what the phrase "breach the
peace" meant (which was error; this was a decision for the judge in instructing the jury);
to then decide if what they thought the phrase meant was what the law intended when the
phrase was used in the domestic protection order (which was error; the interpretation of
the law is for the judge to determine and instruct). To allow the jury to interpret and
determine the law according to the evidence in the case means that the jury could
subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs and standards, what is
and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what the defendant did
in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created. Under any
theory of law, this is impermissible.
The second flaw in the state's argument is that it presupposes as proper a

subjective assessment of what might be considered a breach of the peace to a given
individual. To the contrary, the law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to
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determine their application to particular facts, the interpretation must be based upon an
objective standard relative to to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the
particular desires of any single individual. See State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,508, 988
P.2d 1170, 1182 (1999). This is necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression
of what is and is not acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of
what is or is not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between
individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat sharp but
not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vigor, but were not
loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps contentious, but
without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would seriously argue that any of
these situations approach the level of misconduct required by the statute. Yet all of them
include conduct that could be upsetting or unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at
any given time. It would be impennissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal
code to be bent in such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate ·individual could
bring about the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such
personal and individual demands.
If the test here is to be under an objective standard of what is or should be
acceptable or unacceptable to society generally, can it be said that a property owner's
decision to notify a utility to terminate service could be considered wrongful or illegal? In
the instant case, there was no evidence that the defendant instructed the power company
not to tell the occupant or warn the occupant the power was being terminated. There is no
evidence that the defendant was in any way involved with the actual action of shutting off

the power. There is no claim that he was present to cheer on the power crew or to gloat
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over his ex-wife's predicament The transaction was handled in the manner of hundreds
of transactions at the power company where a property owner is telephoning in with an
instruction for his account.
The point here is that there is nothing about the transaction, when viewed in
isolation, that could be consider wrong or improper or illegal in any respect. Insofar as
defendant's expectations of his ex-wife's reaction, if the water company example applies,
he would expect that with a few phone calls, the power would be restored in his ex-wife's
name. Is not this exactly what a tenant moving out would think when advising the power
company to terminate service in the tenant's name on a given date? How was the
defendant to know that the power company would act on a Friday afternoon, or that the
power company would not treat the issue as a weekend emergency, or that they would not
notify he occupant if the power is being shut down.
Where attempts have been made to leave such statutes open for case by case
assessment of what was legal and illegal conduct, the courts have routinely stricken such
laws as unconstitutional. The widest examples of such were the broadly drawn statues in
the south that expressed the prohibitions in general terms such as "offensive conduct,"
without more. The United State Supreme Court, for example, held that a disturbing the
peace ordinance could not be used where the only conduct being charged was against
some black teenagers for sitting at a white-only lunch counter. See, Garner v. State of
La., 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248, 7 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1961). It did not matter that the

conduct was offensive to many. It would not be a jury question for the jury to decide
whether the conduct under examination should be considered criminal. Under our law, it

is the legislature in the first instance, and the judge where discretionary flexibility may
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appears to exist, that is responsible to define where the division lines are between the
merely rude and insulting and that which crosses the line into the sufficiently obnoxious
to be criminal; between the innocently enthusiastic protest march, and one that involves
the looting and destruction that accompanies the march that crosses the line. The point is
that it is not a subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of
objective elements that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily
excludes jury participation in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury
measures the conduct to be sure; but only after the boundaries and intricacies in
application have been defined by the court. That was not done in this case, and the
omission is reversible error.
To summarize: there is no proof in this case that the defendant was involved in
the termination of water to the property at all. For reasons not part of this appeal, the
magistrates struck the state's witness on the water circumstance. However, for some
reason, having stricken the witness, the state left the charge in for instructions and
argument, and the jury apparently included it as part of their verdict Since a guilty
verdict could have been based upon either one of the circumstances alleged, or on both, it
was reversible error to leave this charge in through the final instruction's and argument.
The act of a property owner asking the power company to shut off service is not,
in the abstract, wrongful. It is a routine business decision carried out by countless
property owners every day. There is no evidence that the defendant directed the power
company to act in an underhanded, mean or evil manner. There was no evidence of
whether the power company attempted to contact the occupants before the power was

shut off. It is not explained why the power company did not treat the matter as a weekend
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emergency when it learned the actual circumstances. There is no proof that the defendant
knew how the power company was going to act.
The conduct in question does not fit within any of the categories of conduct
proscribed by the criminal statute, which is the necessary measure of action under the
protective order. In my view, that is the end of it. Domestic protection orders are
intended, as a matter of legislative policy, to protect the person of the protected partiesto prevent violence and abusive misconduct. In the case of the addition of an ill-defined
catch-all term - such as ''breach the peace" - the law requires that conduct falling into
this catch-all be of the same general character or caliber as the conduct in the more
clearly defined areas. This means the catch-all terms are limited to proscribing conduct
directed at, or at least in the area of, the violent or abusive misconduct that precipitated
this law in the first place. It would not countenance extending the law into every comer

of commerce and business, making every business decision subject to examination over
whether wtexpected inconveniences might spring up.
The magistrate erred in not defining specifically the conduct that would have been
subject to sanction wtder the criminal code or that was included within the call of the
protective order. The magistrate was bound to explain to the jury where the lines were
that would have to be crossed in order for what would otherwise be routine business
decisions to be turned into criminal activity - whether under the disturbing the peace
statute that was incorporated into the order or under any of the direct prohibitions of the
protective order.
The magistrate's error in failing to instruct meant that the jury was free to make
up its own criminal bowtdaries or standards, and then determine whether this defendant

Memorandum Decision

Page - 14

000102

c·
.,.

had crossed the line or violated the standard which the jury had created. This is not
permitted to the jury under any application oflaw. There simply was no evidence that the
defendant acted with malicious intent or wanton disregard to harm his wife or her
property. There was no evidence that the defendant knew the power company was going
to act on a weekend, and then not respond to requests to restore service. There is no basis
to place this on the back of the defendant in this case. Further, there was no reason for the
defendant not to expect the power company to notify the occupants before the power was
shut off, to give them time to act and restore service. Or if interrupted, not to expect that
the interruption would have been brief, while the arrangements were made. There is no
showing that the reasonable expectations of this case would have been any more onerous
or inconvenient than befalls many a landlord or tenant caught up in identical situations in
the ordinary process of moving in or out.
Whatever the disagreements were that continued to plague these parties after their
divorce, there is no sufficient evidence in his case that any of it crossed the line into the
arena of the violent or abusive misconduct which is the gravamen of the protective order
issued in this case.

Conclusion
For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is and ruling denying the
defendant's motion for acquittal are vacated and reversed. The case is remanded with
directions to enter a directed verdict of acquittal and dismiss all charges.
0.~
Dated thisu day of December, 2014.

Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
Aaron Eugene Lantis
Defendant.

Case No. CR01-17-07609
SCHEDULING ORDER ON MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

On August 25, 2017, counsel for defendant Aaron Lantis filed a Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c) (hereinafter "Motion").
On the same day, counsel served a copy of the Motion on the Ada County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office by email and by interdepartmental mail.
The State has until Monday, September 25, 2017, to file a written objection and/or
other response to the Motion.
The defendant shall then have until Monday, October 9, 2017, to file a reply to the
State's pleading or until fourteen (14) days after the State files its pleading,
whichever is earlier.
The Sentencing Hearing currently scheduled for October 5, 2017, at 2:30 p.m. is
hereby vacated and rescheduled to November 28, 2017 at 2:30 p.m.
If either party wants to present oral argument in favor of or against the Motion, that
party must contact the Court's clerk for an appropriate hearing date and time on or
before November 1, 2017, and then properly file and serve a Notice of Hearing. If
neither party requests oral argument by Monday, October 16, 2017, then the Court
shall consider the matter to be fully submitted and will issue a decision without a
hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated:

A_~w::,+-

~l I Zo17

Michael W. Lojek
Judge
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200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
vs.

Plaintiff,

AARON LANTIS
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR01-17-7609
STATE’S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

COMES NOW, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, by and through D. Garrett Swenson,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State of Idaho, and objects to Defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the State presented substantial evidence at trial upon
which a rational trier of fact could have found the Defendant guilty of the crime alleged beyond a
reasonable doubt. Additionally, Defendant’s reliance on State v. Pierce is misplaced as Pierce is
distinguishable from the present case. Finally, Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not impermissibly vague as
applied or overbroad on its face.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Defendant with video voyeurism. The felony charges were dismissed at
preliminary hearing on December 16, 2016, and refiled as misdemeanor disturbing the peace, a
violation of Idaho Code § 18-6409. Idaho Code § 18-6409 provides:
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or
offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or
fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language
within the presence or hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
I.C. § 18-6409.
Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Defendant willfully and maliciously disturbed the
peace of Hillary Henslee by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to
Hillary Henslee’s employer. Compl. ¶ 2. The case went to trial on August 11, 2017, and the jury
returned a guilty verdict. Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under Idaho Criminal
Rule 29(c) on August 25, 2017.
ARGUMENT
1. The Court should deny Defendant’s motion because the State presented substantial
evidence of guilt at trial.
In reviewing a motion for acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29, a trial court uses the
same standard applied in appellate review of convictions. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 480, 482
(Ct. App. 1989), citing State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863 (Ct. App. 1984). “The trial court, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, must determine whether the inculpatory
evidence presented as to any essential element of the crime is so insubstantial that jurors could
not help but have a reasonable doubt.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 395 (Ct. App. 2000),
citing Hoffman, 116 Idaho at 482. The trial judge must give full consideration to the right of the
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jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, and the right to
draw all justifiable inferences. State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 427 (Ct. App. 1982). The
appropriate standard, therefore, is “whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684 (2004).
At trial, the State presented substantial evidence as to every element of disturbing the
peace such that a trier of fact could have found—and did find—the Defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. The elements of disturbing the peace were submitted to the jury without
objection: (1) On or about July 4, 2016, (2) in the state of Idaho, (3) the defendant, Aaron
Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully (4) disturbed the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee (5)
by offensive conduct. Jury Instruction 11. “Maliciously” was defined as the desire to annoy or
injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act. Jury Instruction 13; see also I.C. § 18-101.
“Willfully” was defined as doing an act on purpose, without necessarily the intent to violate the
law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. Jury Instruction 14; see also I.C. § 18-101.
A. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged conduct occurred on or about July
4, 2016.
Three witnesses testified to the date the email and pictures were sent, and it was
confirmed by a recorded phone call with the Defendant. Both Hillary Henslee and Nancy van
Winkle testified that the email and pictures were received on July 4, 2016. On a recorded phone
call, Aaron Lantis admitted that he sent the email and pictures on “Monday morning.” State’s Tr.
Ex. 1. Officer Jeremy Miller testified that, in context, that statement meant July 4, 2016. The
State presented substantial evidence that the conduct occurred on or about July 4.
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B. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged crime occurred in the state of
Idaho.
Hillary Henslee and Nancy van Winkle testified as to the bank’s location in the state of
Idaho. Hillary Henslee testified that she was in Idaho when the email and pictures were sent. The
State presented substantial evidence that the alleged crime occurred in the state of Idaho.
C. The State presented substantial evidence that Aaron Lantis acted maliciously and willfully.
Hillary Henslee identified the Defendant as Aaron Lantis in court. Officer Jeremy Miller
testified that he called the Defendant’s phone number and verbally identified the speaker as
Aaron Lantis. The State presented a recording of a phone call with Aaron Lantis wherein Lantis
admitted that he sent the email and pictures because he knew Hillary’s job was important to her.
See State’s Tr. Ex. 1. Lantis admitted on the recording that his intent in sending the email and
pictures was to cause Hillary Henslee to lose her job. Id. The State clearly provided substantial
evidence of the Defendant’s identity and that he purposely acted with the specific intent to annoy
or injure Hillary Henslee.
D. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee’s peace.
Hillary Henslee testified that she was humiliated that the email and pictures had been sent
to her employers and coworkers. She felt uncomfortable at work, and continues to feel
uncomfortable every time she sees a recipient of the email. She was nervous that she would lose
her job, or that her career would be impacted by the email and pictures. She testified that she was
concerned because she is a single mother. She was worried about providing for her family
because of the Defendant’s actions. The State presented substantial evidence that Hillary
Henslee’s peace was disturbed.
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E. The State presented substantial evidence that the Defendant’s conduct was “offensive.”
“Offensive conduct” must be defined by its plain meaning. In the absence of a statutory
definition, words should be given their commonly understood, everyday meanings. Ada County
Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428 (1993); see also State v. Schulz, 151
Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (stating that words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meanings). The Court should give effect to all words and provisions so that none would be void,
superfluous, or redundant. Schulz, 151 Idaho at 863.

Courts frequently refer to a word’s

dictionary definition to determine its commonly understood meaning. See State v. Poe, 139 Idaho
885, 895-96 (2004) (using Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary to define
“traducing,” “quarrelling,” “vulgar,” “profane,” and “indecent”); Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (citing
the Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “cohabit” in addition to its
common law meaning). “Offensive” is defined as: “1. making attack…2. Giving painful or
unpleasant sensations…3. Causing displeasure or resentment.” See WEBSTER’S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (G&C Merriam Co. 1979); see also Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offensive (23 Sept. 2017). Moreover,
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “offensive” as “1. Of or for attack…2. Unpleasant or
disagreeable to the senses; obnoxious…3. Causing displeasure, anger, or resentment; esp.,
repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is decent or moral….” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
887 (7th ed. 2000).
The State presented substantial evidence that the Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee’s
peace by offensive conduct. Nancy van Winkle testified that the email accused Hillary of
inappropriate behavior and had pictures attached. The State presented four pictures, and Hillary
Henslee testified that they were the four pictures sent with the email. See State’s Tr. Ex. 3-6.
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Two of the photos depicted the inner thighs of a female seated in what appeared to be an office
environment. One of the photos of the upper thigh included the vaginal area, although the subject
wore what appeared to be black underwear. The subject’s hand covered the vaginal area in the
second picture of the upper thigh. A third picture depicted an apparently nude Hillary Henslee
seated with her knees drawn up to cover her chest. The fourth picture depicted the subject’s
buttocks and pink underwear. Hillary Henslee testified that she was the subject of the pictures,
that she had taken them of herself, and that she had sent the pictures to Aaron Lantis while the
two were dating. Hillary Henslee further testified that she did not give the Defendant permission
to show the pictures to anyone else, and had in fact asked the Defendant to delete them. Hillary
Henslee testified that the recipient list included her immediate boss, the chief financial officer of
the bank she worked at, a coworker, and several members of the bank’s board of directors. The
State presented a recording of Aaron Lantis in which he admitted that he had sent the email and
pictures to Hillary Henslee’s supervisor because he knew Hillary’s job was so important to her,
and Lantis wanted her to lose her job. See State’s Tr. Ex. 1. The State presented substantial
evidence that Hillary Henslee’s peace was disturbed by offensive conduct, particularly given the
nature of the pictures, the fact that they were sent without consent, the nature of the recipients,
and the Defendant’s stated intent in sending the email and pictures. Given this evidence, a jury
could reasonably conclude that the act of sending the email or pictures constituted offensive
conduct as that term is commonly understood.
The State provided substantial evidence at trial of each element of the crime of disturbing
the peace such that a trier of fact could find the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
particularly when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. The Court
should therefore deny the Defendant’s Rule 29(c) motion.
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2. State v. Pierce is clearly distinguishable from the instant case and does not control.
Defendant’s motion relies on the court’s ruling in State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct.
App. 2015), for the proposition that sending an offensive email or pictures cannot be made to
resemble any of the elements of Idaho Code § 18-6409. Mot. J. Acquittal 5. In Pierce, the
defendant and his ex-wife were in litigation over their divorce. 159 Idaho at 662. A magistrate
had determined that the house in question was Pierce’s separate property, but Pierce’s ex-wife
continued to live in the house without Pierce. Id. A protection order was entered, prohibiting
Pierce from disturbing the peace of his ex-wife or her children. Id. Prior to the order, water
service to the residence was terminated. Following the order, electrical service was also
terminated, allegedly at Pierce’s request. Id. The state alleged that Pierce violated the terms of
the protection order by turning off utilities, which disturbed the peace of the protected parties. Id.
The state argued that it was not required to prove elements of a crime it had not charged, and that
it met its burden by providing evidence that the defendant had generally disturbed the peace of
his ex-wife by canceling electricity to his house. Id. at 663.The court found that the state did not
provide evidence at trial that the defendant had engaged in acts constituting disturbing the peace
as defined by Idaho Code § 18-6409. Id.
In the present case, the State alleged that Aaron Lantis disturbed the peace of Hillary
Henslee by offensive conduct. The legislature specifically articulated acts constituting disturbing
the peace and included offensive conduct. I.C. § 18-6409. The State, therefore, alleged that the
Defendant committed the crime of disturbing the peace specifically by conduct that is statutorily
included within the crime’s definition. The jury was not left to decide for itself what “disturbing
the peace” meant, as the Defendant claims was the case in Pierce. See Mot. J. Acquittal 6 (citing
the district court’s memorandum decision in stating “It was impermissible for the court to leave
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the jury to decide what ‘breach the peace’ meant, and thus whether the charged actions were
prohibited by the protection order”). The State alleged that the victim’s peace was maliciously
and willfully disturbed by offensive conduct. The State articulated the specific conduct that was
offensive. The instant case is therefore distinguishable from Pierce because the State alleged that
the Defendant committed the crime of disturbing the peace by conduct that was specifically
included in the statutory definition of the crime.
The facts of the two cases are clearly distinguishable. In Pierce, the defendant was
accused of terminating electricity to his own house, a property he owned separately from his exwife. See 159 Idaho at 662. In the instant case, the State presented evidence at trial that the
Defendant sent sexually provocative pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her employers and coworkers
for the purpose of getting her fired, despite his ex-girlfriend’s request that he delete the pictures.
While there was insufficient evidence in Pierce for a trier of fact to find that the defendant had
engaged in conduct fitting the definition of disturbing the peace, the State has clearly presented
substantial evidence of every element of the crime as defined in Idaho Code 18-6409. As such,
Pierce is distinguishable from the instant case and does not control.
3. Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
Defendant contends that Idaho Code § 18-6409 is both impermissibly vague as applied to
the facts of the case and facially overbroad. Mot. J. Acquittal 11. The Defendant’s argument
revolves around the appropriate interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-6409. The Idaho Supreme
Court divided the statute into three parts based on the three verbs used: “disturbs,” “fires,” and
“uses.” Poe, 139 Idaho at 894. The Court further divided the portion of the statute related to
“disturbs” into three sections of adverbial prepositional phrases that explain how someone can
disturb the peace in order to violate the statute. Id. at 894-95. The statute is disjunctive.
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Therefore, one can “disturb” the peace [a] by loud and unusual noise, or [b] by tumultuous or
offensive conduct, or [c] by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting.
See Id. at 894. The adverbs “maliciously” and “willfully” modify all three verbs. Id.at 895. Thus,
one can violate Idaho Code § 18-6409 by maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace of
another by offensive conduct.
To succeed on an “as applied” challenge the defendant must show that the statute, as
applied to his or her conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant’s conduct was
proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion.
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003). Given the plain meaning of “offensive conduct,” it
seems highly unlikely that anyone would believe that sending sexually provocative pictures of an
ex-girlfriend to her boss for the purpose of getting her fired would not fall under the purview of
the statute. The Defendant’s conduct is clearly offensive, both to the victim and to society. A
plain meaning reading of the statute could not but provide fair notice that such conduct was
proscribed. As to whether the statute provides sufficient guidelines for enforcement, the statute
itself limits its application to offensive conduct that disturbs another and is willful and malicious.
“The requirement that the defendant must maliciously and willfully disturb the peace in one of
the ways specified provides adequate standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” Poe, 139 Idaho at 903. It is not merely offensive conduct that is proscribed, but
offensive conduct that is purposive, intended to annoy, injure, or do a wrong, and that has its
desired effect in that it disturbs another. As such, the statute itself provides adequate limitations
to enforcement and is not impermissibly vague as applied.
For a facial challenge to be successful, “the complainant must demonstrate that the law is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712 (quoting Village of
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Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)). The challenger must
show that the statute is invalid in toto. Id. Where the statute proscribes conduct rather than
merely spoken words, the overbreadth of the statute must be real and substantial, judged in
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Poe, 139 Idaho at 892. Idaho Code § 18-6409
regulates speech and conduct. As narrowed by Idaho courts, the speech regulated by Idaho Code
§ 18-6409 is largely unprotected. See Poe, 139 Idaho at 895-96 (stating that threatening,
traducing, quarrelling, and challenging to fight are unprotected). Other portions of Idaho Code §
18-6409 seek to regulate conduct and are “neutral as to any expressive element that may exist in
a particular circumstance.” Id. at 895. The legislature is free to regulate conduct that does not
infringe on Constitutional protections. As discussed above, the statute appropriately limits itself
by specifying the manner, result, and intent that must exist for an act to be criminalized. The
statute is therefore not invalid in all applications and is not substantially overbroad in relation to
its plainly legitimate sweep. The statute is not overbroad on its face.

CONCLUSION
The standard for motions pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c) is clear. In the light most
favorable to the State, the State presented substantial evidence at trial upon which a rational trier of
fact could find the Defendant guilty of Disturbing the Peace under Idaho Code § 18-6409 beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Defendant’s motion should therefore be denied. In addition, Defendant’s
reliance on State v. Pierce is misplaced as Pierce is distinguishable from the present case. Finally,
Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not impermissibly vague as applied or overbroad on its face.
WHEREFORE, the State objects to Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and
respectfully requests this Court DENY the Defendant’s motion.

STATE’S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL (LANTIS), 10
000116

DATED this 25th day of September, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
_______________________________________
By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _______
day of September, 2017, I caused to be served,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing State’s Objection to Motion for Judgment of Acquittal upon
the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Name and address: Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender, Boise, ID 83702


By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.



By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.



By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.



By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _________



By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.

x By iCourt File and Serve.
__________________________
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON LANTIS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Criminal No. CR01-17-7609
REPLY TO STATE’S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, AARON LANTIS, by and through his
Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender’s Office, Anita Moore, handling attorney,
and hereby replies to the State’s Objection to Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, filed herein on
September 25, 2017 in response to his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, filed herein on August
25, 2017. The Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was made on the grounds that the state’s
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction in that it fails to prove an actus reus that falls
within the strictures of § 18-6409, Idaho Code.
ARGUMENT
The state in its Objection entirely misses the point of State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661
(Ct.App.2015), rev. den. February 10, 2016, which is that the conduct must constitute an actus
reus within the meaning of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state goes through the elements
instruction for disturbing the peace and focuses on the quantity of evidence it offered to support
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each element. The issue here, however, is not the quantity of evidence offered to support each
element; it is that, however much proof the state offered, the state failed to prove acts that were
loud, boisterous, tumultuous, quarrelsome, or tending to incite or provoke violence, such as
constitute disturbing the peace. As Mr. Lantis demonstrated in his post-verdict Rule 29 motion,
the lesson of Pierce is that the conduct complained of must be prohibited by § 18-6409. In part
because the case against Pierce was based on conduct that did not fall within the strictures of that
statute, the district court on intermediate appeal held that Pierce’s Rule 29 motions should have
been granted. The Court of Appeals quoted from and affirmed this holding, and the Idaho
Supreme Court declined the state’s invitation to review.
The state argues in this case that (a) the legislature included “offensive conduct” in its list
of prohibited acts; (b) the state established that the conduct in question was indeed “offensive”;
and that therefore (c) the conduct in question – sending an offensive email to the complaining
party’s bosses – was “specifically included in the statutory definition of the crime,” (State’s
Objection at 8), even though (d) neither email nor any other electronic communication is listed as
a means whereby a person may commit the crime of disturbing the peace. Although the Pierce
court points out that “disturb the peace” is a term of art, not in common use, that describes
specific prohibited conduct and cannot be imparted a common meaning (Pierce, 159 Idaho at
663), the state asserts that “offensive conduct” is not a term of art and should be given its
ordinary, dictionary meaning.

This is really just another way of asking the court to read

“offensive conduct” in isolation from the surrounding text that sets the stage for what that term in
fact means. It stands on its head the rule of noscitur a sociis by arguing that “offensive conduct”
introduces an entirely new and unforeseen class of behaviors into the statute, instead of the
statute governing and restricting those acts that constitute “offensive conduct.” If this reading of

REPLY TO STATE’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
OF ACQUITTAL – 2
000119

§ 18-6409 is the correct one, then there is no conduct for which a citizen may not be prosecuted,
provided only that the state can find someone willing to testify that he found that conduct
offensive.
But noscitur a sociis is still in effect, and still a factor to be reckoned with in the instant
case; thus, the state’s very careful explanation of why the conduct at issue here was offensive
serves only to underscore why it has nothing in common with the enumerated prohibited acts in
the statute. In the first place, the statute makes no mention whatever of email, texting or any
other electronic communication, so that it cannot really be said – as the state declares on page 8
of its Objection – that the conduct complained of here is “specifically included in the statutory
definition of the crime.” In the second place, § 18-6409 covers conduct that is loud, boisterous
and tumultuous, disruptive of exterior quiet and tranquility rather than merely someone’s interior
peace of mind. Even when 18-6409 outlawed uttering profanity in front of children, the state
still had to prove that this was done “in a loud and boisterous manner.” To disturb the peace,
then, the accused must have engaged in behavior that breaches the exterior peace of a person or
community by means of some jarring or abrupt assault on the senses – particularly hearing – or
that is calculated to incite or provoke violence. Whatever else the state may have proven in the
instant case, it has failed to prove conduct that matches this description. This court should
therefore grant Mr. Lantis’ motion for judgment of acquittal.
The state further argues that Mr. Lantis’ argument of vagueness and overbreadth are not
well taken because the constitutive elements of § 18-6409 are in the disjunctive, and thus the
state had a wide variety of items to choose from in prosecuting him for disturbing the peace –
including whatever conduct could conceivably be shoe-horned into the phrase “offensive
conduct.” This is just yet another way of arguing that “offensive conduct” needs to be read in
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isolation from the surrounding text, and that it therefore can mean whatever the state wants it to
mean, provided, again, it can find a complaining witness willing to testify as to its offensiveness.
The state further argues that “It seems highly unlikely that anyone would believe that
sending sexually provocative picture of an ex-girlfriend to her boss for the purpose of getting her
fired would not fall under the purview of the statute. The Defendant’s conduct is clearly
offensive, both to the victim and to society.” State’s Objection at 9. What the state is really
doing here, however, rather than addressing the question of whether the conduct in this case fits
the statute, is appealing to the sense of indignation the conduct arouses by reason of its
reprehensibility. But this is a distraction – and a perilous one, in light of the need to interpret and
apply the law objectively and impartially in all criminal cases. It is possible for a thing to be
reprehensible yet not criminal, and therefore it is neither possible nor appropriate to use the
criminal justice system to redress every conceivable grievance between individuals. The issue
here is not whether the conduct in question is boorish or socially unacceptable, but whether it is
criminal under the state’s theory of the case. Mr. Lantis argues that, whatever else his conduct
might be, it does not belong to the class of behaviors that is proscribed by § 18-6409. Therefore,
his motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted.
CONCLUSION
As Judge McKee pointed out on intermediate appeal in Pierce, it is the province of
neither juries nor judges to make the law: the jury is there to determine facts, and the court is
there to instruct on the law and resolve ambiguities in the law. Memorandum Decision at 9-10.
“What a judge may not do is create law – identify new areas of conduct not included in the
statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list of prohibited activities that is
included….To allow the jury to interpret and determine the law according to the evidence in the
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case means that the jury could subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs
and standards, what is and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what
the defendant did in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created.
Under any theory of law, this is impermissible.” Id. at 10.
Yet, by pressing the charge of disturbing the peace in the instant case, that is exactly what
the state asked, and continues to ask, this court to do. The state seeks to use a statute about
tumultuous, boisterous, quarrelsome conduct to avenge perceived wrongs committed via the use
of email, which is nowhere mentioned in the statute. Taking the word “offensive” in isolation, as
the state has done in the present case, and adding to it alleged conduct of a character that is
highly likely to arouse strong emotions, left the jury free to apply its own subjective standards to
convict Mr. Lantis of a crime of the jury’s own making and definition. In such a situation, and
with no other guidance than their own feelings on the meaning of “offensive conduct,” the jury
was free to define a crime not contemplated by the legislature and return a verdict of guilty.
This court should grant Aaron Lantis’ motion under Rule 29(c).
9th day of October, 2017.
DATED, this _____
___________________________________
ANITA MOORE
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 10th day of October, 2017, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the:
Ada County Prosecutor
by email and by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
___________________________________
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10/12/2017 2:11 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 10054
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
)
)
)
Defendant.
________________)
STATE OF IDAHO,

TO:

Case No. 2016-0000887; CR0l-17-07609
NOTICE OF HEARING

Anita Moore, Attorney of Record, you will please take notice that on 31st day of

October, 2017 at the hour of 8:30 AM of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney D. Garrett Swenson, will move this Honorable Court regarding the
oral argument on defense's motion for judgment of acquittal in the above-entitled action.

DATED this _1_1_day of October, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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State of Idaho
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 10/31/2017 02:12 PM

Dated:
Dated: October 31,
31, 2017
Michael W. Lojek
Magistrate Judge
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Programs Ordered: (Defined on Responsibilities Form) D No Alcohol Poss/Consume D Refuse no evidentiary test for drugs/alcohol (BAC)
D Alcohol/Drug Trtmt Lvl _ _ _ D Anger Management hrs
D Tobacco Ed hrs _ _
D Driving School hrs _ __
0 Victim's Panel D Theft classes hrs
Domestic Violence Trea&Reut IJ'iefks ~
D Cog Self Change _ _ __

~OT

[8] De

0
DEFE

A AA."-'?T

Et;~D

\ltc.llJJ..

dant ace ted er sa condJJons
EA AN
E TENCE VIA D

\1'2

+ +f't\OW

d supplemental Notice of Responsibilities after Sentencing.
0 IN CHAMBERS PER WRITTEN GUllTY PLEA

~

JUDGE

ANT

IJ.t;.. UE)..l

n/ze/17

Number

Date of Order

D Release Defendant this case only
DISTRIBUTION: White-File Canary-Jail (in-custody} or File Pink-Defendant
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SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER
c

Defendant: Aaron Eugene Lantis

Case No. CR01-17-07609

Address: 1707 S 26th St
Nampa, ID 83686

Date Ordered: 11/28/2017

Judge: Judge Lojek
Phone:

CR01-17- 07609
SPROB
Supervised Probation Ordered

i~i il l ml l ~l l l~l l l l l l

,_

.

-.)~:ts~-1~'·?

Prosecuting Attorney: David Garrett Swenson
Defense Attorney: Anita Marie Elizabeth Moore

You have been sentenced to the following term of supervised probation: _1.!...,Lye""a"""r_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Commencing on 11/28/2017 and terminating on 11/27/2018.
~TIS HEREBY ORDERED THAT you comply with the following terms and conditions of supervision:
~111itial Probation Contact: You understand that you MUST contact Ada County Misdemeanor Probation

at the address
below within one business day to schedule an appointment. Failure to do so may result in the issuance of a warrant for your
arrest. You will bring all court paperwork with you to this appointment.
Ada County Misdemeanor Probation
7180 W. Barrister Dr., Entrance #4, Boise, Idaho 83704
Phone: 208-577-3380 I FAX: 208-577-3389
laws: You shall respect and obey all laws and comply with all terms of probation as ordered by the court or directed by a
probation officer. You shall comply with all lawful requests of a probation officer.
Compliance: You shall comply with all lawful direction given to you by a probation officer.
Notification: You will notify your probation officer within 24 hours (or within one business day) following any contact with law
enforcement, including but not limited to citations, arrests, or investigations. You will fully cooperate in a respectful manner
with any law enforcement requests and advise them that you are on supervised probation and provide them with the name of
your assigned probation officer.
Residence/Contact: You shall notify your probation officer prior to making any changes to your residence, phone numbers
or email addresses. You will submit any changes to your probation officer for approval. You must notify your probation
officer within one business day of making any approved changes. You will maintain a contact phone with voice messaging.
You are responsible for checking this phone number at least daily and complying with any instructions given by a probation
officer.
Reporting: You shall check in at the Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Office on a monthly basis, unless directed
otherwise by a probation officer. You shall truthfully submit any written or oral reports requested by a probation officer.
Atte111dance: You understand that failure to appear for any assigned/scheduled appointments with any service providers,
c;rug testing service, or your probation officer may result in a probation violation being filed with the court or the imposition of
ciscretionary jail time.
Con~rolled Substances and Alcohol:
You will not use, possess, or distribute any alcoholic beverages, controlled
substances or intoxicants while on probation unless lawfully prescribed by a licensed physician. You shall submit to any
testing of breath and bodily fluids for these substances as directed by the court, law enforcement, treatment providers or the
probation officer. You shall be truthful in said testing and shall not ingest substances or take any actions in an attempt to
mask or alter the test results. Any attempts shall be considered the same as a presumptive positive result. You shall pay all
fees and costs of such testing.

!Employment/Education: You will obtain and maintain appropriate full-time employment and/or participate in an educational
program as directed by a probation officer.
Electronic Monitoring Device/Alcohol Monitoring Device/Interlock Device: You understand that you may be placed on
eleGtronic monitoring device/alcohol monitoring device/Interlock device as deemed necessary by the probation officer. You
shall pay the daily monitoring costs and any costs associated with any damages or lost equipment.
SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER (D44)- Page 1
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Court Fines and Restitution: You shall pay any and all court fines, restitution and other costs as ordered by the Court and
defined in your fine agreement.
!Programs & Treatment: You shall cooperate and successfully complete any and all assessments and/or treatment
programs ordered by the Court. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely manner.
Classes or Treatment: You shall comply, cooperate and successfully complete any assessments and/or treatment
program required by the probation officer. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely manner.
Review Hearings: You understand that you must appear before the Court as scheduled to review your compliance with the
conditions of your probation.
Costs of Supervision: You must pay a fee for misdemeanor probation services. The fee is on a sliding scale, but will not
be more than $75/month. This is true regardless of how many active probation cases you may have. The probation
department will assist in monitoring the fee.
Release of Information: You authorize the release and exchange of confidential information to and from your probation
officer, including but not limited to evaluations, medical history, reports, and treatment records related to your probation.
Travel: You will not leave the state of Idaho without first obtaining a travel permit from your probation officer.
Addntionallnstructions: You will comply with any and all additional instructions given by a probation officer.
fOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVER:
){The Judge is ordering a 4th Amendment Waiver in this case pursuant to the following terms: Defendant agrees and
consents as a term and condition of probation to a search of his or her person, automobile, residence, and any property
under their control, any place, anytime, by any parole or probation officer or any law enforcement officer acting at the
direction of a parole or probation officer. Any right to the contrary under the United States and Idaho Constitutions is
hereby waived by the Defendant for the term of probation."

0 The Judge is NOT ordering a 41h Amendment Waiver in this case
other:

''

z~

Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order

SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER (D44)- Page 2
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RMAN
Remanded
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•
FILED

l\l2SSlll

AT

?_t:;/..p

.M.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,

CLERK OF WTRJCT COURT
BY

~

e

Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
Plaintiff,

)
)

/ta.RD~ LOlV1-f, s

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

CASE NO.

CRot -t 1-l (.p D:l

ORDER REMANDING DEFENDANT TO THE
CUSTODY OF THE ADA COUNTY SHERIFF

)

Defendant.

)
)
)

gsecuting Agency:
Ada County
D Boise
D Garden City
D Meridian

D Eagle

)
TO: THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUNTY:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take custody of the above-named defendant
D until further order of this Court I J u d g e - - - - - - - - - - 0

until the defendant posts a new bond in the amount of $_ _ _ _ _ _ cash or surety
(previous bond was revoked by this Court).

a t - - - - - - a.m./p.m., at which time you shall return
D until
the defendant to open Court before J u d g e - - - - - - - - - D until
at
the defendant on his/her own recognizance.

~other

a.m./p.m., at which time you shall release

Ul-J11L \-\E WA'7 C,Ef<.\IEI:? '"t14(<e:E AD>l/tno~AL

PAY'? (~
IT IS SO ORDERED on

ORDER REMANDING DEFENDANT

~AtL

w l\1-t ~D OP"flo~~

7.<6 N b \l \ f

[REV 11-2010]
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CR01-17- 07609
NCO
No Contact Order

NOV 2S 2m7

i\\ii~IMII\II~Imlll\llll\~ll!

~HE

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTr:O.fisrc) _.,

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

-'

'

Case No. _ _t..._)Z_o_\-_l_r_-_7_6_l'1_

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

No Contact Order I.C. 18-920 -I.C.R 46.2
r1foriginal

vs.

QQ Amended

Law enforcement agency

"Zb [

7- {I 'I

lll.f"Z.S.S

/_ t.-'5

~

Expires at 11:59 p.m. on
H_z.7
or
upon dismissal of this case, whichever occurs first

Defendant.

Defendant's Identifiers:

ender: M.

Race: LJ

Protected Person(s) Identifiers:
\..\- \L-\...AtL"'{
\4 t::N St.-IE6
(Date of Birth (optional)

Name (First, Middle, Last)

TO THE DEFENDANT: You have been charged with or convicted of the following crime(s):
Count
Statute
Charge Description
- ,-

I

'i' ""lP4oq

t) \!) f'Vl'l..S \ tJl':=t

f"\.4 S

Z>s~&

Relationship to protected person(s), if any:
This COURT, having personal and subject matter jurisdiction, finds that a no contact order is appropriate
and HEREBY ORDERS THAT, with regard to the protected person(s) named above, YOU must not
engage in any of the following conduct:

[01]

Do not contact or attempt to contact, either personally or through another person, the protected person(s)
named above in any manner, including: 1) do not communicate in person or in writing or through any
electronic means, including telephone, email, text, through social networking, or facsimile 2) do not
harass, stalk, threaten, use, attempt to use or threaten use of physical force, engage in any other conduct
that would place the protected person(s) in reasonable fear of bodily injury 3) do not knowingly remain
within 100 feet of the protected person(s) 4) do not go within and/or knowingly remain within 500 feet of
the following address(es):
Protected person's h o m e : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[04]

Protected person's w o r k p l a c e : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Protected person's s c h o o l : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - However, you may attend court proceedings involving you and the protected person(s), and you may
communicate through attorneys about legal issues involving you and the protected person(s).

[OS]

~

0

THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE ORDER.
THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE ORDER ABOVE AS FOLLOWS:
D to contact by telephone between
.M. and
_ _ .M.
for the following purposes: ----,--~--:-------------------0 to participate in court ordered mediation

000131

o)

D

to provide for the exchange of children between the protected person and defendant
through: --------------------------------------------------------

D

[03]

0

to retrieve personal necessities from the residence/protected address one time
through:--:--:----------:---,-----:-------------:-------:-----:---:---:---------------to respond to emergencies involving your natural or adopted children

D

other:----------------------------------

[ ] IF THIS ORDER REQUIRES YOU TO LEAVE A RESIDENCE SHARED WITH THE PROTECTED
PERSON, you may contact a law enforcement officer who may make arrangements to accompany you to
the residence to remove items and tools necessary for employment and personal belongings. The officer
may determine what constitutes necessary personal belongings.
Yes r.M No [ ] Defendant appeared or had actual notice of this hearing and the opportunity to participate.
If N6,'" then upon service, Defendant is notified of the right to request a hearing before a judge on this
Order. The request must be filed within 7 days of service. To request a hearing you must contact the
clerk of the court at (address)
(phone)
---:----:----:-:-:----::----:-::-:-:----:· The court must hold a hearing within 14 days of the filing of the request
and must provide notice of the hearing to the protected person and the parties.

A violation of this order is a separate crime under Idaho Code § 18-920, for which no bail will be set
until you appear before a judge. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Order is one year in jail
and/or up to a $1000 fine. However, if the violation is a third offense, the violation is a felony, which is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for up to five years and/or up to a $5000 fine. If any other
Civil Protection Order or Criminal No Contact Order is in place you must abide by the terms in the most
restrictive order. Dismissal of any other order will not result in a dismissal of this Order. ONLY A JUDGE
CAN MODIFY THIS NO CONTACT ORDER.
The court clerk must immediately send a copy of this Order to
this Order was originally issued for entry into record systems.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
~0\l
Dated:

-zq

l7

Judge

WARNINGS: As a result of this Order, it may be unlawful for you to purchase or possess a firearm,
including a rifle, pistol, or revolver, or ammunition pursuant to federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) . If
you have any questions whether these laws make it illegal for you to possess or purchase a firearm, you
should consult an attorney.
This Order is valid and entitled to enforcement in each jurisdiction throughout the 50 states of the United
States, the District of Columbia, all tribal lands, and all U.S. territories, commonwealths, and possessions
and shall be enforced as if it were an order of that jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 2265).

~~~-grm·~er.

Served by:

.f:Atlf-.&:1:~~~~~~~=-- Law Enforcement Id.#:

D File
D Protected person(s)

DProsecutor

ate;igned

Bi.,..ts=

IJ

bJ.2e

Date seJed"'#

I~

D Defense Attorney

D Protected person(s) via prosecuting attorney
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Lojek Zuber 11/28/17
Time
02:36:04 PMI

Speaker

1A-CRT402

i Lantis

Note
CR01-17-7609 Sentencing

··a2·:·3·a:3·s···P·MTJLia9e. Lo]ek·T·c·as·e···c;ane·ci···G-~irrefs·wenson. prese.ilHor·"Aaa. .colii1tY::··Anlfa··
l
l Moore present for the defense .
. 0'2:3.if·1·t=fi5MTAilHa. .riJi'o·o-re. .rRev·iews . vi'airn. 'fm·p·a"Ct. siaie·m-enr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
l
. a2·:·4-3:3'9. .i3.MlJLia9eToJe.i<
. .fR.ev.iews
. aocumenf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. a2·:·4·3·:4s. .i5M't';t.:i1Ha. iVioo.re. "lo5Ieds. to. .eve·;:ytt1Til.9. .o.ti1er.1:h'an. .ti1e. ctiTia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. a2·:·44·:. 1. 4. .i3.Ml"Garrett. . . . . . . . . . rR·es·p·o·il·se. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
!Swenson

!

. a2·:·s·a:4Y.i5MlJLia9eToJe.i<. . [Vis. .i).rov·iaea. 'is. .appro·p·ri'ate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. a2·:·s-2:3·2. .i5Ml"Ga.rrett. . . . . . . . . .
. .s.e·n·tend'il.9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
lSwenson
. 0"3:·a'1':·s·4. .P.MlAnHa
. iVioo.re. l·lR·e·s·p·a·il·se. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
lAr~iues

. 0"3:·0"t:f:"04. .F>MlA·a·roi1. Laniis·rrvfa'kes. stateme.ilt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. O'i.O'a·:-4f. F>MlJLia9e. Lo]e.i<. . t.Aad·res·s·e·s. aete·il·aant". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 6'3:·1"r3·s. .i3.M'tl'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !t..D'ec.is.io.il. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. o.3:·34.:4·4. .i3.MT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .T'End. .o¥. c·as·e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
"63·:·34.:44. .i3.MT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"6'3·:·34:44. .i3.MT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"a3·:34:44. .i5MT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Filed
Electronically Filed
12/5/2017
12/5/2017 3:01
3:01 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Ruckdashel, Deputy Clerk
By: Brenda Ruckdashel,

ADA COUNTY
DEFENDER
ADA
PUBLIC DEFENDER
COUNTY PUBLIC
for Defendant
Attorneys
Defendant
Attorneys for
ANITA
ANITA M.
ISB #5885
M. E.
E. MOORE,
#5885
MOORE, ISB
Deputy
Public Defender
Defender
Deputy Public
200
Front Street,
Suite 1107
200 West
107
West Front
Street, Suite
287-7400
Telephone:
287-7400
Telephone: (208)
(208)
287-7409
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 287-7409
1

IN
IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
THE STATE
THE
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF ADA
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN
STATE OF
STATE
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO”

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS'
AARON
AARON EUGENE
EUGENE LANTIS,
LANTIS,

CR01-17-07609
Case
No. CR01-17-07609
Case No.

MOTION
STAY OF
MOTION FOR
FOR STAY
EXECUTION OF
OF EXECUTION
OF
SENTENCE
APPEAL
PENDING APPEAL
SENTENCE PENDING

Defendant.
Defendant.
COMES
the above-named
by and
above-named Defendant,
AARON EUGENE
EUGENE LANTIS,
through his
his
COMES NOW,
and through
Defendant, AARON
LANTIS, by
NOW, the
Defender’s Office,
ANITA MOORE,
handling attorney,
Attorney
the Ada
of Record,
Public Defender’s
and
Ada County
Attorney of
MOORE, handling
Record, the
Ofﬁce, ANITA
County Public
attorney, and

hereby
this Honorable
the sentence
in
for its
its Order
the execution
pending appeal
of the
Honorable Court
execution of
Court for
Order staying
sentence pending
appeal in
moves this
staying the
hereby moves
the instant
pursuant to
instant case
the
to I.C.R.
I.C.R. 54.5
54.5 (a).
case pursuant
(a).

DATED December
DATED
2017.
December 05,
05, 2017.

W2

Anita
Anita?M.
M. E.
E. Moore
Moore
Attorney
for Defendant
Defendant
Attorney for

APPEAL
MOTION
PENDING APPEAL
STAY OF
SENTENCE PENDING
MOTION FOR
FOR STAY
EXECUTION OF
OF EXECUTION
OF SENTENCE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 05, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the within
instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor.

Debbie Florence

MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL
000135

Filed
Electronically Filed
12/5/2017
12/5/2017 3:01
3:01 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Ruckdashel, Deputy Clerk
By: Brenda Ruckdashel,

ADA
ADA COUNTY
DEFENDER
PUBLIC DEFENDER
COUNTY PUBLIC
Attorneys
for Defendant
Defendant
Attorneys for
ANITA
ANITA M.
ISB #5885
M. E.
E. MOORE,
#5885
MOORE, ISB
Deputy
Public Defender
Defender
Deputy Public
Front Street,
200
1107
Suite 1107
200 West
West Front
Street, Suite
287-7400
Telephone:
287-7400
Telephone: (208)
(208)
Facsimile:
287-7409
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 287-7409
IN
IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
THE STATE
THE
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF ADA
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN
STATE OF
STATE
OF IDAHO,
IDAHQ

CR01-17-07609
Case
No. CR01-17-07609
Case No.

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.
AARON
AARON EUGENE
EUGENE LANTIS,
LANTIS,

NOTICE OF
APPEAL
NOTICE
OF APPEAL

Defendant.
Defendant.

ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT,
THE ABOVE-NAMED
BY AND
AND THROUGH
THE STATE
TO:
STATE OF
THROUGH
OF IDAHO,
TO: THE
RESPONDENT, THE
IDAHO, BY

ABOVE-ENTITLED
AND THE
THE CLERK
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
THE ADA
ADA COUNTY
CLERK OF
THE
OF THE
COUNTY PROSECUTOR,
PROSECUTOR, AND
COURT.
COURT.
HEREBY GIVEN
GIVEN THAT:
NOTICE IS
NOTICE
THAT:
IS HEREBY

1.
1.

above-named Defendant-Appellant,
AARON EUGENE
Defendant-Appellant, AARON
The above-named
EUGENE LANTIS,
The
appeals
LANTIS, appeals

against
the State
the District
the Fourth
District Court
Fourth Judicial
of the
against the
of Idaho
to the
State of
Idaho to
Court of
Judicial District,
District,
from
in Case
from the
the order
Acquittal in
CR 01
01 17
17 07609,
of Acquittal
Judgment of
order denying
No. CR
Case No.
denying Judgment
07609,
nd day of
2nd
in the
entered
the Magistrate
the
the 2
Division of
Magistrate Division
of the
on the
entered on
November, 2017,
2017, in
day of November,

Fourth Judicial
Fourth
the Honorable
Michael Lojek
of Idaho,
Lojek
Honorable Judge
State of
Judicial District,
District, State
Judge Michael
Idaho, the

presiding.
presiding.
2.
2.

Mr.
right to
to appeal
to the
the judgment
judgment described
District Court,
Mr. Lantis
Lantis has
the District
has a
and the
appeal to
described
a right
Court, and
in the
in
the preceding
preceding paragraph
paragraph is
pursuant to
to Idaho
Criminal
is appealable
under and
Idaho Criminal
and pursuant
appealable under

Rule
Rule 54(a)(1)(F)
54(a)(1)(F)
3.
3.

The
transcript(s) are
requested:
The following
following additional
additional transcript(s)
are requested:
st, 2017, Jury Trial
th,
11‘“,
Oral
for October
for August
Arguments Transcripts
Transcripts for
Transcripts for
Oral Arguments
August 11
October 335‘,
2017, Jury Trial Transcripts
2017.
2017.

NOTICE
APPEAL
NOTICE OF
OF APPEAL
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4.
4.

II certify:
certify:
a)
a)

That
the estimated
That the
from paying
Appellant is
the Appellant
exempt from
is exempt
estimated
paying the
transcript
because he
indigent person
transcript fee
he is
is an
an indigent
is unable
to
person and
fee because
and is
unable to
pay
said fee.
fee.
pay said

b)
b)

That
paying the
That the
from paying
Appellant is
the Appellant
the estimated
for
exempt from
is exempt
estimated fee
fee for
indigent person
preparation
preparation of
the record
record because
because he
of the
he is
is an
an indigent
is
person and
and is

unable
to pay
pay said
unable to
said fee.
fee.
c)
0)

That
paying the
the appellate
filing fee
That the
from paying
Appellant is
the Appellant
exempt from
is exempt
appellate filing
fee
because he
to pay
indigent and
he is
is indigent
is unable
and is
unable to
said fee.
fee.
because
pay said

d)
d)

That
parties required
required to
to be
be served,
That service
all parties
has been
upon all
been made
made upon
service has
served,
pursuant
to I.A.R.
I.A.R. 20.
pursuant to
20.

5.
5.

taken upon
That
That the
the appeal
all matters
matters of
is taken
of law
fact.
upon all
law and
and fact.
appeal is

6.
6.

That
raising issues
including but
but not
Defendant-Appellant anticipates
That the
not
the Defendant-Appellant
anticipates raising
issues including
limited
limited to:
to:
a)
a)

Appellant’s motions
The
judgment of
in denying
Trial Court
The Trial
for judgment
motions for
of
Court erred
erred in
denying Appellant’s
acquittal
Criminal Rules.
the Idaho
acquittal under
Rule 29
29 of
of the
under Rule
Idaho Criminal
Rules.

DATED December
DATED
2017.
December 05,
05, 2017.

£77,)

Anita
Anita M. E.
E. Moore
Moore
Attorney
for Defendant
Defendant
Attorney for
.

CERTIFICATE
MAILING
CERTIFICATE OF
OF MAILING

73W

the within
II HEREBY
that on
HEREBY CERTIFY
CERTIFY that
within
on December
of the
correct copy
December 05,
and correct
served aa true
true and
2017, II served
05, 2017,
copy of
instrument
to the
the Ada
instrument to
Prosecutor.
Ada County
County Prosecutor.

Debbie
Florence
Debbie Florence

APPEAL
NOTICE
NOTICE OF
OF APPEAL
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Filed: December 6,
6 2017 at 9:22 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D.
the Court
D. Rich,
ofthe
Rich, Clerk of
’BOb‘AépLVE/
By: Bob
Aspiri Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
Aaron Eugene Lantis
Defendant.
Defendant.

CRO1-17-O7609
Case No. CR01-17-07609

Notice of Reassignment

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case has been reassigned
reassigned to the
Honorable Theresa L. Gardunia.
Dated:
12/6/2017
Dated: 12/6/2017
D. Rich
Christopher D.
Clerk of the District Court

By:
30E Aspiri
By: Bob
Deputy Clerk

ﬂspiri

ANY OTHER HEARING S
WITH THE NEWLY
S CURRENTLY SET WILL HAVE TO BE RESET WITH
ASSIGNED JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day
day I served a copy
copy of the attached to:
I

I

David Garrett Swenson
200 W Front Street Rm 3191
3191
Boise ID 83702
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
Anita Marie Elizabeth Moore
200 W Front Street Rm 1107
1107
Boise ID 83702
amoore@adaweb.net

[X]
By email [[ ]] By
By mail
[X] By

Aaron Eugene Lantis
1707
1707 S
S 26th St
Nampa,
Nampa, ID 83686

[[ ]] By
By mail
[[ ]] By
By personal delivery
Clerk_______
Date ____
Clerk

[X]
By email
[X] By

[[ ]] By
By mail

Signed: 12/6/2017 09:23 AM

Dated:
12/6/2017
Dated: 12/6/2017

By:
By:
Deputy Clerk

NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT

11
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Signed: 12/7/2017 08:41 AM

ADA COUNTY
DEFENDER
ADA
PUBLIC DEFENDER
COUNTY PUBLIC
for Defendant
Attorney
Defendant
Attorney for
ANITA
ANITA M.
ISB #5885
M. E.
E. MOORE,
#5885
MOORE, ISB
Deputy
Public Defender
Defender
Deputy Public
200
Front Street,
1107
Suite 1107
200 West
West Front
Street, Suite
287-7400
Telephone:
287-7400
Telephone: (208)
(208)
287-7409
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 287-7409
IN
IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
OF ADA
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN
STATE
STATE OF
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO’

Case
No. CR01-17-07609
CRO 1-17-07609
Case No.

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
vs.
AARON
AARON EUGENE
EUGENE LANTIS,
LANTIS,

ORDER STAYING
ORDER
STAYING EXECUTION
EXECUTION OF
OF
APPEAL
PENDING APPEAL
SENTENCE PENDING
SENTENCE

Defendant.
Defendant.

The
before this
this Court,
The above
entitled matter,
having come
appearing
and good
come before
above entitled
good cause
cause appearing
matter, having
Court, and
therefrom;
therefrom;
that the
IT
IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED,
AND THIS
THIS DOES
the execution
IS HEREBY
DOES ORDER,
of sentence
is
execution of
sentence is
ORDERED, AND
ORDER, that
stayed
pending appeal.
appeal., pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54(e).
stayed pending

ORDERED:
ORDERED:

.

Signed: 12/6/2017 03:46 PM

Judge
Judge Hawley/Lojek
Hawley/Lojek
Magistrate
Magistrate

HEREBY CERTIFY
CERTIFY that
II HEREBY
that on
on

X
X
X
X

Ada
Prosecutor
Ada County
County Prosecutor
Ada
County
Public
Defender
Ada County Public Defender

CERTIFICATE
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
OF SERVICE
Signed: 12/7/2017 08:41 AM

, II served
true and
to:
electronic copy
correct electronic
and correct
served aa true
copy to:
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
public.defender@adacounty.id.gov
public.defender@adacounty.id.gov

CHRISTOPHER
RICH
CHRISTOPHER D.
D. RICH
Ada
the Court
Clerk of
of the
Court
Ada County
County Clerk
Deputy
Clerk
Deputy Clerk

APPEAL
ORDER
PENDING APPEAL
ORDER STAYING
SENTENCE PENDING
STAYING EXECUTION
EXECUTION OF
OF SENTENCE
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:.~.-~3.,.s;...-z,r-;;:Fil-;;~.~~-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_DEC 0 8 2017
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEBBIE PERKINS
OEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CR0117-7609
vs.
ORDER GOVERNING
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL
Aaron Eugene Lantis,
Defendant.

Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all the
testimony of the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues on appeal:
It is ORDERED:

1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript within 14
days after the filing of the notice of appeal.
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date of the notice
of the filing of the transcript.
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service of
appellant's brief.
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after service
of respondent's brief.

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1

000140

5) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all briefs are
filed, and that if within fourteen ( 14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so notice
for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and
the record.
Dated this 8th day of December 2017.

GERALD F. SCHROEDER
Senior District Judge

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 2

000141

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of December, 2017. I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Anita Marie Elizabeth Moore
VIA Email: Amoore@adaweb.net

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
David Garrett Swenson
VIA Email: acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT
VIA Email: transcripts@adaweb.net

ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 3
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NO·----:::::-:::=:--~~,_-
FILED
:
A.M., _ _ _ _..r. M,__~=---

DEC 1 3 2017
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ByP. BOURNE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant/Appellant,

_____________

)
)
)
)
) Case No. CR01-17-07609
)
) NOTICE OF PREPARATION
) OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT
)
)

A Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled matter on December 5, 2017 and a copy of said
Notice was received by the Transcription Department on December 11, 2017. I certify the
estimated cost of preparation of the appeal transcript to be:
Type of Hearing: Jury Trial
Date ofHearing: August 11,2017 Judge: Michael Lojek
Type ofHearing: Oral Argument
Date of Hearing: October 31, 2017 Judge: Michael Lojek
335 Pages x $3.25 = $1,088.75
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(k)(l), the appellant must, unless otherwise
ordered by a District Judge, pay the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript within
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, and the appellant shall pay the balance of
the fee, if any, for the transcript upon completion.

In this case, the Ada County Public Defender has agreed to pay for the cost of the transcript
fee upon completion of the transcript.

The Transcription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District
Court within thirty-five (35) days from the date of this notice. The transcriber may make
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 1

CR01 -17- 07609
NOPT
Notice of Preparation of Transcript
488447
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application to the District Judge for an extension of time in which to prepare the transcript.

Dated this Wednesday, December 13, 2017
Ada Co

Transcripts Department

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on December 13,2017 a true and correct copy ofthe Notice of Preparation of Appeal
Transcript was forwarded to Appellant or Appellant's attorney of record, by electronic mail, at:
Ada County Public Defender
public.defender@adacounty. id. gov
ANITA M.E. MOORE

PAMj?LA BOURNE
Ada County Transcripts Department

NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 2
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~~-.-+~~~7:rfr-~~F~~;~~M.========
JAN 0 3 2018
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEBBIE PERKINS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

DEPUTY

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. CR0117-7609
CONDITIONAL ORDER
DISMISSING APPEAL

Aaron Eugene Lantis ,
Defendant/~ppellant.

It appearing to the Court upon a review of the record in the above-entitled action
that an Estimated Cost of Appeal Transcript dated December 13th, 2017 was emailed to
Defendant/Appellant counsel requiring payment of the estimated transcript fee within
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The time for making said
payment has now expired ;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED , That the appeal in the action be and the same is
hereby dismissed fourteen (14) days from the filing date of this order, unless on or before
that date the appellant takes the necessary steps to furnish payment for the transcript.
Dated this

<;?

day of --r=-----'--,1'---='~

GERALD F. SCHROEDER
Senior District Judge

CONDITIONAL ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL- PAGE 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

_l_ day of _ ____;::5=-::;o~V1.. . :·._ _ _ , 201 ..[, I mailed a

true and correct copy of the within instrument to :
Ada County Public Defender
Anita M.E. Moore .
Via Email: public.defender@adacounty.id .gov
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPT
VIA EMAIL: transcripts@adaweb.net

CONDITIONAL ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL - PAGE 2
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JAN 0 3 2018
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DEBBIE PERKINS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Criminal Court - Traffic Division
200 W. Front St.
Boise, Idaho 83702

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

Date:

I-

Case Number:
Defendan t:

~ - LO I

g

C ~ 0 \ \ -:f

- -=f toOC,

Aa.rot\ f.v~efLe, LaflfiS

Condi±iontd Or-hv Di.sm lss-,~ Y\~ A-py-eal ti\.Ja..S +fte..J
\ n e rtor . Cta r-r'fi e.el w ;.+J, Tc A. 771 e., &ce 0 ofA cR vJ I I I

Subject:

ttl¥ ~y +ranJco'p-h upon

CtJrnpfe:6'o tt.

/- 3> -2Dtf'
DEBBIE PERKrNS

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

Date

[RE V 9-200 1 )
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JAN 0 3 2018
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By OE88iE PERKINS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

nr;"''1"

THE STATE OF IDAHO, iN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

State of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. CR0117-7609
CONDITIONAL ORDER
DISMISSING APPEAL

Aaron Eugene Lantis.
Defendant/~ppe!lant.

It appearing to the Court upon a review of the record in the above-entitled action
that an Estimated Cost of Appeal Transcript dated December 13th, 2017 was emailed to
Defendant/Appellant counsel requiring payment of the estimated transcript fee within
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of AppeaL The time for making said
payment has now expired;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the appeal in the action be and the same is
hereby dismissed fourteen (14} days from the filing date of this order, unless on or before

Senior District Judge

JAN 0 4 2018
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By P. BOURNE .
DEPUTY

CONDITIO

CR01-17- 07609
ORDR

Order
506776

000148
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Ada County Public Defender
Anita M.E. Moore
Via Email: public.defender@adacounty.id.gov
4

1,

ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPT
VIA EMAIL: transcripts@adaweb.net

lr

CONDITIONAL ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL- PAGE 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO·---~reo--,___

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

~t---41£_,.
--....__:_

A.M._

Case No. CR01-17-07609
NOTICE OF LODGING
APPEAL TRANSCRIPT

To:

DAVID G. SWENSON,

Attorney for Respondent.

To:

ANITA M. MOORE,

Appearing Appellant

JAN 2 2 2018
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
By P. BOuRNE '
DEPUTY

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT a transcript ofthe proceeding in this action was
lodged with the Court on January 22, 2018.
Unless objections to the content of the transcript are received within
twenty-one (21) days from the date of mailing of this notice, such transcript shall be
deemed settled.
Dated January 22, 2018.

PAMEL BOURNE
Deputy Clerk of the District Court
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on Monday, January 22,2018, I served a true and correct
electronic copy to:
David D. Swenson
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Anita M. Moore
Ada County Public Defender

acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
gublic.defender@adacounty.id.gov

PAMEL~BOURNE
Deputy Clerk of the District Court
NOTICE OF LODGING

- 1-
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Filed
Electronically Filed
2/23/2018 4:38 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Olson, Deputy Clerk
By: Maura Olson,

ADA COUNTY
DEFENDER
ADA
PUBLIC DEFENDER
COUNTY PUBLIC
for Defendant
Attorneys
Defendant
Attorneys for
ANITA
ANITA M.
ISB #5885
M. E.
E. MOORE,
#5885
MOORE, ISB
Deputy
Public Defender
Defender
Deputy Public
200
Front Street,
Suite 1107
200 West
107
West Front
Street, Suite
287-7400
Telephone:
287-7400
Telephone: (208)
(208)
287-7409
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 287-7409
1

IN
IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
THE STATE
THE
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF ADA
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN
STATE OF
STATE
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO”

CR01-17-07609
Case
No. CR01-17-07609
Case No.

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS'

MOTION
EXTEND TIME
TIME TO
FILE
MOTION TO
TO EXTEND
TO FILE
BRIEF
BRIEF OF
APPLLANT
OF APPLLANT

AARON
AARON EUGENE
EUGENE LANTIS,
LANTIS,
Defendant.
Defendant.

COMES
the above-named
through his
above-named Defendant/Appellant,
AARON LANTIS,
his
COMES NOW,
Defendant/Appellant, AARON
and through
LANTIS, by
NOW, the
by and
Defender’s Office,
ANITA MOORE,
Attorney
the Ada
handling attorney,
of Record,
Public Defender’s
Ada County
Attorney of
Office, ANITA
MOORE, handling
Record, the
County Public
attorney, and,
and,

this Honorable
for its
its Order
Appellate Rules,
pursuant
to Rule
the Idaho
Rule 34
34 of
of the
Honorable Court
pursuant to
Idaho Appellate
Court for
Order
moves this
Rules, hereby
hereby moves

2

granting
to file
the Brief
by the
the
Brief of
This Motion
Motion is
ﬁle the
granting an
Appellant. This
extension of
of Appellant.
is supported
an extension
of fourteen
fourteen (14)
supported by
days to
( 14) days
Affidavit
by reference
reference as
Exhibit A.
Anita Moore,
herein by
Afﬁdavit of
of Anita
hereto and
A.
attached hereto
incorporated herein
and incorporated
as Exhibit
Moore, attached
DATED February
DATED
2018.
February 23,
23, 2018.

Q

Anita
Anita M.
M. E.
E. Moore
Moore
Attorney
for Defendant
Defendant
Attorney for

EXTEND TIME
TIME TO
FILE BRIEF
BRIEF OF
APPLLANT
MOTION
TO FILE
MOTION TO
TO EXTEND
OF APPLLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 23, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the within
instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor.

Kari Bankston

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF APPLLANT
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Electronically Filed
2/23/2018 4:38 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

AARON LANTIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Criminal No. CR01-17-7609

AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND
TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF
APPELLANT

--------------------------~)
State of Idaho

)

)ss.
County of Ada

)

1.

I am counsel for Aaron Lantis in the above-entitled appeal.

2.

Brief of Appellant in the above-entitled appeal is currently due on February 26, 2018.

3.

No previous extensions of time for filing Brief of Appellant have been requested, granted
or denied in the above-entitled appeal.

4.

This request is made upon the following grounds:
a.

I am a deputy in the magistrate division of the Ada County Public Defender's
Office, and have had a heavy caseload.

b.

My caseload has left me with insufficient time in which to complete the Brief of
Appellant in this appeal.

c.

I am in the process of transitioning onto a felony trial team and am already
beginning to be assigned new cases. I am also concluding business from my old
calendar and clearing out my office in preparation for my new caseload.-

AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO
FILE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Page 1
000153

5.

I am requesting an extension of 14 days, with an expected due date ofMarch 12, 2018.

6.

I believe 14 additional days will be sufficient time to complete the Brief, given all the
factors with which I am contending.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGH .

ITA MOORE
AFFIANT
JURAT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

~3

day ofFebruary, 2018 .

•Notary Public111£ f.
(SEAL)

Van~

I reside at -4~~~+--=~-+--My Commission Expires:

{~

AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO
FILE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Page 2
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Electronically Filed
2/26/2018 10:22 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State BarNo. 10054
200_W, Front Street, Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-·7709
acpocourtdocscwadaweb.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON EUGENE LANTIS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CROl-17-07609
STATE'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND
TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF
APPELLANT

Defendant.
___________________________
)

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State ofldaho, and hereby objects to the Defendant's Motion
to Extend Time to File Brief of Appellant for the following reason:
Rule 34 states that " [e]xtensions of time for filing briefs shall not be favored and will be
granted .... only upon a clear showing of good cause .... " Defendant/Appellant has failed to show good
cause for an extension oftime. The State respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion to Extend
Time to File Brief of Appellant be denied.

STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME (LANTIS)
Page 1
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DATED this

k{a

day of February, 2018.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

~ ..~

By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of February, 2018, I caused to be served, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Defendant's Motion upon the
individual(s) named below in the marmer noted:
Anita Moore. Ada Count Public Defendant. Boise ID 83 702
~

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.

~

By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

0 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.

0 By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _ __ __ _.

CJ By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.

~ By iCourt eFile and Serve.

Legal

STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME (LANTIS)
Page2
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Electronically Filed
2/27/2018 11:13 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Chynae Hull, Deputy Clerk

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
AARON LANTIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Criminal No. CR01-2017-7609

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

____________________________)
APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL LOJEK, MAGISTRATE, PRESIDING

Anita Moore
Ada County Public Defender's Office
200 W. Front St. #1102
Boise ID 83702

Garrett Swenson
Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise ID 83702

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Aaron Lantis, the Appellant, was charged with the misdemeanor offense of disturbing the
peace in violation of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state alleged that Mr. Lantis committed this
crime by sending sexually suggestive pictures of the alleged victim, Hillary Henslee, to her
employers in an attempt to have her fired from her job. Mr. Lantis exercised his right to a trial
by jury on this charge, and was found guilty. He also made pre- and post-verdict motions under
Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, both of which were denied. Aaron Lantis asks this
Court to hold that a conviction cannot stand under § 18-6409 on the facts of the present case, or,
alternatively, that § 18-6409 is vague and overbroad, and that therefore the trial court erred in
denying his Rule 29 motions and Mr. Lantis' conviction should be reversed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 4, 2016, Nancy Van Winkle was working as a branch manager and commercial
lender at the Idaho Independent Bank in Star, Idaho. Trial Transcript (Tr.) at 44-45. Hillary
Henslee at that time was the assistant manager and under Ms. Van Winkle's direct supervision.
Tr. at 45. Ms. Henslee had been friends with Aaron Lantis for six years, and then were in an onand-off relationship for eight months. Tr. at 52, 11. 10-12. This relationship ended in May of
2016. Tr. at 52, ll. 22-23.
On July 4, 2016, Ms. Van Winkle received an email from someone calling himself"Santa
Claus," which was addressed not only to her but also to several other bank officers. Tr. at 45-46.
The email contained photographs as attachments, one of which Ms. Van Winkle looked at and
recognized as Ms. Henslee depicted in a sexual-type manner. Tr. at 47. On July 5, 2016, Ms.
Van Winkle forwarded the email to Ms. Henslee and also called Ms. Henslee to ask if she knew
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about the email. Tr. at 47, 55 at 11. 12-14. Ms. Van Winkle described her discomfort at seeing
the email, but also testified that Hillary Henslee was not fired from her job as a result of the
email. Tr. at 47-49.
Ms. Henslee was at her desk at work when she received the email forwarded by Ms. Van
Winkle.

Tr. at 55, 11. 11-18.

At trial, Ms. Henslee described her feelings of humiliation,

annoyance and hurt at the dissemination of pictures she had sent to Mr. Lantis "for his eyes only"
to people that she worked with. Tr. at 56; 59; 78, 1. 18. These sexually suggestive images were
pictures that Ms. Henslee had taken of herself and sent to Mr. Lantis. Tr. at 57, 11. 1-2. One had
been taken at Mr. Lantis' residence. Tr. at 67 11. 23-25. She took one picture either at Ms.
Henslee's own bathroom or in the bathroom at her work. Tr. at 69, 11. 2-10. She took one at her
office. Tr. at 70, 11. 3-5.

She took one in the bathroom at U.S. Bank, where she was then

working. Tr. at 70, 11. 16-22. The pictures she took at her places of employment may or may not
have been taken during business hours. Tr. at 72-73. Mr. Lantis is not the only person to whom
Ms. Henslee had sent pictures similar to the ones at issue at trial. Tr. at 75, ll. 20-22.
On July 5. 2016, Off. Jeremy Miller of the Nampa City Police Department took a report
from Hillary Henslee about the email sent to her supervisors. Tr. at 82-83. He then phoned
Aaron Lantis, who admitted to sending the email. Tr. at 83-84. He further admitted to sending
the email in order to cause Ms. Henslee to lose her job. Tr. at 87, 11. 14-18.
On March 7, 2017, a criminal complaint and summons issued as a result of the foregoing.
The summons returned unserved, so the court issued a warrant, which was served on about May
7, 2017. The case came on for pretrial conference on June 20, 2017, and the matter was set for
trial on August 10, 2017. The trial began as scheduled on August lOth but mistried and was
started over with a new jury panel on August 11th. After the state rested, the defense moved for
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judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, and, alternatively, dismissal under Rule 48, which motion
was denied. Tr. at 90-110. The defense then rested, the case proceeded to the jury, and the jury
returned a verdict of guilty.
The defense filed a post-verdict Rule 29 motion, which came on for hearing on October
31, 2017. Tr. at 167-195. This motion too was denied. The case then proceeded to sentencing
on November 28, 2017.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Whether the conduct complained of in the above-entitled case falls outside the purview of
of § 18-6409, Idaho Code, such that the court erred in denying Aaron Lantis' motions under
Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules?
Whether, if the conduct complained of in the above-entitled case does fall within the
purview of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code, that statute is void for vagueness and overbroad?
ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Court of Appeals Case of State v. Pierce Is Not Distinguishable from the
Present Case in Its Most Critical Aspects; Pierce Strongly Supports Reversing the
Trial Court.
After the state rested, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal and dismissal,

respectively, pursuant to Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, citing in support State v.
Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct.App.2015), rev. den. State v. Pierce,_ Idaho_, 2016 Ida. LEXIS
28 (2016). Tr. at 90-110. After studying the Pierce decision, the court denied the defense's
motion, holding that the present case was distinguishable. In support of its ruling, the court cited
the Court of Appeals' comment, 159 Idaho at 664, that "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not
provide evidence at trial that Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within
the meaning ofi.C. § 18-6409." The court tendered the following comments:
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So, the Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's decision in that
case. And the case, in the - in my mind, is different from what we have before us
today in one important way. And this is, I think, the third full paragraph before
the end of the opinion in the Pierce [sic] case.
What the Court of Appeals says is that it is undisputed that the State did
not provide evidence at trial that Pierce engaged in acts constituting disturbing the
peace, as prohibited by 18-6409. And the issue was here whether or not the State
had to do that, or whether or not they could prove something else that constituted,
quote, disturbing the peace, but somehow met that definition without also falling
within the gambit [sic] of 18-6409.
And in this particular case, the Pierce matter, nobody disagreed with the
idea that the State had not proven 18-6409 Disturbing the Peace. And the Court
of Appeals went through the analysis and recognized that the state did not provide
any sort of a definition of a common sense meaning of what disturbing the peace
is. And their conclusion was that it can't be imparted a common meaning, as the
State suggests.
And so, this was really part of the basis of their decision in this case.
So, what happened is that the Court of Appeals concluded as follows: It is
undisputed that the State did not provide evidence at trial that Pierce disturbed the
peace of his ex-wife and her children within the meaning of 18-6409.
Accordingly, he could not have been found guilty of violating the protection order
by disturbing the peace.
And what they mean by that is, if you disturb the peace at all, if you're
accused by that [sic], then the state is required to prove that you violated 18-6409.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order vacating Pierce's
Judgment of Conviction in that case.
So, what we have before us in Mr. Lantis' case is a little bit different, in
the sense that there is a dispute, first of all, as to whether or not the State has
established - or provided evidence that could support a conviction for violating
18-6409. Where it was undisputed that the State did not do that in the Pierce [sic]
decision, that is not the situation before us here in this Lantis case.
Tr. at 106-108.
The trial court apparently interpreted the Court of Appeals' comment to mean that the
state in Pierce had failed to offer any evidence as to the effect of Pierce's conduct upon the
complaining parties, since it contrasted this with the state of the evidence in the present case,
which included Hillary Henslee's testimony that Mr. Lantis' conduct left her feeling humiliated,
fearful for her job, and worried what recipients of the email in question thought of her. Tr. at
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108-110. This, the court held, was sufficient grounds to deny Mr. Lantis' motion and send the
case to the jury. !d.
The Pierce case, however, bears closer examination. Pierce went to trial in Canyon
County, the Hon. Dayo Onanubosi presiding, and was convicted of violating a protection order
in violation of§ 39-6312, Idaho Code. The state's theory of the offense was that the standardform protection order, entered during the course of a contentious divorce, contained a clause
directing Pierce not to disturb the protected party's peace; and that he disturbed her peace on two
separate occasions by having the water and the electricity, respectively, shut off at his home
where she was residing.

Pierce made pre-verdict and post-verdict motions for judgment of

acquittal under Rule 29, which motions were denied. He then appealed to the district court, the
Hon. Duff McKee presiding. The district court reversed on several grounds, the most pertinent
of which for purposes of the instant case was that the conduct alleged did not constitute
disturbing the peace within the meaning of§ 18-6409. 1
The state appealed further, raising the single issue whether the district court on
intermediate appeal erred by holding the state to the standards set by § 18-6409 when it had not
chosen to charge Pierce with a violation of that statute. Although Pierce raised additional issues
in his respondent's brief, the Court of Appeals did not address these; instead, it rejected the
state's argument that§ 18-6409 was inapplicable, and affirmed the district court, holding that it
was undisputed that the state offered no evidence that Pierce had disturbed the peace within the

meaning of§ 18-6409. The Idaho Supreme Court then, without opinion, declined the state's
invitation to review the Court of Appeals.

1

A copy of Judge McKee's opinion on intermediate appeal (State v. Pierce, Canyon County case no. CR-201313285-C) is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Appendix A.
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In considering the clause "within the meaning ofl.C. § 18-6409" it is instructive to study

Judge McKee's memorandum decision, which the Court of Appeals affirmed and quoted from.
To begin with, the memorandum decision makes clear that, so far from failing to proffer
evidence about the effects of Pierce's conduct on the complaining party, the state elicited the
testimony of "several witnesses including the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account
of the breach." Appendix A at 4. The court summed up "the turmoil all of this caused in the life
of the protected party and her children .... ":
With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being
restored within a few hours. The electrical service caused greater disruption.
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not
treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the
next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen foods were lost, and
the protected party and her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the
several days until the power was turned back on. This, the state contends, was
sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace," with the jury being allowed to
determine for themselves whether the actions in question should be deemed
illegal ....

!d. at 8.
The district court went on to note that disturbing the peace is a "well-recognized and
useful catch-all" for plea bargaining purposes, but that in the absence of a stipulation to a factual
basis, the state has to prove at least one of the "specific elements designated in the statute":
No matter how this statute is dissected or rearranged, the circumstances of the
case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of service, no
matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual noises,
(b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d)
anything related to guns or pistols, or (e) any use of vulgar or obscene language
around children. 2 If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the
misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred.

2

The Idaho Supreme Court, of course, struck down as unconstitutional this last provision pertaining to vulgar
language in front of children in State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004).
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!d. at 8-9 (emphasis added). Thus, the key to the district court's holding on intermediate appeal
was not that the state failed to offer evidence that the complaining party's peace was disturbed:
the state clearly presented copious evidence to that effect. Rather, one of the problems for the
state was that the charged conduct did not fit the legislature's definition of disturbing the peace.
The instant case presents essentially the same problem. The amended complaint alleged
that Aaron Lantis "did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, to-wit [sic] :
Hillary Henslee, by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Hillary
Henslee's employer." The charging instruction read to the jury in this case (No. 11) puts it in the
following terms: "3. the defendant, Aaron Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully 4. disturbed
the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee 5. by offensive conduct." Judge McKee's analysis ofthe
facts in Pierce is squarely on point in the instant case.

Sending an offensive email to the

complaining party's bosses, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or
unusual noises, (b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, or
(d) anything related to guns or pistols. Since the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of
the misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, and this court
should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Lantis' motions.
An important issue on appeal in Pierce was the lack of a jury instruction to clarify the

meaning of "breach of the peace" or "disturbing the peace," which the district court held - and
the Court of Appeals agreed - is a term of art, not carrying the plain, ordinary dictionary
meaning of those words or combination of words. Appendix A at 9; Pierce, 159 Idaho at 66364. The jury was left to decide for itself what "disturbing the peace" meant, and, at one point in
its deliberations, asked a question that made its level of confusion obvious. Appendix A at 5.
The state's whole theory of the offense in the case at bar raises substantially the same problem,
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namely, that the jury had too much scope to apply its own subjective standards in determining
whether the charged conduct- sending an email to the complaining party's bosses- rose to the
level of "offensive conduct" within the meaning of§ 18-6409.
The district court in Pierce expanded on this problem, noting that it is the province of
neither juries nor judges to make the law: the jury is there to determine facts, and the court is
there to instruct on the law and resolve ambiguities in the law. Appendix A at 9-10. "What a
judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of conduct not included in the statute by the
legislature, or within reach of the designated list of prohibited activities that is included." Id. at
10. It was impermissible for the court to leave the jury to decide what "breach the peace" meant,

and thus whether the charged actions were prohibited by the protection order at issue in the case.
"To allow the jury to interpret and determine the law according to the evidence in the case means
that the jury could subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs and
standards, what is and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what the
defendant did in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created.
Under any theory of law, this is impermissible." I d.
The district court then went on to elucidate the dangers of applying subjective
assessments in determining whether a crime has been committed:
... [T]he law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to determine their
application to particular facts, the interpretation must be based upon an objective
standard relative to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the
particular desires of any single individual. [Case cite omitted.] This is
necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression of what is and is not
acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of what is or is
not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between
individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat
sharp but not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vigor,
but were not loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps
contentious, but without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would
seriously argue that any of these situations approach the level of misconduct
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required by the statute. Yet all of them include conduct that could be upsetting or
unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at any given time. It would be
impermissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal code to be bent in
such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate individual could bring about
the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such
personal and individual demands.
!d. at 10-11 (emphases added).
The district court went on to note that courts have routinely stricken down enactments
that sought to have illegal conduct determined on a case-by-case basis, citing the example of
laws in the South against disturbing the peace based on general terms such as "'offensive
conduct':" in one such case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such a law could not be invoked to
prosecute black people for sitting at a whites-only lunch counter, even though such conduct was
considered by many at the time to be offensive. Appendix A at 12. "The point is that it is not a
subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of objective elements
that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily excludes jury participation
in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury measures the conduct to be sure;
but only after the boundaries and intricacies in application have been defined by the court." Id.
at 13.
There is nothing absurd or far-fetched about the problem of the slippery slope. We
currently live in an age when the nation is in a fever pitch of touchiness and highly overwrought
sensibilities. We see people coming to blows over mere political differences, and destroying or
calling for the destruction of historic monuments that they find offensive. We have even, in
recent months, been treated to the spectacle of a popular cable sports network pulling a reporter
off an assignment on the grounds that he bears a name very similar to that of a leading Civil War
Confederate general. "Offensive conduct" is at present, and given the current national mood, an
extremely big and ever-expanding tent.
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But it is imperative that in the criminal justice system, where life, liberty and property are
at stake, cooler heads prevail. In the instant case, we have a charge of disturbing the peace based
solely on the theory of "offensive conduct." As we have seen, an extremely broad range of
behaviors may be - and very often is - swept within the ambit of the word "offensive," viewed
in isolation. Taking the word "offensive" in isolation, as the state has done in the present case, is
the source of the slippery slope problem: it leaves the jury free to apply its own subjective
standards to convict Mr. Lantis of a crime of the jury's own making and definition. The danger
is all the greater when, as here, the conduct described in the complaint is of a character that is
highly likely to arouse strong emotions. In such a situation, and with no other guidance than
their own feelings on the meaning of "offensive conduct," the jury is free to define a crime not
contemplated by the legislature and return a verdict of guilty.
The Pierce case clearly supported Aaron Lantis' motions for judgment of acquittal and
dismissal in the above-entitled case, and these should have been granted. The trial court should
be reversed.
II.

Either "Offensive Conduct" Must Be Interpreted in its Textual Context to Exclude
the Charged Conduct or § 18-6409 is Void for Vagueness and Overbroad.

Although the state's theory of the offense cannot stand without taking the word
"offensive" in isolation, the word "offensive" does not in fact occur in isolation in the statute,
and the canons of statutory construction require that it not be read in isolation. The statute must
be read as a whole, with its components taken in the light of the surrounding text.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted
in the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a
whole, and words should be given their plain, usual and ordinary meanings. It
should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous or redundant.
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State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (20 11) (holding that "household member" for
purposes of the attempted strangulation statute includes only those in an intimate relationship
and excludes the parent-child relationship), quoting Ferber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho
307, 310 (2009). Further, "[i]n determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim
noscitur a sociis, which means "a word is known by the company it keeps." Schultz, 151 Idaho
at 867, citing State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816 (2000), overruled in part by State v. Poe, 139
Idaho 885 (2004).
Reading the word "offensive" in its proper context as part of a whole, and recognizing the
word by the company it keeps, supports the McKee analysis as applied above. The type of
conduct outlawed in § 18-6409 is clearly of the loud, boisterous and tumultuous variety that
disrupts not merely a person's interior peace of mind but exterior quiet and tranquility:
•

Loud or unusual noise

•

Tumultuous or offensive conduct

•

Threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting

•

Firing any gun or pistol

•

Disrupting services connected with the burial of the dead

Even the now-stricken-down provision against using profane language in front of
children is modified by the phrase "in a loud and boisterous manner." There is not even any
reference in the statute to email or any other kind of electronic communication. 3 It must be the
case, then, that the "offensive conduct" the statute contemplates needs to be tumultuous, noisy,
and generally part of a class of behaviors that breaches the exterior peace of a person or a
community by means of some jarring and abrupt assault on the senses, or conduct calculated to
3

The legislature has proven itself capable of criminalizing specific types of electronic communication; cf. § 186609, criminalizing video voyeurism (sometimes known as Idaho's "revenge porn" statute) or § 18-6710,
criminalizing harassment by telephone.
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incite or provoke violence.

That necessarily excludes the state's theory that Aaron Lantis

disturbed the peace by sending an offensive email to Hillary Henslee's bosses: sending an
upsetting email to third parties simply does not fall into this category of conduct.
If, on the other hand, the state is right, and the word "offensive" is properly read in
isolation and outside the context of the words that surround it, and it encompasses that which
breaches only a persons' interior peace by provoking some negative emotional response, then §
18-6409 must be void for vagueness and overbroad, since no one, including Mr. Lantis, is on fair
notice as to what kind of conduct is prohibited, and since there is almost no behavior that it
would not reach, including constitutionally protected conduct.
The United States Supreme Court "has on more than one occasiOn invalidated
statutes ... because they contained no standard whatever by which criminality could be
ascertained, and the doctrine of these cases has subsequently acquired the shorthand description
of 'void for vagueness."' Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974), citing Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 45 (1939); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). "In these cases, the
criminal provision is vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to
an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all."' Id., quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971).
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001). This "doctrine requires that a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted).
"The more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other
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principle element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement."' Id. at 358, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
"Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a
'standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections."' Id., quoting, Smith, 415 U.S. at 575. "Legislatures may not so abdicate their
responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law." Smith, 415 U.S. at 575. Rather,
the "absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578 (citation omitted). Simply put, a law is void for vagueness
when it subjects a person "to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court,
and jury [are] free to react to nothing more than their own preferences ...." Id. When the
accused asserts that a statute is vague as applied to the facts of his particular case, he must
demonstrate the that statute "failed to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed or
failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in
determining whether to arrest him." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003).
In this case, the state alleged that Mr. Lantis disturbed the peace of Ms. Henslee by using
email to cause her embarrassment and hurt her employment situation. Since, as noted above,
there is no reference to email or any other electronic communication in § 18-6409, there is
nothing in the statute that puts the accused on notice that sending an email might constitute
disturbing the peace. The state's reading of§ 18-6409 leaves it with far too much discretion to
use the criminal law to avenge perceived wrongs committed via email without notice to
reasonable persons that such perceived wrongs are criminal in nature.
If the state's theory of the offense in this case is justified, then § 18-6409 is also facially
overbroad. The first step in determining whether a statute is facially overbroad is to determine
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whether that statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 614 (1973); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714. The next step in the analysis is to determine
whether the statute precludes a significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Korsen,
138 Idaho at 713. "Ifthe statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent ofthe
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion to consider rules of statutory
construction. The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed
legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." State v. Dickerson,
142 Idaho 514, 517 (Ct.App.2006) (internal quotation marks and cites omitted). Courts "are not
free to rewrite a statute under the guise of statutory construction." State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326
(2009).
Speech in its various forms is obviously protected by the First Amendment. While it is
true that the right to free speech is not 100% unqualified, nevertheless, if the state is right in this
case, and sending an "offensive" email can constitute disturbing the peace, then anyone who
sends an email or indeed any sort of communication that someone else might deem "offensive"
needs to fear the risk of being charged with a crime for doing so. Thus, the state's theory of the
offense in this case, if justified, means that § 18-6409 is overbroad, and the conviction herein
must be reversed.
CONCLUSION

The Pierce case - both at the level of intermediate appeal and at the Court of Appeals
level - instructs us that there are limits to the kinds of upsetting conduct that can be addressed by
the criminal justice system. In that case, as in the case against Aaron Lantis, the state presented
plenty of evidence as to how disturbed the complaining parties were by the conduct alleged.
Also, as in the Pierce case, the state's theory of the offense in the instant case left the jury free to

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Page 14

000174

apply its own subjective standards in determining whether the act of sending an "offensive"
email was criminal. But, as in Pierce, the acts alleged did not fall within the strictures of § 186409, Idaho Code.
A proper reading of § 18-6409 requires the exclusion of the actus reus described in the
complaint in this case, which means that the state failed to offer evidence sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Otherwise, if the state's reading of § 18-6409 is true, then that statute must be
facially overbroad, as sweeping a great deal of protected conduct within its ambit, and void for
vagueness facially and as applied, for putting no one on notice that sending an "offensive" email
may constitute the crime of disturbing the peace.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court below should have granted Aaron Lantis'
motions under Rules 29 and 48, and this court should reverse the trial court's denial of those
motions and the conviction entered herein.
DATED, this.J1®'day of February, 2018.

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 27, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
within instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TilE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. CR-2013-13285-C

v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BRIAN W. PIERCE,
Defendnat/Appellant

This case is before this court on appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on
a jury verdict by the magistrate below, and the subsequent denial of a post judgment
motion for acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. The appellant herein, Brian W.

Pierce, appears by and through counsel, Nolan Sorenson, Office of Public Defender,
Caldwell. The state appears by and though counsel. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Nancy
Hurd, canyon County Prosecutor's Office, Caldwell. The matter has been fully briefed,

and submitted for decision on the briefs without argument.
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For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction entered herein is reversed. The
motion for acquittal presented to the court under Rule 29 is granted. The defendant is
acquitted and all charges are dismissed.
Facts and Procedural History

The salient facts are not in dispute. At the time of the events in question in 2013,
Pierce was in litigation with his ex~wife over issues pertajning to their divorce. On May
15, 2013, an order was entered in the divorce proceeding directing that the house the
parties had been living in was Pierce's separate property. The wife and her two children
were permitted to live there. The two children were not Pierce's children. A domestic
violence order was entered against Pierce- the temporary order was issued May 8, 2013,
and the permanent order replaced the temporary after hearing on May 16, 2013. This
order was to remain in place for a full year, unless modified by the court. The operative
provisions of this ordert as are relevant here, was apparently an identical provision in
both orders which provided:

Personal Conduct Order: Respondent shall not harass, annoy, disturb the
peace ot: telephone, contact, or otherwise communicate with (either
directly or indirectly, in person or through any other person): The
protected person [and] The minor children residing in the Protected
Person's household.
Both of the orders, including this paragraph, were pre-printed forms used by the court in
connection with domestic abuse orders in Canyon County. Other than filling in names
and addresses, and several blanks, the magistrate made no manuscript entries on either
fonn. There is no dispute in this case that this order was entered, serially on the dates
indicated, that both orders had been served on Pierce, and that he was aware of it.
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On May 10,2013, service for water to the subject house was cut offby the utility.
On May 31, 2013, service for electricity to the subject house was cut off by the utility.

The state alleged that both shut-offs were accomplished by Pierce calling the utilities and

requesting that the services be terminated. At trial, the only evidenc::e of Pierce's
involvement was the testimony of the investigating detective, who testified that Peirce
admitted to him that he (Pierce) had called the power company to shut off the power.
There was no direct evidence of Pierce's involvement with the water shut off.

Pierce was charged in a single count complaint with the misdemeanor offense of
willfully violating the terms of the domestic abuse protection order, with knowledge of
the prohibitions contained within the protection order, by twning off the utilities at the

residence where the protected person and her children were residing, alleging tbat such
disturbed the peace of the protected person and her children.
Following a trial that was completed in less than one day, the jury retmned a
verdict finding the defendant guilty of the charge. A post trial motion for acquittal under
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 was denied. The defendant was sentenced on January 16,2014.

This appeal followed.
Analysis

The charge was violating a domestic violence order, with the charging language

being that the defendant breached the peace of the protected party by his action in
causing the water and power utilities to be shut off. The magistrate ruled that the phrase

''breached the peace" was a tenn of art, and that reference to the Idaho Code criminal
provision of disturbing the peace would be the criteria for defining the offense in the

protective order. The crime, a misdemeanor, is at I.C. § 18-6409, and provides as follows:
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Disturbing the feace: {1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the
peace and quiet of any neighborhood, family or person by loud or unusual noise,
or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, ttaducing. quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires and gun or pistol or uses vulgar, profane
or indecent language within the presence ofhearing of children, in loud and
boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The tdal consisted of the testimony of the investigation detective from the Canyon

County Sheritrs office on the occurrence of the breach, and several witnesses including
the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account of the breach. The 1rial took less
than one day.

The charging instruction was a single instruction to the jury. The instruction was
~

by drawing some specific language from the code section on the misdemeanor

crime of breach the peace, adding this to ~ standard elements instruction for violation of
a domestic protection order. This instruction, numbered for the jury as Instruction No.

204 and edited here slightly to emphasize the relevant portions, read as follows:
Instruction 204
In order for the defendant to be guilty of violating a protection order, the
State must prove each of the following elements:
1. That on or about May 8, 2013 and June 1, 2013;
2. In the State ofldaho;
3. The Defendant Brian Wade Pierce;
4. Did willfully violate the temporary domestic violence order ... and

the amended domestic violence order ••. by turning off the utilities
at the residence where [the protected parties] were residing which
disturbed the peace of [the protected parties] with knowledge that a
domestic violence protection order prohibits him from doi
5. Before such violation, the defendant had notice of the Older.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.
The jury sent a question through the bailiff that :frames the issue in this analysis;
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Are we deciding if he willfully violated the order, i.e., did he shut off the utilities
to disturb her peace or are we deciding if he willfully shut off the utilities and it
disturbed her peace but he didn't necessarily know he was violating the order?

Despite this red flare from the jury that plainly demonstrated that they were confused by
the instructions and did not undeiStand the issues to be resolved, the solution reached by
the court below, with the concurrence of counsel, was to advise the jury that the answer
was within the instructions they already had, and that no further instruction would be

given. The error in not clarifying the jury's confusion is subsumed completely by the
mors in the instructions themselves. discussed within.

The charging instruction is wrong. The grammatical construction of the fourth
element awkwardly attempts to put three concepts for the jury to decide into one
sentence: (1) did or did not the state prove that the defendant shut off the utility in
question. which act (2) did nor did not constitute a breach of the peace of the protected
person. and (3) of which the defendant did or did not willfully intended to breach. As is
apparent from the jury's question. the awkward sentence was confusing. The sentence
could be read to mean that the court has already determined that shutting off the utility
was a breach of the peace, and the only thing to be decided is whether the defendant
intended or knew of the consequences. The instruction set as a whole was wrong in that

the set did not include an instruction defining what would have been necessary to find
that acts in question did constitute disturbing the peace - something to relate the acts in

question to the elements contained in the statute, I.C. §18-6409.
For the jury to determine its verdict, the jury must be able to determine and
complete answer to each of these questions from the evidence at trial;
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(a) Do the acts described in the charge (the termination of utilities) constitute one
or more of the enumerated elements of"disturbing the peace,. under the law of
Idaho?

(b) Did the defendant do one of these acts (cause termination of utilities);

(c) If so, did he do so willfully and with malice?
(d) Did the defendant know of the existence of a protective order that prevented
him ftom doing the acts?

In my view, there is no way the circumstances described by the evidence should

or could constitute a crime under the criminal statute, and therefore they could not form
the basis for a charge of breach of the protective order by disturbing the peace. There is
no other clause or part of the protective order that comes into play, and the state has not
alleged any. The case should not have survived the Rule 29 motions; one of the defense
motions for a directed verdict of acquittal at close of the state's case, or at the close of
evidence, or post-trial should have been granted.
According to the proof at trial, when the electrical power was shut off on or about

May 31, the house belonged to the defendant. The final divorce orders were entered on or
about May 1S, 2013, which confirmed the house as being the separate property of the
husband. Yet the protected parties continued to remain in the house, although it is not
clear under what authority. There was no proof that the defendant had been ordered to
allow the protected parties to remain in the house, or that he had to provide them with
utilities. The protected parties were, in effect, tenants at sufferance of the defendant continuing to occupy the house after it had been awarded to him in the divorce, but
before any legal steps had been taken either to clarify what their rights and obligations on
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continuing occupancy would be or to evict them. None of this was brought into evidence
at trial.

The situation with respect to the water service is a little different, in that it is

alleged that this utility was shut off on or about May 10, 2013, before the final divorce
orders were entered. While the defense maintained that the house had always been the

defendant's separate property, no evidence was offered at the trial here and, depending
upon what the evidence might show in this issue. this position may not appear so clearly
defined - the status of this property as marital property may still have been open in early
May. But even then, it is not alleged that the defendant was legally obligated to provide
water service to the house where is

soon-to-be ex-wife and her children were living.

Although there were allegations about the water service, there was no competent
proof at trial that the defendant bad anythins to do with the termination of water service.

In readins the complete transcript, it tmns out that minutes before the trial started, the
court struck the witness from the water utility on motion of the defense for a discovery

rule inftaction. This meant that the only proof at trial of the defendant's involvement in
any of the acts alleged consisted of the investigating detective's testimony that the
defendant admitted to calling the power company on or about June 1, because he did not
want to be liable for the power bills. (Tr. p. 110, 1. 1-5.) The detective did not follow up
with any specific inquiry about the water utility.

The defendant's admission to the sheriffs detective as to the power was the sum
total of the evidence on defendant's guilt. The rest of the testimony was devoted to proof
of the consequences - the turmoil all of this caused in the life of the protected party and

Memorandum Decision

Page -7

000182

c
her children. On this proot the issue of the water utility termination should not have
gone to the jury.

With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being restored
within a few hours. The electrical service termination caused greater disruption. Power

was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not treat this as a
weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the next week. There
was testimony that reftigerated and frozen foods were lost, and the protected party and

her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the several days until the power
was turned back on. This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the
~"

with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in

question should be deemed illegal. I conclude this to be error.
I fully recognize that the charge of "disturbiug the peace" is a well-recognized

and useful catch-all into which all manner of questionable conduct can be cataloged for
the purpose of closing troublesome cases. Invariably, these questionable situations tum
up by stipulation in plea agreements whereby more significant charges are being
dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to a disturbing the peace charge. These deals are

usually at the defendant's request, and there is no one calling for any inquiry into whether
the specific acts fit the statute.
Without a stipulation, the State would be obligated to prove one or more of the
specific elements designated in the statute had been violated or breached in order to
sustain a conviction. No matter how this statute is

dis~ted

or rearranged, the

circumstances of the case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of
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service, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual

noises, (b) tmnultuous or offensive cond~ (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d)
anything related to guns or pistols, or (e) any use of vulgar or obscene language around

chilcben. If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the misdemeanor statute,
the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred.

And if the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, neither has the
circumstance of violating a protective order by disturbing the peace. The magistrate
below correctly observed that the term "disturbing the peace" is a term of art. It does not
carry the plain ordinary dictionary meaning of the words, or combination of words. It

carries the meaning of the statute- here, I.C. § 18-6409.
The state argues that a jury can decide whether a given circumstance could be said
to breach the peace of a given individual. The argument is wrong on two counts. The jury
does not make the law, it is to determine the facts, and it is the responsibility oftbe judge
to define the law, to set the frame for decision. State v. Golden, 67 Idaho 497, 186 P.2d
485; State y. Bet/well. 11 Idaho 57, 61-62, 286 P.2d 641, 644 (1955). The judge may not
make up law out of whole cloth but is bound by case precedent and by the acts of the
legislature. State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122, 131,267 P.3d 709,718 (2011). Ifthere is an
ambiguity in the law, the judge must resolve the ambiguity - it would be improper to
permit the jury to do so. But that is as far as it goes. The judge would also not be
permitted to create new categories of conduct for sanction under the misdemeanor statute,
absent a stipulation. Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619, 620, 651 P.2d 553, 554 (Ct. App.
1982)(Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes, but have no power to
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change the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature and cannot insert into
statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there.)
The principle is that the legislature makes the law, the judge identifies and
explains the law to the jury, and the jury determines whether facts exist or do not exist
within the framework of the law as instructed by the court. The court may interpret the

law, and break down complex provisions to provide relevant extracts for the jury's use.
The court may fill in gaps, if such occur, but must do so consistently with what the

legislature has enacted. What a judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of
conduct not included in the statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list
of prohibited activities that is included.
In this case, the trial judge left for the jury to decide what the phrase "breach the
peace" meant (which was CIIOr; this was a decision for the judge in instructing the jury);

to then decide if what they thought the phrase meant was what the law intended when the
phrase was used in the domestic protection order (which was error; the interpretation of
the law is for the judge to determine and instruct). To allow the jury to interpret and
determine the law according to the evidence in the case means that the jury could
subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs and standards, what is
and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what the defendant did
in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created. Under any
theory of law, this is impermissible.
The second flaw in the state's argument is that it presupposes as proper a
subjective assessment of what might be considered a breach of the peace to a given

individual. To the contrary, the law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to
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determine their application to particular facts, the interptetation must be based upon an
objective standard relative to to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the
particular desires of any single individual. See State v. Hairston. 133 Idaho 496, 508, 988

P.2d 1170, 1182 (1999). This is necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression
of what is and is not acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of
what is or is not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between

individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat sharp but
not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vig!Jf, but were not
loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps contentious, but
without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would seriously argue that any of
these situations approach the level of misconduct required by the statute. Yet all of them
include conduct that could be upsetting or unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at
any given time. It would be impermissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal
code to be bent in such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate 'individual could

bring about the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such
personal and individual demands.
If the test here is to be under an objective standard of what is or should be
acceptable or unacceptable to society generally, can it be said that a property owner's
decision to notify a utility to terminate service could be considered wrongful or illegal? In
the instant case, there was no evidence that the defendant instructed the power company

not to tell the occupant or warn the occupant the power was being terminated. There is no
evidence that the defendant was in any way involved with the actual action of shutting off
the power. There is no claim that he was present to cheer on the power crew or to gloat
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over his ex-wife•s ptedicament The transaction was handled in the manner of hundreds
of transactions at the power company where a property owner is telephoning in with an
instruction for his account.
The point here is that there is nothing about the transaction, when viewed in
isolation, that could be consider wrong or improper or illegal in any respect. Insofar as
defendant•s expectations of his ex-wife's reaction, if the water company example applies,

he would expect that with a few phone calls, the power would be restored in his ex-wife's
name. Is not this exactly what a tenant moving out would think when advising the power
company to terminate service in the tenant,s name on a given date? How was the
defendant to know that the power company would act on a Friday afternoon, or that the
power company would not treat the issue as a weekend emergency, or that they would not
notify he occupant if the power is being shut down.
Where attempts have been made to leave such statutes open for case by case
assessment of what was legal and illegal conduct, the courts have routinely stricken such
laws as unconstitutional. The widest examples of such were the broadly drawn statues in

the south that expressed the prohibitions in general terms such as "offensive conduct,"
without more. The United State Supreme Court, for example, held that a disturbing the
peace ordinance could not be used where the only conduct being charged was against

some black teenagers for sitting at a white-only lunch counter. See, Garner v. State of
La., 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248, 7 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1961). It did not matter that the

conduct was offensive to many. It would not be a jury question for the jury to decide
whether the conduct under examination should be considered criminal. Under our law, it

is the legislature in the first instance, and the judge where discretionary flexibility may
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appears to exist, that is responsible to define where the division lines are between the
merely rude and insulting and that which crosses the line into the sufficiently obnoxious
to be criminal; between the innocently enthusiastic protest march, and one that involves
the looting and destruction that accompanies the march that crosses the line. The point is
that it is not a subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of
objective elements that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily
excludes jury participation in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury
measures the conduct to be sure; but only after the boundaries and intricacies in

application have been defined by the court. That was not done in this case, and the
omission is reversible error.
To summarize: there is no proof in this case that the defendant was involved in
the termination of water to the property at all. For reasons not part of this appeal, the
magistrates struck the state's witness on the water circumstance. However, for some

reason, having stricken the witness, the state left the charge in for instructions and
argument, and the jury apparently included it as part of their verdict. Since a guilty
verdict could have been based upon either one of the circumstances alleged, or on bo~ it
was reversible error to leave this charge in through the final instruction's and argument
The act of a property owner asking the power company to shut off service is not,
in the abstract, wrongful. It is a routine business decision carried out by countless

property owners every day. There is no evidence that the defendant directed the power
company to act in an underhanded, mean or evil manner. There was no evidence of
whether the power company attempted to contact the occupants before the power was

shut off. It is not explained why the power company did not treat the matter as a weekend
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emergency when it learned the actual circumstances. There is no proof that the defendant
knew how the power company was going to act.
The conduct in question does not fit within any of the categories of conduct
proscribed by the criminal statute, which is the necessary measure of action under the
protective order. In my view, that is the end of it Domestic protection orders are

intended. as a matter of legislative policy, to protect the person of the protected partiesto prevent violence and abusive misconduct In the case of the addition of an ill-defined
catch-all term - such as "breach the peace" - the law requires that conduct falling into
this catch-all be of the same general character or caliber as the conduct in the more

clearly defined areas. This means the catch-all terms are limited to proscribing conduct
directed at, or at least in the area of, the violent or abusive misconduct that precipitated
this law in the first place. It would not countenance extending the law into every comer
of commerce and business, making every business decision subject to examination over
whether unexpected inconveniences might spring up.
The magistrate erred in not defining specifically the conduct that would have been
subject to sanction under the criminal code or that was included within the call of the
protective order. The magistrate was bound to explain to the jury where the lines were
that would have to be crossed in order for what would otherwise be routine business
decisions to be turned into criminal activity - whether under the disturbing the peace
statute that

was incorporated into the order or under any of the direct prohibitions of the

protective order.
The magistrate•s error in failing to instruct meant that the jury was free to make
up its

own criminal boundaries or standards, and then determine whether this defendant
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had crossed the line or violated the standard which the jury had created. This is not
permitted to the jury under any application of law. There simply was no evidence that the

defendant acted with malicious intent or wanton disregard to harm his wife or her
property. There was no evidence that the defendant knew the power company was going
to act on a weekend, and then not respond to requests to restore service. There is no basis
to place this on the back of the defendant in this case. Further, there was no reason for the

defendant not to expect the power company to notify the occupants before the power was
shut off, to give them time to act and restore service. Or if interrupted, not to expect that
the interruption would have been brie~ while the arrangements were made. There is no

showing that the reasonable expectations of this case would have been any more onerous
or inconvenient than befalls many a landlord or tenant caught up in identical situations in
the ordinary process of moving in or out
Whatever the disagreements were that continued to plague these parties after their
divorce, there is no sufficient evidence in his case that any of it crossed the line into the
arena of the violent or abusive misconduct which is the gravamen of the protective order

issued in this case.
Conclasion

For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is and ruling denying the
defendant's motion for acquittal are vacated and reversed. The case is remanded with
directions to enter a directed verdict of acquittal and dismiss all charges.

!J!JP.--

Dated thisu day of December, 2014.

Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee

Memorandum Decision

Page-15

000190

·.

(

(
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy~ fo~egoing Memorandum
Decision was forwarded to the following persons on this~ day of December, 2014:

Canyon County Public Defender
111 N. lllh Ave.; Ste 120
Caldwell, ID 83605
Mark 1. Mimura
MIMURA LAW OFFICE
S10 Arthur St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

Ty K.etlinski
Deputy Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
Theresa Randall
Appeals Clerk
Canyon County Courthouse

~Ulli~
putyCierk

Memorandum Decision

Page-16

000191

Electronically Filed
3/26/2018 10:01 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
AARON LANTIS
Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. CR01-17-7609

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

-------------------------- )
APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL LOJEK
MAGISTRATE, PRESIDING

Anita Moore
Ada County Public Defender's Office
200 W. Front Street, Room 1102
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208)-287-7400

Jan M. Bennetts
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208) 287-7700

Attorney for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

000192

I.
I.
II.

III.

IV.
V.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................ 3
A. Procedural History ............................................................................ 3
B. Statement of Facts ............................................................... ............. 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................... 4
A. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Idaho Criminal
Rule 29 motions because the State provided substantial evidence
to support the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt ..................... .4
1. The State presented substantial evidence that the
alleged conduct occurred on or about July 4, 2016 .. .. .. ......... .... ............... 5
2. The State presented substantial evidence that the
alleged crime occurred in Idaho ......................... ......... . ... ......... ......... 5
3. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant
acted maliciously and willfully .......................................................... 5
4. The State presented substantial evidence that
Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee's peace .................. ..................... 6
5. The State presented substantial evidence that
Defendant's conduct was "offensive." ................................................. 6
B. The trial court's denial of Defendant's Rule 48 motion was
an appropriate exercise of discretion ............................................. ..... .... 9
C. State v. Pierce does not support the proposition that the conduct
in the present case falls outside the scope of Idaho Code § 18-6409 ............... 10
D. Idaho Code§ 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad ............... 12
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............ ... ...... ..... ........ ..... ........ ..... ........ ... 15

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF (LANTIS), Page 1

000193

II.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES

I.C. § 18-6409 ......................................................................................... 4, 10, 12
I.C. § 18-101 .... ....... .... ........ .... ........ .... ......... ...... ...... .... ........ ....... ....... .... ....... 4-5

CASES
Ada Countv Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425 (1993) ........... ..... . .............. 6
Members of City Counsel v. Taxpavers ofVincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) ..................................... 14
State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584 (1990) .............................................................................................. 13
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679 (2004) ............................................................................................... 4
State v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131 (Ct. App. 2010) ........................................................................... 9
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706 (2003) ..... .... ........ .... ........ ... ......... ..... .................. 12-13
State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780 (1999) ............................................................... 12-14
State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 2015) . .. ......... ... ........ .... ........ ...... ........... 9, 10-11
Statev. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004) ................................................................................... 6-7, 12-14
Statev. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863 (2011) .............................................................................................. 6
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ..................................................... 13
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) . .. ........... 13

OTHER
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 887 (7th ed. 2000) ........................................................................... 7
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 .......... .... ....... ...... .................................... ......... ..... ... .passim
Idaho Criminal Rule 48 ......... ..... ....... ...... ...... ...... ....... .... ....... ...... ................. .passim
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offensive
(24 March 20 18). .. ........................................................................................................................ 7
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (G&C Merriam Co. 1979) ................................ 7

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF (LANTIS), Page 2
000194

III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Procedural History

On March 7, 201 7, the State of Idaho charged Aaron Lantis ("Defendant") with one count
of disturbing the peace in violation of Idaho Code § 18-6409. On August 10, 2017, the State filed
an amended complaint alleging that Defendant willfully and maliciously disturbed the peace of
Hillary Henslee by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Ms. Henslee's employer. On
August 11, 2017, the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant moved
for a judgment of acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rules 29 and 48 both before and after the
verdict. Both motions were denied.

B. Statement of Facts
In July of2016, Hillary Henslee was an assistant manager at the Idaho Independent Bank
in Star, Idaho, under branch manager Nancy Van Winkle. Trial Transcript (Tr.) at 44-45. Ms.
Henslee had known Defendant for six years, and had been in an on-and-off relationship for eight
months until the relationship ended in May 2016. Tr. at 52, 11. 10-12, 22-24. During the course of
their relationship, Ms. Henslee took sexually suggestive pictures of herself and sent them to
Defendant. Tr. at 57-58; State's Trial Exhibits 3-6. No one else was present when Ms. Henslee
took the pictures. Tr. at 79 11. 18-22. Ms. Henslee did not send the pictures to anyone else, did
not give Defendant permission to share the pictures, and later asked Defendant to delete the
pictures. Tr. at 58 11. 14-22, 77ll. 23-25.
On July 4, 2016, Defendant sent an email containing provocative pictures of Hillary
Henslee to multiple supervisors at Idaho Independent Bank. Tr. at 83 l. 23-84 1. 3. He sent the
email to Ms. Henslee's direct supervisor, the CFO of the bank, three members of the Board of
Directors, and another bank employee. Tr. at 54 l. 21- 55 l. 10. Ms. Henslee testified that she was
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humiliated and annoyed that the pictures were sent. Tr. at 5611. 2-9, 78 1. 18. She further testifieq
that the email affected the way she felt at work, and that she was nervous about losing her job
when the pictures were sent. Tr. at 59 11. 10-24. In a phone interview with Officer Jeremy Miller,
Defendant admitted that he sent the pictures because he wanted Hillary to lose her job. Tr. at 87,
11. 14-18; State's Tr. Ex. 1.

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Idaho Criminal Rule 29

motions because the State provided substantial evidence to support the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motions. When
reviewing a decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, the appellate court must
determine "whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684
(2004). Idaho Code section 18-6409 provides:
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or
offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or
fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language
within the presence or hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
I.C. § 18-6409.
The elements of disturbing the peace were submitted to the jury without objection:
(1) On or about July 4, 2016, (2) in the state of Idaho, (3) the defendant, Aaron Eugene
Lantis, maliciously and willfully (4) disturbed the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee (5) by
offensive conduct. Jury Instruction 11; Tr. at 119 1. 25-120 1. 7. "Maliciously" was defined
as the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act. I. C. § 18-101; Jury
Instruction 13; Tr. at 120 11. 15-20. "Willfully" was defined as doing an act on purpose,
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without necessarily the intent to violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any
advantage. I.C. § 18-101; Jury Instruction 14; Tr. at 120 11. 21-24. The State presented
substantial evidence to support each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Ru1e 29 motions.
1. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged conduct occurred on or about
July 4. 2016.
Three witnesses testified to the date the email and pictures were sent, and it was
confirmed by a recorded phone call with the Defendant. Nancy Van Winkle testified that she
received the email and pictures on July 4, 2016. Tr. at 45 ll. 15-20. Hillary Henslee testified that
her boss forwarded the email to Hillary on July 5. Tr. at 54 11. 12-14. On a recorded phone call,
Defendant admitted that he sent the email and pictures on "Monday morning." State's Trial Ex.
1. Officer Jeremy Miller testified that, in context, Defendant's statement meant July 4, 2016. Tr.

at 87 11. 9-13. The State presented substantial evidence that the conduct occurred on or about July
4, 2016.
2. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged crime occurred in Idaho.
Hillary Henslee and Nancy van Winkle testified as to the bank's location in the state of
Idaho. Tr. at 44 11. 16-23, 52 11. 1-6. Hillary Henslee testified that she was in Idaho when the
email and pictures were sent. Tr. at 55ll. 11-18. The State presented substantial evidence that the
alleged crime occurred in the state of Idaho.
3. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant acted maliciously and willfully.
Hillary Henslee identified the Defendant as Aaron Lantis in court. Tr. at 52 11. 13-18.
Officer Jeremy Miller testified that he called the Defendant's phone number and verbally
identified the speaker as Aaron Lantis. Tr. at 83 11. 5-18. The State presented a recording of the
phone call wherein Defendant admitted that he sent the email and pictures because he knew
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF (LANTIS), Page 5

000197

Hillary's job was important to her. State's Trial Ex. 1; Tr. at 87 1. 3. Defendant admitted on the
recording that his intent in sending the email and pictures was to cause Hillary Henslee to lose
her job. State's Trial Ex. 1; Tr. at 87 ll. 14-18. The State provided substantial evidence ofthe
Defendant's identity and that he purposely acted with the specific intent to annoy or injure
Hillary Henslee.
4. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee's
peace.
Hillary Henslee testified that she was humiliated that the email and pictures had been sent
to her employers and coworkers. Tr. at 56 11. 2-9, 78 1. 18. She felt uncomfortable at work, and
continues to feel uncomfortable when she sees a recipient of the email. Tr. at 59 ll. 10-18. She
testified that she was concerned because she is a single mother and did not know if she would
lose her job. Tr. at 59 11. 19-24. The State presented substantial evidence that Hillary Henslee's
peace was disturbed.
5. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant's conduct was "offensive."
"Offensive conduct" must be defined by its plain meaning. In the absence of a statutory
definition, words should be given their commonly understood, everyday meanings. Ada County
Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428 (1993); see also State v. Schulz, 151
Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (stating that words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meanings) (citations omitted). The Court should give effect to all words and provisions so that
none would be void, superfluous, or redundant. Schulz, 151 Idaho at 863 (citations omitted).
Courts frequently refer to a word's dictionary definition to determine its commonly
understood meaning. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (citing the Webster's Dictionary and Black's
Law Dictionary definitions of "cohabit" in addition to its common law meaning); State v. Poe,
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139 Idaho 885, 895-96 (2004) (using Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary to define
"traducing," "quarrelling," "vulgar," "profane," and "indecent").
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "offensive" as: "1. making attack ... 2.
Giving painful or unpleasant sensations ... 3. Causing displeasure or resentment." See WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (G&C Merriam Co. 1979); see also Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offensive (24 March 2018).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "offensive" as ''1. Of or for attack ... 2. Unpleasant or
disagreeable to the senses; obnoxious ... 3. Causing displeasure, anger, or resentment; esp.,
repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is decent or moral.. .. " BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
887 (7th ed. 2000).
Defendant proposes to interpret "offensive" as a loud, boisterous, or tumultuous assault
on the senses or conduct calculated to incite violence. Appellant's Br. 11-12. This interpretation
is inadequate in a number of ways. First, as is clear from the standard definitions cited above, it
would cover only a very small fraction ofthe plain meaning of"offensive." Second, Defendant's
proposed interpretation makes "offensive" superfluous in the context of § 18-6409. If the
legislature intended "offensive" to mean loud, boisterous, or tumultuous, then it would not have
made "offensive" disjunctive with "loud or unusual noise" and "tumultuous." 1 Further, if
"offensive" was to be interpreted as conduct calculated to incite violence, it would be redundant
for the legislature to then prohibit threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or
fighting. Defendant's proposed interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and

1
The Idaho Supreme Court divided the statute into three parts based on the three verbs used: "disturbs," "fires,"
and "uses." Poe, 139 Idaho at 894. The Court further divided the portion of the statute related to "disturbs" into three
sections of adverbial prepositional phrases that explain how someone can disturb the peace in order to violate the
statute. Id. at 894-95. The statute is disjunctive. Therefore, one can "disturb" the peace [a] by loud and unusual
noise, or [b] by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or [c] by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or
fighting. See Id. at 894. The adverbs "maliciously" and "willfully" modify all three verbs. Id.at 895. Thus, one can
violate Idaho Code § 18-6409 by maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace of another by offensive conduct.
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makes "offensive" superfluous or redundant. "Offensive conduct" must be interpreted in accord
with its plain meaning and given validity within the statute.
The State presented substantial evidence that the Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee's
peace by offensive conduct. Nancy Van Winkle testified the email had pictures attached of a
sexual nature. Tr. at 4 7 11. 1-17. The State presented four pictures, and Hillary Henslee testified
that they were the four pictures sent with the email. State's Tr. Ex. 3-6; Tr. at 57. Hillary Henslee
testified that she was the subject of the pictures, that she had taken them of herself, and that she
had sent the pictures to Defendant while the two were dating. Tr. at 56 1. 24-58 1. 13. Hillary
Henslee further testified that she did not give Defendant permission to show the pictures to
anyone else, and had in fact asked Defendant to delete them. Tr. at 58 11. 19-22, 77 11. 23-25.
Hillary Henslee testified that the recipient list included her immediate boss, the chief financial
officer of the bank she worked at, a coworker, and several members of the bank's board of
directors. Tr. at 54 l. 21-55 1. 10. The State presented a recording of Defendant in which he
admitted that he had sent the email and pictures to Hillary Henslee's supervisor because he knew
Hillary's job was so important to her, and Defendant wanted her to lose her job. State's Tr. Ex. 1;
Tr. at 87 11. 3, 14-18. This conduct is offensive. There is no other reasonable way of viewing it.
Defendant's act was, without question, "repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is decent or
moral." While it was not physical in nature, it was an attack on Hillary Henslee. Defendant was
willfully trying to harm Ms. Henslee's career; a career that was crucial for Ms. Henslee to
maintain so that she could support her children. As such Defendant's attack reasonably caused
Ms. Henslee displeasure, anger, and resentment. Any reasonable person would have felt the
same.
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The State presented substantial evidence that Hillary Henslee's peace was disturbed by
offensive conduct, particularly given the nature of the pictures, the fact that they were sent
without consent, the nature of the recipients, and Defendant's stated intent in sending the email
and pictures. Given this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that the act of sending the
email or pictures constituted offensive conduct as that term is commonly understood.
The State provided substantial evidence of each element of the crime of disturbing the
peace such that a trier of fact could find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial
court properly denied Defendant's Rule 29 motions.
B. The trial court's denial of Defendant's Rule 48 motion was an appropriate
exercise of discretion.

The trial court did not err in denying the Defendant's Idaho Criminal Rule 48 motion.
Appellate courts review motions made under Idaho Criminal Rule 48 for abuse of discretion. State
v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131, 138 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). The appellate court must
determine: "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. (citations omitted).
In the present case, the trial court found that it could dismiss the action

e~ther

on its own

motion or on motion of any party, if the appropriate grounds existed. Tr. at I 04 11. 1-6. The court
reasoned that the conduct at issue was distinguishable from Defendant's analogies to political
conversations and bad table manners because the statute required criminal conduct to be willful and
malicious in disturbing the peace of another. Tr. at 103 11. 14-24. The court further reviewed
Defendant's arguments in regard to State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 2015), and stated that
the holding in Pierce meant simply that if an individual is accused of disturbing the peace then the
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state is required to prove the elements as defined in Idaho Code§ 18-6409. Tr. at 107 11. 5-24. The
court determined that the State in the present case had presented evidence that could support a
conviction of disturbing the peace under Idaho Code§ 18-6409. Tr. at 108 1. 3-109 1. 9. The court
reviewed the grounds for a dismissal under Rule 48 and found that neither ground was met in the
present case before denying Defendant's Rule 48 motion. Tr. at 10411. 1-21. Defendant has failed to
establish that denying the Rule 48 motion was an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not err in
denying Defendant's Rule 48 motion.
C. State v. Pierce does not support the proposition that the conduct in the present
case falls outside the scope ofldaho Code § 18-6409.

Defendant' s brief relies on the court's ruling in Pierce for the proposition that sending an
offensive email or pictures does not fall under any of the elements of Idaho Code § 18-6409.
Appellant's Br. 7. Pierce is clearly distinguishable from the present case, however, and does not
support the claim that the conduct in the present case is beyond § 18-6409. In Pierce, the
defendant and his ex-wife were in litigation over their divorce. 159 Idaho at 662. A magistrate
had determined that the house in question was Pierce's separate property, but Pierce's ex-wife
continued to live in the house without Pierce. Id. A protection order was entered, prohibiting
Pierce from disturbing the peace of his ex-wife or her children. Id. Prior to the order, water
service to the residence was terminated. ld. Following the order, electrical service was also
terminated, allegedly at Pierce's request. ld. The state alleged that Pierce violated the terms of
the protection order by turning off utilities, which disturbed the peace of the protected parties. Id.
The state argued that it was not required to prove the elements of disturbing the peace under
Idaho Code § 18-6409 because it was not charging the defendant with a violation of Idaho Code
§ 18-6409, and that it met its burden by providing evidence that the defendant had generally
disturbed the peace of his ex-wife by canceling electricity to his house in violation of the terms
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of the protective order. Id. at 663. The court found that "disturbing the peace" was a term of art
and that the state did not provide evidence at trial that the defendant had engaged in acts
constituting disturbing the peace as defined by Idaho Code§ 18-6409. Id. at 663-64.
In the present case, the State alleged that the Defendant committed the cnme of
disturbing the peace under Idaho Code § 18-6409 by engaging in conduct that qualifies as a
violation under the statutory language. The State alleged that Defendant maliciously and
willfully disturbed the peace of Hillary Henslee by offensive conduct. The legislature
specifically articulated acts constituting disturbing the peace and included offensive conduct. I.C.
§ 18-6409. The jury was not left to decide for itself what "disturbing the peace" meant, as was

the issue in Pierce. Nor was the jury here tasked with enforcing a law of its own creation,
because the jury here was provided with the relevant elements of the charged offense as defined
by statute. The State articulated the specific conduct that was offensive. The jury was asked to
determine whether the evidence presented proved the alleged crime according to the statutory
definition of the offense, which is precisely what juries are supposed to do. The instant case is
therefore distinguishable from Pierce because the State alleged that the Defendant committed the
crime of disturbing the peace by conduct that was specifically included in the statutory definition
of the crime and presented significant evidence that the Defendant violated each specific element
of the crime as defined by statute.
The facts of the two cases are also clearly distinguishable. In Pierce, the defendant was
accused of calling a utility company to terminate electricity to his own house, a property he
owned separately from his ex-wife. See 159 Idaho at 662. It is unclear what evidence was
presented as to Pierce's intent. In the instant case, the State presented evidence at trial that the
Defendant sent sexually provocative pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her employers and coworkers
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for the purpose of getting her fired, despite his ex-girlfriend's request that he delete the pictures.
It strains reason to claim that the two scenarios are factually similar. While there was insufficient

evidence in Pierce for a trier of fact to find that the defendant had engaged in conduct fitting the
definition of disturbing the peace, the State has clearly presented substantial evidence of every
element ofthe crime as defined in Idaho Code§ 18-6409. As such, Pierce is distinguishable from
the instant case and does not control. The trial court's ruling that Pierce is distinguishable from
the present case should be affirmed.

D. Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
Idaho Code § 18-6409 is neither impermissibly vague as applied to the facts of the case,
vague on its face, nor overbroad. "There is a strong presumption that legislative enactments are
constitutional." State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 784 (1999). "A statute may be challenged as
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct." State v. Korsen, 138
Idaho 706, 712 (2003). "To succeed on an 'as applied' vagueness challenge, a complainant must
show that the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the
defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had
unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him." Id. Given the plain meaning of
"offensive conduct," no reasonable person would believe that sending sexually provocative
pictures of an ex-girlfriend to her boss for the purpose of getting her fired would not fall under
the purview of the statute. The Defendant's conduct is clearly offensive, both subjectively to the
victim and objectively to a reasonable person. A plain meaning reading of the statute would
provide fair notice that such conduct was proscribed to all but the most unreasonable. As to
whether the statute provides sufficient guidelines for enforcement, the statute itself limits its
application to offensive conduct that disturbs another and is willful and malicious. See I.C. § 18-
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6409. "The requirement that the defendant must maliciously and willfully disturb the peace in
one of the ways specified provides adequate standards to protect against arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Poe, 139 Idaho at 903. It is not merely offensive conduct that is
proscribed, but offensive conduct that is purposive, intended to annoy, injure, or do a wrong, and
that has its desired effect in that it disturbs another. As such, the statute itself provides adequate
limitations to enforcement and is not impermissibly vague as applied.
For a facial challenge to be successful, "the complainant must demonstrate that the law is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712 (quoting Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)). The challenger must
show that the statute is invalid in toto. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712. The challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exist under which the law would be valid. Id. (citing United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Defendant does not claim that Idaho Code§ 18-6409 is
vague in all of its applications. Defendant's argument that "offensive conduct" must be
interpreted in terms of the other provisions of the statute presupposes that there are applications
for which the terms of the statute are not unconstitutionally vague. As limited by the
requirements that the conduct at issue be malicious and willful, with the end result of one's peace
being actually disturbed, Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague on its face.
Defendant's argument that Idaho Code § 18-6409 is facially overbroad is also without
merit. In order to make this determination, a court first must determine whether the statute
regulates constitutionally protected conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713 (citing State v. Bitt, 118
Idaho 584, 589 (1990)). If it does, the court then must determine whether the statute precludes a
significant amount of the protected conduct. Id. Where the statute proscribes conduct rather than
merely spoken words, the overbreadth of the statute must be real and substantial, judged in
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relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Poe, 139 Idaho at 892. Overbreadth is not
substantial if, "despite some possibly impermissible application, the remainder of the
statute ... covers

a

whole

range

of

easily

identifiable

and

constitutionally

prescribable ... conduct .... " Leferink, 133 Idaho at 785 (citations omitted). A statute will not be
invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional
applications. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714 (citing Members of City Counsel v. Taxpayers of
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)).
Idaho Code § 18-6409 regulates speech and conduct. As narrowed by Idaho courts, the
speech regulated by Idaho Code § 18-6409 is largely unprotected. See Poe, 139 Idaho at 895-96
(stating that threatening, traducing, quarrelling, and challenging to fight are unprotected). Other
portions of Idaho Code § 18-6409 seek to regulate conduct and are "neutral as to any expressive
element that may exist in a particular circumstance." Id. at 895. The legislature is free to regulate
conduct that does not infringe on Constitutional protections. As discussed above, the statute
appropriately limits itself by specifying the manner, result, and intent that must exist for an act to
be criminalized. Merely sending an email or pictures that could be offensive is not sufficient to
bring the conduct under the purview of§ 18-6409 as the Defendant claims. Rather, the offensive
conduct would have to be malicious and willful in addition to actually disturbing someone's
peace. As such, the statute does not substantially infringe on protected conduct. The statute is not
overbroad in relation to its plainly legitimate application.
V.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Rule 29 motions because the State
presented substantial evidence of each element of disturbing the peace as defined in I. C. § 18-6409.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's Rule 48 motion. Pierce is
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distinguishable from the present case and does not control. Finally, I.C.

§

18-6409 is not void for

vagueness as applied, impermissibly vague on its face, or overbroad on its face. The rulings

of the

trial court and Defendant’s conviction should be afﬁrmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The State Argues for the Criminalization, Under § 18-6409, Of Anv and All
Offensive Conduct Whatsoever.

The state claims that § 18-6409 "itself provides adequate limitations to enforcement and
is not impermissibly vague as applied." Respondent's Brief at 13. It purports to describe the
sort of "offensive conduct" that is actionable in the criminal courts as "not merely offensive
conduct that is proscribed, but offensive conduct that is purposive, intended to annoy, injure, or
do a wrong, and that it has its desired effect in that it disturbs another." !d. It argues that this
definition constitutes a limit to the types of conduct that will trigger criminal liability; but in fact,
the class of behaviors that may fall within its purview is without limit.

Elsewhere in its brief,

the state asserts:
Defendant [that is, Aaron Lantis] proposes to interpret "offensive" as loud,
boisterous or tumultuous assault on the senses or conduct calculated to incite
violence. [Cite omitted.] This interpretation is inadequate in a number of
wavs. First, as is clear from the standard definitions cited above, it would
cover only a very small fraction of the plain meaning of "offensive." Second,
Defendant's proposed interpretation makes 'offensive" superfluous in the context
of § 18-6409. If the legislature intended "offensive" to mean loud, boisterous, or
tumultuous, then it would not have made "offensive" disjunctive with "loud or
unusual noise" and "tumultuous." [Footnote omitted.] Further, if"offensive" was
to be interpreted as conduct calculated to incite violence, it would be redundant
for the legislature to then prohibit threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging
to fight or fighting. Defendant's proposed interpretation conflicts with the plain
meaning of the term and makes "offensive" superfluous and redundant.
"Offensive conduct" must be interpreted in accord with its plain meaning and
given validity within the statute.
Respondent's Brief at 7 (emphasis added).
What the state is arguing here is that there ought to be no limit whatsoever to the kind of
offensive conduct that its coercive police power can reach. The state continues to argue on
appeal, as it did below, that the conduct forming the basis for the instant charge of disturbing the
peace is specifically included in § 18-6409. Respondent's Brief at 11. It appeals, not to the
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language of the statute, but to the sensibilities of a reasonable person, to make this determination
(Respondent's Brief at 12) - as indeed it must, since no language in the statute specifically
includes disturbing the peace by electronic communications. It urges on this Court the dictionary
definition of "offensive conduct" and complains that the defense argues too narrow an
interpretation - certainly too narrow to include all the conceivable "offensive conduct" that the
state would like to be actionable under the statute.
On appeal, as at the trial level, the state entirely misses the point of State v. Pierce, 159
Idaho 661 (Ct.App.2015), rev. den. February 10, 2016, which is that the conduct charged must
constitute an actus reus within the meaning of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state goes through
the elements instruction for disturbing the peace and focuses on the quantity of evidence it
offered to support each element. The issue here, however, is not the quantity of evidence offered
to support each element; it is that, however much proof the state offered, the state failed to prove
acts that were loud, boisterous, tumultuous, quarrelsome, or tending to incite or provoke
violence, such as constitute disturbing the peace.

The lesson of Pierce is that the conduct

complained of must be prohibited by § 18-6409. In part because the case against Pierce was
based on conduct that did not fall within the strictures of that statute, the district court on
intermediate appeal held that Pierce's Rule 29 motions should have been granted. The Court of
Appeals quoted from and affirmed this holding, and the Idaho Supreme Court declined the
state's invitation to review.
The state's argument is, essentially, that (a) the legislature included "offensive conduct"
in its list of prohibited acts; (b) the state established that the conduct in question was indeed
"offensive"; and that therefore (c) the conduct in question - sending an offensive email to the
oomplaining party's bosses - was "conduct that was specifically included in the statutory
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definition of the crime," (Respondent's Brief at 11), even though (d) neither email nor any other
electronic communication is listed as a means whereby a person may commit the crime of
disturbing the peace.
Although the Pierce court points out that "disturb the peace" is a term of art, not in
common use, that describes specific prohibited conduct and cannot be imparted a common
meaning (Pierce, 159 Idaho at 663), the state continues to argue in the case at bar that "offensive
conduct" is not a term of art and should be given its ordinary, dictionary meaning. This is really
just another way of asking this Court to read "offensive conduct" in isolation from the
surrounding text that sets the stage for what that term in fact means. The state argues that Mr.
Lantis would have this court interpret § 18-6409 in such a way as to render much of it
superfluous; but in fact, so far from arguing superfluity, Mr. Lantis asserts that the rest of the
statute is crucial to getting at the meaning of the phrase "offensive conduct." The state stands on
its head the rule of noscitur a sociis by positing that "offensive conduct" introduces an entirely
new and unforeseen class of behaviors into the statute, instead of the statute governing and
restricting those acts that constitute "offensive conduct." If this reading of§ 18-6409 is the
correct one, then there is no conduct for which a citizen may not be prosecuted, provided only
that the state can find someone willing to testify that he found that conduct offensive. Indeed,
the state gives this away as the result it hopes for when it complains that Mr. Lantis is urging an
"inadequate" interpretation of "offensive conduct" that "would cover only a very small fraction
of the plain meaning of' offensive.'" Respondent's Brief at 7.
But noscitur a sociis is still in effect, and still a factor to be reckoned with in the instant
case; thus, the state's very careful explanation of why the conduct at issue here was offensive
serves only to underscore why it has nothing in common with the enumerated prohibited acts in
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the statute. In the first place, the statute makes no mention whatever of email, texting or any
other electronic communication, so that it cannot really be said- as the state declares on page 11
of its Respondent's Brief- that the conduct complained of here is "specifically included in the
statutory definition of the crime." As noted in the Brief of Appellant at 11, fu. 3, the legislature
has proven itself perfectly capable of criminalizing certain electronic communications; it has not
done so with respect to § 18-6409. In the second place, § 18-6409 covers conduct that is loud,
boisterous and tumultuous, disruptive of exterior quiet and tranquility rather than merely
someone' s interior peace of mind. Even when 18-6409 outlawed uttering profanity in front of
children, the state still had to prove that this was done "in a loud and boisterous manner." To
disturb the peace, then, the accused must have engaged in behavior that breaches the exterior
peace of a person or community by means of some jarring or abrupt assault on the senses particularly hearing - or that is calculated to incite or provoke violence. Whatever else the state
may have proven in the instant case, it has failed to prove conduct that matches this description.
The trial court should therefore be reversed on appeal.
The state's position is not saved by its argument that the element of "maliciousness"
prevents the prosecution of all "offensive conduct." It argues that criminally offensive conduct
means "not merely offensive conduct that is proscribed, but offensive conduct that is purposive,
intended to annoy, injure, or do a wrong, and that it has its desired effect in that it disturbs
another." Respondent's Brief at 13. But, as noted above, this is no sort of limitation at all.
Speech itself is an action that is purposive in that it is engaged in for the purpose of
communicating a specific thing, and it is very often intended to annoy or disturb another. In a
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world where the state's theory of disturbing the peace prevails, any and every annoying action
that is not inadvertent would be a potential object for criminal prosecution. 1
The state further argues that Mr. Lantis' argument of vagueness and overbreadth are not
well taken because the constitutive elements of § 18-6409 are in the disjunctive, and thus the
state had a wide variety of items to choose from in prosecuting him for disturbing the peace including whatever conduct could conceivably be shoe-homed into the phrase "offensive
conduct." This is just yet another way of arguing that "offensive conduct" needs to be read in
isolation from the surrounding text, and that it therefore can mean whatever the state wants it to
mean, provided, again, it can find a complaining witness willing to testify as to its offensiveness.
The state further argues the reprehensibility of the conduct in question. State's Objection
at 9. What the state is really doing here, however, rather than addressing the question of whether
the conduct in this case fits the statute, is appealing to the sense of indignation the conduct
arouses by reason of its reprehensibility. But this is a distraction - and a perilous one, in light of
the need to interpret and apply the law objectively and impartially in all criminal cases. It is
possible for a thing to be reprehensible yet not criminal, and therefore it is neither possible nor
appropriate to use the criminal justice system to redress every conceivable grievance between
individuals.

The issue here is not whether the conduct in question is boorish or socially

unacceptable, but whether it is criminal under the state's theory of the case. Mr. Lantis argues
that, whatever else his conduct might be, it does not belong to the class of behaviors that is
proscribed by § 18-6409. Therefore, the trial court should be reversed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The criminal law is a blunt instrument, and not fit to be invoked in every single grievance
that one person may have against another.
1

There are various levels of sanctions - social,

Not that inadvertence necessarily shields an accused from prosecution, since intent will be an issue for a jury.
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religious, civil, and criminal
level
a

of sanctions

—

that may be invoked against bad behavior, and the lowest possible

should be applied to each bad act. It is an abuse to apply criminal sanctions to

bad act that would more properly be dealt with Via civil sanctions, religious sanctions or social

sanctions. Yet the state would make a catch-all

coercive police power against all kinds

of §

18-6409 that would permit

it to mobilize its

of bad conduct that falls more properly within the domain

of lesser sanctions.
As Mr. Lantis has previously argued, as in the Pierce case, the acts alleged here did not

constitute an actus reus within the meaning of § 18-6409, Idaho Code, which means that the state

failed to offer evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. Otherwise,

if the state’s reading of §

18-6409 is true, then that statute must be facially overbroad, as sweeping a great deal

of

protected conduct within its ambit, and void for vagueness facially and as applied, for putting no
one on notice that sending an “offensive” email may constitute the crime

of disturbing the peace.

For all the reasons argued in this appeal, the trial court below should have granted Aaron

Lantis’ motions under Rules 29 and 48, and this court should reverse the trial court’s denial of
those motions and the conviction entered herein.

DATED, thisgﬁﬂj day of March, 2018.

ANITA MOORE
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 30th
39th

,

2018, I served a true and correct copy

of the

within instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor.

@Mm
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Page 6
000216

AM..
Filed: April 02,
02 2018 at 10:14 AM
District, Ada County
Fourth Judicial District,
Christopher D. Rich,
the Court
ofthe
Rich, Clerk of
By: Deb
D85 Perkins
Teréins Deputy Clerk

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CRO1-17-O7609
State of Idaho
Case No. CR01-17-07609

Plaintiff,

Notice of Oral Argument

vs.
Aaron Eugene Lantis
Defendant.
Defendant.
above-entitled case is set for:
NOTICE IS GIVEN That the above-entitled
for:

Hearing Type
Tyge
Oral Argument

Date
04/26/2018

Time
3:30 PM

Judge
Gerald F. Schroeder

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the Court
By:
By: Deb Perkins
Deputy Clerk

965 Terkins

Dated:
Dated: 4/2/2018

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date I served
served a copy of the attached to:
I

Anita Marie Elizabeth
Elizabeth
Moore
David Garrett Swenson

I

public.defender@adacounty.id.gov [X]
email
Byemail
[X] By
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net

Dated:
Dated: April 02,
02, 2018

NOTICE OF HEARING
M-CV CR FL PR (NO2)
(Appv.10.23.15)
(N02) (Appv.10.23.15)

[X]
By email
[X] By

By:
By: Deb Perkins
Deputy Clerk

965 Perkins

11

000217

SCHROEDER I D. PERKINS I 4-26-18 I VANESSA STARR

Time

Speake

1A-CRT509

Note

! CR0117-07609 STATE OF IDAHO VS. AARON EUGENE LANTIS

03:35:53 PM !

: :g·~:::~:~:::$.:~:·:~:~I~~~~:~:.: : : : ::I~:~·i:I:~:-·?.:~:~~·;:: ~:~T:P.:~·~:i:~~·: :Pr.~:~~-~~J?.<~-~~:f~??r.~:·: : : : : :.: : : : : : : : :· : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : ·: :·: : : :·: · :·: · : :·: : : ·: :

. 9..~.:- ~.?..:. ~. ?. . ~.~.l... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .l..~~~-l.f~.r.~.~-~:.~~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
. 9..~.:-~.?..:. ~. ~ . -~-~-l..~.?..?..~:. . . . .:. ?.r..~.~/Y~.~-~:~~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..9..~_:_~.?..:. ~-~ . -~-~-L~- ~?~.:. . . . . .l..9~:~~~-?..~. .t.?.~ . ~-?..~.~-~:.1
.......................................................................................................................................................................

03:38:20 PM ! Moore

Response to courts question
"6'3.:'3'fF3'2. .F>N1T'. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . !r. c·
on-iril·Li·e;·a. .braf'Ar9'Li·m·e;·r;T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

. . . . . . rR·e;·;;-p·c;·r;·;;·i·v·e;·. brai"Ar9u·m·e·ilf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. ... . . .. ......... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6'~f4·s -: 4·2" -F>N1Tst'at'e

: g_~_:A:~:~4.:7..::~~T~~~~~::::::::I9~~~~~:?~:::~?:: ??~~~:~!:.: :.: : : : : .: : ": ":.: : ": :.: : ": ": .:.: : : : : : : .: :.: : : :.: : : : : . : :.: : : : : : : :.: :.: :.: : :.: :.: : : : : : : : :.:.:. : .: :.:. : .: : : :.: : : .:
03:47:56 PM ! State

! Response to courts question

"o'3':·4·a·:. fi''F>N1T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tc·c;·r;·uil·u·e;a . Re.sponsh/e . bra'i"Ar9·Li·m·ent". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ..
"6'3:·4·9·:. 1·a. .F>.fV1l jiJd9e. . . . .lauesii'oil. .tor . c·a·u·il·sef. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ..
"6'3:'4·9-:4·a. .F>N1Tst'aie. . . . . . .r..R·e;·;;·p·c;·r;·;;·e;. ic;. .c;.c;·u·rts . Ciuesii·c;·r;. . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
"6'3·:·s·O':.T6. .F>.N1TJud9e. . . . Tauesti.oil. .to. couns.ei. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ... . .
.,g-~::~·9.::·:~~::·~:~.r::~~~~:~_:: .: ·: :.:r~·~:~:P.:?.:~-~~"!?.: . ~:?.:~:~~:_§~~~~~:?.:~·:.: ": : : :.:· : ":".::: .: : : : : : : .:·: : :.: : :.:.:.:.:.:.: : : : .: : : :: : : : :: : :. : : :.: : :: ::: :·:· :·: ·:.: :_:.,_: : : : :·:.: :
03:52:39 PM ! Judge ! Statement to counsel
"6'3:'s·2':·5T"F>'N1T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f'\rvhere. a·c;·. we . dr:a·w. the. .ii·r;·e;. .wiii1. .thi.s. subJ'ect"'m.atier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ........ . .. . . . .. . . . .
"6'3:'5K. 66. .F>.N1Tst'aie. . . . .. Tc·c;·r;'ti·il-i:i'ea. .Re.spo.nsi've. ora'i"Ar9·u·m-ent'. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
"6'3·:·s·6:--3'1. . F>.N1TJud9.e. . . . . f. st'at'e·m-eri't"and. Ci.Lie.st'ion . t'o. .c6'lj·il·sei. . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . .
·6'3:'56·:"3·9. .F>.N1T'st'at'e. . . . . .. r..c·c;aril·Li·eci"Respo.nsi.ve . ora'i"Ar9·u·m·enf". .. . ... . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . ... . ... . . . . .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
·a4·:·a4:·2·4. .F>.fV1TjiJd9'9. . . . . f. auestroil.s...ior. .co·u·nsei". . .. . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
. 5'6"F>'N1Trv1'o·o-re. . . . .[. R.es·p·c;·il·se. io...c.o·u·rts . Ciuesti'o.il. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. . . . . . . . .
·a4·:. 1"6':"3i"F>'N1TJud9e. . . . . ["auestrori'. tor. c·a·Li·il·sef. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"a4·:. 1"6':. 5'6"F>'N1T'f:io·o-re. . . . .rR·e;·;;·p·c;·il·s·e. io...c:.c;·Li·its . Ciuesii'o.il. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
"a4·:. 1"1":·4·s. .rfV1TjiJd9e...... Tauesti.oil. .tor. c·a·u·n·sef. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
................................................ ............................... ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
04:12:04 PM ! Moore i Response to courts question
"a4·:. 1"2':"3'1. . F>fV1TjiJd9e. . . . .f\i\ii'ii. .iss·Li·e. .a. w·r:itfe.n. .o.i)i·il-ion. . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ... . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
"a4·:·a~i':

.;.

;.

:_ g4.:_:~::?.:4_~ . :~:~:r:.:::::::::·:·:::·:::·:::·:::r~:~~:-.?..t.:.~~~~-::: . : : :. :. :·.:.:: · _:. : . ·: ·:: . :.: . : . ·:·:. : . : :·:. :·:: .: : : : : : :.:·: :.:: .:·:.:: .:: .:: .:·:: ·:::.:::.:: ·: :·: : :.:.:·:.:·:.:.::.:: .:·:.:: .:.:.:·:. .:-. : :.:.::.
04:12:44 PM !

4/26/2018

'

1 of 1

000218

Filed: 06/14/2018 10:22:29
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Lyke, Martha

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR01-17-7609
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

OPINION ON APPEAL

AARON LANTIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

ADORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: ANITA MOORE
ADORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: GARRETI SWENSON

I. NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant appeals his conviction of Disturbing the Peace following a jury trial.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Appellant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of disturbing the peace in
violation of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state alleged that he committed the crime by
sending sexually suggestive pictures of the alleged victim, Hillary Henslee, to her employers
in an attempt to have her fired from her job. A jury found him guilty. He made pre- and postverdict motions under Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. They were denied.
This appeal followed.
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Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The appellant asserts the following issues: (1) the conduct complained of falls outside
the purview of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code; and, (2) if the conduct complained of does fall within
the purview of§ 18-6409, the statute is void for vagueness and overbroad.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a
trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v.
Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or

statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho
458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000).
V. ANALYSIS

The appellant contends the magistrate erred in failing to grant his Rule 29 and Rule
48 motions because the conduct he was charged with and convicted of committing does not
constitute disturbing the peace, as set forth in the Idaho Code.
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) provides that the trial court on motion of the
defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of
one or more charged offenses after the evidence on either side is closed if the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The
test applied when reviewing the ... court's ruling on a motion for judgment of
acquittal is to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged. State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 186
P.3d 670, 674 (Ct. App. 2008).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence where a judgment of conviction
has been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the
jury's guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We do
not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
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drawn from the evidence. Moreover, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. /d.
"This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal
action for an abuse of discretion." When a trial court's discretionary decision is
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Johnston, 2016 WL 1569522, *2 (ld.
Ct. App.) (citing State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778, 275 P.3d 1,
4 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Hodges, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333
(1989).
However, an appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and the
application and construction of statutes.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction.
The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for
the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. State
v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 968-69, 318 P.3d 955, 958-59 (Ct. App. 2014).
(citations omitted) .
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the
context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole,
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should
be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the
statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory
language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body
must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67, 264 P.3d 970, 973-74
(2011) (emphasis added). See also Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho
Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 108 P.3d 370, 373 (2005) ('It is
a cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be
given meaning. We will construe a statute, "so that effect is given to its
provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant.") (citations
omitted).
Courts must construe statutes "under the assumption that the legislature knew
of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was
passed." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145,
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150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho
214, 218, 254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011).
We assume that the legislature knew of other statutes in existence at the time
a given statute was passed, particularly statutes of a similar concern . State v.
Betterton, 127 Idaho 562, 563, 903 P.2d 151, 152 (Ct. App. 1995). In
deference to legislative expertise, we therefore decline to presume a
redundancy between entire statutes. Rather, statutes in pari materia (relating to
the same subject) are construed as complementary and cohesive. State v.
Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782, 786 (2002) . State v. Folsom, 139
Idaho 627, 630, 84 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2003).
The defendant was convicted of Disturbing the Peace, which is found within Chapter
64 of Title 18 of the Idaho Code, and which is entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful Assembly, Prize
Fighting, Disturbing Peace."
Idaho Code§ 18-6409 ("Disturbing the Peace.") provides:
(1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of
any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by
tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar,
profane or indecent language 1 within the presence or hearing of children, in
a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the dignity or
reverential nature of any funeral, memorial service, funeral procession,
burial ceremony or viewing of a deceased person is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
The appellant was charged and convicted pursuant to the "offensive conduct" portion
of the statute. He argued before the magistrate and argues on appeal that his conduct does
not constitute a violation of Idaho's disturbing the peace statute.
The evidence presented at trial was that the appellant and the victim were previously
in a relationship. During this relationship the victim sent the appellant, then her boyfriend,
1

But see State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 901 , 88 P.3d 704, 720 (2004) ("Considering these decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, we are constrained to hold that the third part of Idaho Code § 18-6409 is
unconstitutional because as written it criminalizes speech that is protected by the First Amendment, and we
therefore strike that portion of the statute.") .
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"sexually provocative" photographs she had taken of herself. See Jury Trial Transcript, at 5257. After their relationship ended, the appellant emailed four of these photos to the victim's
workplace, including to her supervisor and members of the company's board of directors, in
an unsuccessful effort to have her fired from her job. See id. at 81-87. The victim testified
that the appellant's conduct "humiliated" and "annoyed" her. See id. at 56, 79.
Reading the Disturbing the Peace statute in its entirety, as required, this conduct,
however reprehensible it is, does not constitute a violation of the statute. The statute clearly
and plainly prohibits disturbing, for lack of a better term, the "exterior" or "sensory" peace of a
neighborhood, family, or person. It does not prohibit offending someone's "internal"
sensibilities by sending an email to them or to their co-workers, as occurred here. It does not
prohibit embarrassing someone by sending an offensive electronic communication. This is
demonstrated by the placement of the statute in the chapter entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful
Assembly, Prize Fighting, Disturbing Peace," (see State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 445, 362
P.3d 514, 520 (2015) (Idaho Supreme Court relied on the context of the placement of the
statute in the code in construing the statute)), as well as the related terms of the statute
requiring that the disturbing the peace conduct include loud or unusual noise, gun fire,
challenging someone to a fight, loudness or boisterousness, or tumultuous conduct.
Rioting requires physical injury, damage or destruction to public or private property, or
a disturbance of the public peace. I. C. § 18-6401.
Unlawful assembly requires two or more persons assembled to perform an unlawful
act or the doing of a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous manner. I. C. § 18-6404.
The words "offensive conduct" cannot properly be removed from the context of the
statute and applied to the appellant's conduct to make it a crime. Looking at the words
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preceding it, the conduct that is deemed "offensive" would need to be similar to "tumultuous" 2
conduct, which is defined as "marked by tumult: loud, excited, and emotional." Support for
this view is found, as the appellant argues, in a recent decision of the Idaho Court of
Appeals: State v. Pierce, 1591daho 661,365 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2016). The Idaho Court of
Appeals stated "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that Pierce
engaged in acts constituting disturbing the peace, as prohibited by I.C. § 18-6409." 159
Idaho at 663, 365 P.3d at 419. The Court of Appeals noted "[i]n Idaho, the prohibited conduct
constituting disturbing the peace is defined by statute. In I.C. § 18-6409 as quoted above,
the legislature of Idaho has provided guidance regarding specific conduct that constitutes
disturbing the peace. It is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that
Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within the meaning of I.C. § 186409." 159 Idaho at 664, 365 P.3d at 420.
The conduct that resulted in Mr. Pierce, who was in litigation with his ex-wife "over
issues related to their divorce," being charged and found guilty, by a jury, of disturbing the
peace was that he "called the electrical power company to terminate service," to the house
(which was Mr. Pierce's separate property) where she and her children, who were not his
biological children, "continued to live in the house without Pierce." 159 Idaho at 662, 365
P.3d at 418. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court which vacated
the Judgment of Conviction entered in the magistrate court. The district court decision gave
the following analysis concerning disruption of power service to the house.

2

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tumultuous
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This disruption in electrical service to the house:
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did
not treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until
sometime the next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen
foods were lost, and the protected party and her children had to impose upon
friends for lodging for the several days until the power was turned back on.
This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace"
with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in
question should be deemed legal. I conclude this to be error. Memorandum
Decision (CR-2013-13285-C), at 8. 3
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the state failed to present evidence supporting a
conviction for disturbing the peace for conduct that was clearly offensive but outside the
statutory definition of disturbing the peace. The same reasoning applies to the facts of this
case.
VI. THE VOID FOR VAGUE ARGUMENT

The appellant also asserts a void for vagueness challenge to the statutory term
"offensive conduct," which was relied upon by the State to obtain his conviction for Disturbing
the Peace. This issue was raised before the magistrate in his Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal.
"'It is well established that when a case can be decided upon a ground other than a
constitutional ground, the Court will not address the constitutional issue unless it is
necessary for a determination of the case."' City of Sandpoint v. Independent Highway
District, 161 Idaho 121, 124, 384 P.3d 368, 371 (2016) (citing Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon
River Fruit Co., 1581daho 269, 279, 346 P.3d 286,296 (2015)).

3

The Court takes judicial notice of this decision. See I.R.E. 201 .
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It is not necessary to address the constitutional analysis in this appeal. This Court will
avoid the morass of constitutional hypotheticals in this case in view of the decision on
statutory construction.
VI. CONCLUSION

The conviction for Disturbing the Peace is vacated and this case is remanded for the
entry of a judgment of acquittal and a dismissal of the charge.
Dated this

/

<2

day of June 2018.

Senior District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
vs.

Plaintiff,

AARON EUGENE LANTIS,
Defendant.
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Case No. CR01-17-07609
STATE’S OBJECTION TO
DISMISSAL AND MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT

COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State of
Idaho, and objects to the entry of acquittal and dismissal of the charge prior to the district court’s
filing of remittitur. The State has 42 days to appeal before remittitur is filed and the decision
becomes final. The State requests that the Court wait for the appeal period to pass and for the district
court to finalize its decision before entering a judgment of acquittal and dismissing the charge.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was found guilty of Disturbing the Peace, I.C. § 18-6409, at trial on August
11, 2017. Defendant appealed his conviction to the district court on December 5, 2017. The
district court filed an opinion on June 14, 2018, vacating the conviction and remanding the case
for acquittal and dismissal of the charge. The district court has not yet filed a remittitur. At a
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review hearing on June 28, 2018, the State requested more time to determine whether to appeal
the decision of the district court.
II. ARGUMENT
The State objects to the entry of acquittal and dismissal of the charge prior to the district
court’s filing of remittitur because the appeal period has not passed and the appellate decision is
not yet final. The State may appeal a decision by the district court on criminal appeals from a
magistrate as a matter of right. See I.A.R. 11. An appeal from the district court must be made
within 42 days of the entry of the order. I.A.R.14. Idaho Criminal Rule 54, outlining procedure
for appeals from the magistrate court to the district court, states:
“If no appeal to the Supreme Court is filed within 42 days after the clerk files the
appellate decision, the clerk must issue and file a remittitur with the magistrate
court....The remittitur must advise the magistrate judge that the decision has
become final and that the magistrate must immediately comply with the directive
of the decision.”
I.C.R. 54(r)(1)(A).
In the present case, the 42-day appeal period runs from June 14, 2018, through July 25,
2018. The State is in the process of screening the case for further appeal and is provided 42 days
to do so under Idaho Appellate and Criminal Rules. Therefore, the district court has not yet filed
a remittitur finalizing the case. The Court should not enter the acquittal and dismiss the case until
the appeal period runs and the district court finalizes its opinion by the filing of a remittitur.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State objects to the entry of an acquittal and the dismissal of
the charge at this time. The State respectfully requests that the Court wait for the district court to file
a remittitur after the appropriate appeal period before the Court carries out the district court’s
instructions.
DATED this 2nd day of July 2018.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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By: D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

STATE OF IDAHO,

) District Court Case No. CROl-17-7609
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

Supreme Court No.

)

v.

) NOTICE OF APPEAL

AARON LANTIS,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)

TO: AARON LANTIS, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, ANITA MARIE
ELIZABETH MOORE, ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, 200 W. FRONT
ST., RM. 1107, BOISE, ID 83702 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the above-named

respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the OPINION ON APPEAL, entered in the aboveentitled action on the 14th day of June, 2018, the Honorable Gerald F. Schroeder presiding. A
copy of the order being appealed is attached to this notice.

NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 1

000233

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rule 11(c)(10), I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district court erred on

intermediate appeal by reversing the jury's verdict of guilt for disturbing the peace.
4.

To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been sealed. However,

State's Exhibits 3-6, admitted at trial, are of a sensitive nature. The State requests that these
photographs be sealed in the appellate record.
5.

The appellant does not request the preparation of a reporter's transcript:

The State believes that a transcript, including the 8111/17 trial and the 10/31/17 hearing
on the motion to dismiss, was prepared for the appeal to the district court. The State requests
that this transcript be included in the record as an exhibit.
6.

Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R.

7.

I ce1iify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the email address set out below:
DAYSHA ZUBER
dzuber@adaweb.net
VANESSA STARR
vgosney@adaweb.net
(b)

That arrangements have been made with the Ada County Prosecuting

Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript;
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record because the State ofldaho is the appellant (Idaho Code § 31-3212);
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(d)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal

case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8));
(e)

That service is being made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2018 .

Deputy Attorney Gener
Attorney for the Appellant
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DAVID G. SWENSON
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR01-17-7609
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

OPINION ON APPEAL

AARON LANTIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: ANITA MOORE
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: GARRETT SWENSON

I. NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant appeals his conviction of Disturbing the Peace following a jury triaL
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Appellant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of disturbing the peace in
violation of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state alleged that he committed the crime by
sending sexually suggestive pictures of the alleged victim, Hillary Henslee, to her employers
in an attempt to have her fired from her job. A jury found him guilty. He made pre- and postverdict motions under Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. They were denied.
This appeal followed.
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Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The appellant asserts the following issues: (1) the conduct complained of falls outside
the purview of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code; and, (2) if the conduct complained of does fall within
the purview of§ 18-6409, the statute is void for vagueness and overbroad.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a
trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v.
Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or
statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State

v. Miller, 134 Idaho

458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000).
V. ANALYSIS
The appellant contends the magistrate erred in failing to grant his Rule 29 and Rule
48 motions because the conduct he was charged with and convicted of committing does not
constitute disturbing the peace, as set forth in the Idaho Code.
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) provides that the trial court on motion of the
defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of
one or more charged offenses after the evidence on either side is closed if the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The
test applied when reviewing the ... court's ruling on a motion for judgment of
acquittal is to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged. State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 186
P.3d 670, 674 (Ct. App. 2008).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence where a judgment of conviction
has been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the
jury's guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We do
not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
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drawn from the evidence. Moreover, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. /d.
"This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal
action for an abuse of discretion." When a trial court's discretionary decision is
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Johnston, 2016 WL 1569522, *2 (ld.
Ct. App.) (citing State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778, 275 P.3d 1,
4 (Ct. App. 2012): State v. Hodges, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333
(1989).
However, an appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and the
application and construction of statutes.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction.
The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for
the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. State
v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 968-69, 318 P.3d 955, 958-59 (Ct. App. 2014).
(citations omitted).
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the
context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole,
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should
be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the
statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory
language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body
must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67, 264 P.3d 970, 973-74
(2011) (emphasis added). See also Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho
Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 108 P.3d 370, 373 (2005) ('It is
a cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be
given meaning. We will construe a statute, "so that effect is given to its
provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant.") (citations
omitted).
·
Courts must construe statutes "under the assumption that the legislature knew
of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was
passed." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145,
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150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho
214, 218, 254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011).
We assume that the legislature knew of other statutes in existence at the time
a given statute was passed, particularly statutes of a similar concern. State v.
Betterton, 127 Idaho 562, 563, 903 P.2d 151, 152 (Ct. App. 1995). In
deference to legislative expertise, we therefore decline to presume a
redundancy between entire statutes. Rather, statutes in pari materia (relating to
the same subject) are construed as complementary and cohesive. State v.
Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782, 786 (2002). State v. Folsom, 139
Idaho 627, 630, 84 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2003).
The defendant was convicted of Disturbing the Peace, which is found within Chapter
64 of Title 18 of the Idaho Code, and which is entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful Assembly, Prize
Fighting, Disturbing Peace."
Idaho Code § 18-6409 ("Disturbing the Peace.") provides:
(1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of
any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by
tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar,
profane or indecent language 1 within the presence or hearing of children, in
a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the dignity or
reverential nature of any funeral, memorial service, funeral procession,
burial ceremony or viewing of a deceased person is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
The appellant was charged and convicted pursuant to the "offensive conduct'' portion
of the statute. He argued before the magistrate and argues on appeal that his conduct does
not constitute a violation of Idaho's disturbing the peace statute.
The evidence presented at trial was that the appellant and the victim were previously
in a relationship. During this relationship the victim sent the appellant, then her boyfriend,
1

But see State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 901, 88 P.3d 704, 720 (2004} ("Considering these decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, we are constrained to hold that the third part of Idaho Code § 18-6409 is
unconstitutional because as written it criminalizes speech that is protected by the First Amendment, and we
therefore strike that portion of the statute."}.
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"sexually provocative" photographs she had taken of herself. See Jury Trial Transcript, at 5257. After their relationship ended, the appellant emailed four of these photos to the victim's
workplace, including to her supervisor and members of the company's board of directors, in
an unsuccessful effort to have her fired from her job. See id. at 81-87. The victim testified
that the appellant's conduct "humiliated" and "annoyed" her. See id. at 56, 79.
Reading the Disturbing the Peace statute in its entirety, as required, this conduct,
however reprehensible it is, does not constitute a violation of the statute. The statute clearly
and plainly prohibits disturbing, for lack of a better term, the "exterior" or "sensory" peace of a
neighborhood, family, or person. It does not prohibit offending someone's "internal"
sensibilities by sending an email to them or to their co-workers, as occurred here. It does not
prohibit embarrassing someone by sending an offensive electronic communication. This is
demonstrated by the placement of the statute in the chapter entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful
Assembly, Prize Fighting, Disturbing Peace," (see State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 445, 362
P.3d 514, 520 (2015) (Idaho Supreme Court relied on the context of the placement of the
statute in the code in construing the statute)), as well as the related terms of the statute
requiring that the disturbing the peace conduct include loud or unusual noise, gun fire,
challenging someone to a fight, loudness or boisterousness, or tumultuous conduct.
Rioting requires physical injury, damage or destruction to public or private property, or
a disturbance of the public peace. I. C. § 18-6401.
Unlawful assembly requires two or more persons assembled to perform an unlawful
act or the doing of a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous manner. I. C.§ 18-6404.
The words "offensive conduct" cannot properly be removed from the context of the
statute and applied to the appellant's conduct to make it a crime. Looking at the words
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preceding it, the conduct that is deemed "offensive" would need to be similar to "tumultuous" 2
conduct, which is defined as "marked by tumult: loud, excited, and emotional." Support for
this view is found, as the appellant argues, in a recent decision of the Idaho Court of
Appeals: State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661, 365 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2016). The Idaho Court of
Appeals stated "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that Pierce
engaged in acts constituting disturbing the peace, as prohibited by I.C. § 18-6409." 159
Idaho at 663, 365 P.3d at 419. The Court of Appeals noted "[i]n Idaho, the prohibited conduct
constituting disturbing the peace is defined by statute. In I.C. § 18-6409 as quoted above,
the legislature of Idaho has provided guidance regarding specific conduct that constitutes
disturbing the peace. It is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that
Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within the meaning of I.C. § 186409." 159 Idaho at 664, 365 P.3d at 420.
The conduct that resulted in Mr. Pierce, who was in litigation with his ex-wife "over
issues related to their divorce," being charged and found guilty, by a jury, of disturbing the
peace was that he "called the electrical power company to terminate service," to the house
(which was Mr. Pierce's separate property) where she and her children, who were not his
biological children, "continued to live in the house without Pierce." 159 Idaho at 662, 365
P.3d at 418. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court which vacated
the Judgment of Conviction entered in the magistrate court. The district court decision gave
the following analysis concerning disruption of power service to the house.

2

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tumultuous
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This disruption in electrical service to the house:
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did
not treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until
sometime the next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen
foods were lost, and the protected party and her children had to impose upon
friends for lodging for the several days until the power was turned back on.
This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace"
with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in
question should be deemed legal. I conclude this to be error. Memorandum
Decision (CR-2013-13285-C), at 8. 3
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the state failed to present evidence supporting a
conviction for disturbing the peace for conduct that was clearly offensive but outside the
statutory definition of disturbing the peace. The same reasoning applies to the facts of this
case.
VI. THE VOID FOR VAGUE ARGUMENT
The appellant also asserts a void for vagueness challenge to the statutory term
"offensive conduct," which was relied upon by the State to obtain his conviction for Disturbing
the Peace. This issue was raised before the magistrate in his Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal.
'"It is well established that when a case can be decided upon a ground other than a
constitutional ground, the Court will not address the constitutional issue unless it is
necessary for a determination of the case."' City of Sandpoint v. Independent Highway

District, 161 Idaho 121, 124, 384 P.3d 368, 371 (2016) (citing Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon
River Fruit Co., 1581daho 269,279,346 P.3d 286,296 (2015)).

3

The Court takes judicial notice of this decision. See I.R.E. 201.
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It is not necessary to address the constitutional analysis in this appeal. This Court will
avoid the morass of constitutional hypotheticals in this case in view of the decision on
statutory construction.

VI. CONCLUSION
The conviction for Disturbing the Peace is vacated and this case is remanded for the
entry of a judgment of acquittal and a dismissal of the charge.
Dated this

1 -=) "-- day of June 2018.

~~
GedF.Chroe~
Senior District Judge

e:-
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